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Abstract  
 
This is an inquiry looking into the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) foreign policy post-
2003. Ever since the overthrow of the former Iraqi regime in 2003, the KRG has been locked in 
a series of disputes with Baghdad over the limits of its autonomy. One of the main arguments 
has concerned KRG’s right to develop its hydrocarbon industry autonomously. This issue 
gained prominence particularly following the discovery of vast oil and gas resources in the 
Kurdistan Region. Understanding the benefits associated with these findings, the landlocked 
KRG approached Ankara as an alternative route to export its energy resources beyond 
Baghdad’s control. Due to the coincidence of Turkey’s and KRG’s interests, the two stroke up a 
Baghdad-defying partnership, resulting in what can be seen a noteworthy step for the KRG 
towards the realization of what it has been for long aspiring: economic independency. 
 
I have examined the unfolding of these events through a strategic-relational analysis (SRA) of 
KRG’s foreign policy strategies interacting with the strategic selectivities of their environment. 
The SRA was initially developed by Bob Jessop, who viewed reality as the product of contingent 
necessity: particular spatio-temporal intersections of strategies and selectivities producing non-
necessary outcomes. My aim was to trace this path of contingent necessity in KRG’s foreign 
policy. The conducted conceptual analysis resulted in two findings. Firstly, the observed 
changes, both in the level of economic independency the KRG had achieved as well as in its 
relations with Baghdad and Ankara post-2003, were found to be the product of contingent, 
rather than deterministic path-dependency. Secondly, I found that KRG’s agency itself is, also, 
the continuously transforming product of contingent necessity, redefined through the region’s 
relations with other actors. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Introducing the Research Problem and the Theoretical Framework 
 
This inquiry is both empirically and theoretically motivated. My starting point and primary 
concern is with the foreign policy development of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq1 
post-2003, with regard to its aims of securing as much economic independency as possible from 
Baghdad via the development of its hydrocarbon industry. In spite of the fact that the KRG is a 
de facto state, the autonomous region can be considered as having external relations of its own, 
independent from those of Baghdad. My objective is to examine the KRG’s deployed foreign 
policy strategies vis-à-vis the federal government of Iraq and the Turkish capital of Ankara. I 
have chosen to study the Baghdad-KRG-Ankara nexus in particular, because it is principally 
within the framework of these relations that the KRG has aimed to reach its objectives. My 
primary interest is located in the process through which the regional government has gradually 
managed to secure its economic independence to the level it has today, at the intersection of a 
complex set of mutually interacting factors. The research is, accordingly, constructed around 
the key question of “How can we explain the foreign policy development of the KRG post-2003?”  
 
The empirical motivation underlying the inquiry initially rose amidst an interest in the recently 
increased cooperation between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government – two actors, 
which had for long been hostile in their mutual relations. Ofra Bengio has portrayed the 
dynamics between Turkey and the KRG, set in motion following the establishment of the no-fly 
zone in 1991 2 , as “schizophrenic”. 3  The relationship can be indeed viewed as rather 
inconsistent and contradictory ever since the creation of the safe haven. On the one hand, a 
Kurdish de facto state right across its southern border had Turkey fearing a domino effect 
                                                        
1 The Kurdistan Region in Iraq is an autonomous de facto state within Iraq. From this point onwards I will refer to 
its leadership with “KRG”. 
2  Natali, 2010, xxiii; 30: In a military operation – “Operation Provide Comfort“ or “Operation Safe Haven”– 
conducted by the US, the UK and some other Gulf War Allies, following the Kurdish uprisings, the Iraqi army and 
its state-apparatus was forced to withdraw from the three Kurdish-populated provinces in Northern Iraq. 
Subsequently, based on the UN Resolution 688, a No-Fly Zone was established in the region by the US, UK and 
France to provide humanitarian relief for the inhabitants of these Kurdish-populated cities and towns. The Kurdish 
leadership in the region established an autonomous zone in the region, developing into what we know today as 
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. 
3 Bengio, December 6th, 2012. 
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causing instability within the country’s own 15 million Kurds. Therefore, up until very recently, 
Ankara had been extremely careful not to encourage – or in fact to halt – the state-building 
process in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. On the other hand, the region constituted a viable trade 
partner for the country. While mutual economic interests were noteworthy in the two decades 
after the establishment of the KRG, they have now gone beyond mere significant following 
major oil and, particularly, gas discoveries made in the Iraqi Kurdistan post-2005, an 
exponentially increased trade between Ankara and the KRG, and Turkey’s growing presence in 
the region through foreign investments. Bengio has, accordingly, claimed that, that “[i]f there is 
one country that has helped build a Kurdish entity in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is Turkey.”4 It was the 
toppling of the Baathist regime in 2003 that set the relationship of the two actors on an entirely 
different path; economic partnership came to evolve into a comprehensive set of multifaceted 
and mutually intermingled political and economic issues, which I am attempting to make sense 
of in this inquiry. At the same time KRG has been struggling amidst continuous disputes with 
the central government of Iraq over the limits of its autonomy, which the increasingly 
improving relations with Turkey are fueling even further. It is, indeed, this Baghdad-KRG-
Ankara nexus where my particular empirical interest is located.  
 
The theoretical motivation of this research lies within an interest in the relationalist approaches 
to social sciences. It is their growing significance in the field that has led me into adopting a 
strategic-relational approach (SRA) 5  to the analysis of KRG’s foreign policy development. 
Relationalist views of social sciences have been indeed gradually developed against the 
background of their substantialist counterparts overwhelmingly dominating the field. At the 
heart of the disagreement between the two has been, where and how to locate relations in 
scientific inquiry. While the latter views relations resulting from the interaction of pre-given 
substances – agents and structures – the former considers them logically preceding and 
constituting entities.6 The SRA is a proponent of the former view. It addresses questions of 
social and political inquiry as the unfolding of dynamic processes instead of static interaction 
between separate, pre-given and black-boxed agents and structures. Let me take a brief look at 
the SRA as a relationalist approach, in order to point out the crucial role it plays in this inquiry.    
                                                        
4 Bengio, December 6th, 2012. 
5  The strategic-relational (SRA) introduced by Bob Jessop, Colin Hay, Stuart MacAnulla and David Marsh is 
developed as an alternative to other – mainly dualistic – relational approaches to social and political inquiry. (Clark 
and Jones 2012, 65.) The SRA will be introduced in detail in Chapter 5.  
6 Emirbayer 1997, 285–288; Jackson and Nexon 1999, 291–293. 
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1.2. Strategic-Relational Model in Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
The conventional tradition in social and political inquiry is to highlight either agents at the 
expense of structures or structures at the expense of agents. Within social sciences, these two 
approaches have come to be known as individualism and structuralism.7 John Dewey and Arthur 
F. Bentley refer to the two understandings as being based on “self-action”.8 Some scholars have 
gone beyond the dichotomy of agents and structures and examined the “inter-action” between 
the two components making up for causal processes in social reality; a good example being 
game-theoretic models.  However, regardless of whether they highlight agents, structures or 
their inter-action, all three understandings have been based on an assumption that entities 
(agents and structures) precede relations. This is what Dewey and Bentley identify as the 
substantialist approach. Transactional or relational approaches, in turn, take relations as their 
starting point; instead of the analysis of constituent entities, they focus on the analysis of 
relations as a dynamic unfolding process, constantly in the making, never finished, always 
organic.9 In the words of Ernst Cassirer:  
 
Things are not assumed as independent existences present anterior to any relation, 
but […] gain their whole being… first in and with the relations, which are 
predicated of them. Such things are terms of relations, and as such, can never be 
given in isolation but only in ideal community with each other.” [italics added]10 
 
The significance of this quote will become apparent when I get to delve deeper into the 
strategic-relational model in Chapter 6. There are a variety of relationalist approaches going all 
the way from the thoughts provided by Pierre Bourdieu to those introduced by Margaret Archer 
and Bob Jessop.11 These approaches, addressed as system theories within this inquiry, will be 
mirrored against the deficiencies of substantialist views to Foreign Policy analysis. In a 
“Manifesto for a Relational Sociology” (1997), Mustafa Emirbayer identifies two major points 
of disagreement among the relationalist tradition; the first one is related to their meta-
                                                        
7 Emirbayer 1997, 285–289. Neorealist theories of balance of power and world system’s theories are a good 
example of the former, whereas rational actor or norm-based models of the latter. 
8 Dewey and Bentley 1949; Emirbayer 1997, 283–288. 
9 Just like sociologists, political analysts are indeed confronted with this problem of whether to make sense of the 
world principally via substances or processes; “static things or in dynamic, unfolding relations”. 
10 Cassirer 1953, 36.  
11 In their examination of relationalist approaches, Jackson and Nexon (1999, 309) recognize Jessop’s perception 
of the state as relational. 
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theoretical assumptions, whereas the second one concerns the way the inter-relationship of 
agents and structures is conceptualized. With regard to the first question Emirbayer 
distinguishes between ontological and methodological relationalism. For instance, the 
ontologically committed critical realism as represented by Roy Bhaskar and Margaret Archer 
epitomizes the former12, whereas the meta-theoretically uncommitted relationalism proposed 
by Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen the latter. In terms of the second question, the manifesto 
separates between dualist and anti-dualist models. 13  The former detaches agents from 
structures either ontologically or methodologically, examining them separately. The latter, in 
turn, relativizes the two components, whose definitions accordingly come to be dependent on 
each other. Archer’s analytical dualism symbolizes the former, whereas Bob Jessop’s and Colin 
Hay’s methodological duality the latter. The two questions are interrelated, but I am more 
concerned with the latter one, since the dualistic and anti-dualistic models generate 
fundamentally distinctive ways of making sense of social reality, in general, and foreign policy 
development, in particular. Suffice it to say at this point that, the anti-dualist relationalism of 
the SRA provides a unique set of conceptual tools to address strategic action in strategically 
selective contexts, which can, in turn, point to some interesting facts about the relationality of 
agents and structures in political reality. 
 
The SRA fundamentally re-formulates understandings of one of the utmost notorious problems 
of social sciences: the agent-structure question indeed. Its unique strategic-relational 
understanding of how social parts (agents) relate to the whole (context) provides the, means to 
not only to overcome structural or agential bias (essentialism or substantialism) in political 
analysis, but also to go beyond the impasse of other dichotomies, such as domestic versus 
international sources of foreign policy, Foreign Policy Analysis versus International Relations 
aka systemic versus unit-level analysis, and naturalist versus interpretivist approaches to 
political inquiry. The capability of the strategic-relational approach to overcome strict 
                                                        
12 Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen (2006, 304) likewise recognize Archer’s approach as ontological relationalism. 
Kivinen and Piiroinen indeed make a distinction between relationalists who ”philosophize sociology” and those 
who ”sociologize philosophy”. While the proponents of the former category argue that knowledge of reality is 
essentially based on ontological commitments, the advocates of the latter denounce the need for any apiori 
metaphysical commitments when conducting scientific research. If one is to follow the this categorization, the SRA 
would be located in the former due to its critical realist approach to social sciences.  
13 In this inquiry, when speaking of dualist models (Archer’s morphogenetic approach), I am referring to analytical 
models, which in their examination of social reality, separate agents from structures, for instance, temporally. 
When talking about anti-dualist models (Bob Jessop’s and Colin Hay’s SRA) I am referring to an analytical model 
relativizing agents and structures instead of examining them separately. 
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dichotomies, especially that of international versus domestic sources and agential versus 
structural explanans of foreign policy, is indispensable for the understanding of KRG’s 
oscillatory foreign policy development over the past ten years. On the one hand, the SRA has 
remarkable potential to capture the KRG’s balancing foreign policies in between the internal 
demands and complex external pressures it is continuously confronted with. On the other hand, 
its analytical duality can accommodate the relationalist idea of reality as a continuous process 
of sequential and interlinked transactions, in which both the KRG and its context – through their 
mutually interdependent relations – become continuously transformed and redefined.  
 
 
1.3. The Plan of the Research  
 
The primary research question can be summed up briefly as: How can we explain the Kurdistan 
Regional Government’s foreign policy development aiming at economic independency through 
autonomous development of its energy sector post-2003? To answer this, I will attempt to 
construct a narrative of the KRG’s foreign policy strategies and their outcomes, using the 
strategic-relational approach as my primary analytical tool.14 This model will present foreign 
policy as a process implicated in the dialectical and relational interplay of three elements: a 
strategically selective context, strategic action and cognitive templates. The research will 
proceed in the following manner.  
 
First, I will introduce the political context of the situation at hand, including a brief overview of 
KRG’s status within Iraq post-2003 and the empirical problem at hand. Not delving too deep 
into the details, because the political dilemma will be further addressed in Chapter 7, I will then 
move on to Chapter 3. This part will focus on the constructivist theorization of de facto states 
mostly via Nina Caspersen’s and Gareth Stansfield’s ideas. The theory makes two interrelated 
assumptions about these theoretical and empirical anomalies of International Relations; their 
policies are claimed to be driven by the idea of statehood and this, in turn, is assumed to have 
resulted in a tendency towards transitory and ambiguous foreign policy behavior. The 
                                                        
14 The SRA is, of course, one among many approaches via which foreign policy change or development can be 
addressed. For instance, Jakob Gustavsson (1999) has outlined six different efforts. Among these are Holsti’s 
foreign policy restructuring, Goldmann’s stabilizers and Carslanes’ diachronic interplay between agents and 
structure – which comes closest to the strategic-relational approach. Gustavsson himself develops a model that 
focuses on the simultaneous occurrence of changes in ”[…] fundamental structural conditions, strategic political 
leadership, and the presence of crisis of some kind” (Gustavsson 1999, 74.) 
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implications of these two hypotheses will become more apparent, when the driving force of 
statehood as an idea, is situated in the strategic-relational model as the “policy paradigm” 
through which KRG formulates its strategies.  
 
In Chapter 4, I will turn to Foreign Policy Analysis as conceptualized by the substantialist 
approaches. The field will be first introduced in general. Subsequently, following Walter 
Carlsnaes, I suggest the domain to be conceptualized not on the basis of the substantive nature 
of foreign policy (the domestic-international divide) as has been generally done, but instead 
from a meta-theoretical perspective (ontology and epistemology), which is “[…] neutral with 
regard to the substance of foreign policy itself.”15  I will discuss the domain via these two 
questions, on the basis of Carlsnaes’ taxonomy of general approaches to foreign policy analysis. 
By doing so, I attempt to demonstrate the dominant role of substantialism within the 
conventional understandings of foreign policy. I will also introduce Carlsnaes’ noteworthy 
tripartite model as an effort to overcome the reductionist positions of holism and individualism.  
 
However, because of the tripartite model’s inability to address foreign policy development 
(which Carlsnaes acknowledges himself as well), as an alternative, I suggest dialectical16 or 
relationalist approaches to the analysis of foreign policy. It is here, in Chapter 5, that I will move 
on to a closer examination of relationalist understandings of social reality via the system 
theories of Anthony Giddens and Margaret Archer. These two relationalist approaches do not 
address reality primarily through agents and structures at the expense of their interactions, 
but, instead, highlight relations as the principal unit of analysis. In doing so, these system 
theories try “[…] to capture social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms”17 . 
Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon have termed this kind of analysis as “processual 
relationalism”.18 I have chosen to focus on Archer’s scientific realism particularly, because her 
                                                        
15 Carlsnaes 2002, 334. 
16 With the dialectical approach I am referring to the ontological and methodological traditions in social theory, 
which recognize the relevance of both agents and structures in the explanation of social action. The dialectical 
approach within the agent-structure debate emerged as a response to the inadequacies of structuralist and 
individualist accounts. The discussion rose initially in sociology but was brought into International Relations by 
Alexander Wendt (1987; 1999), David Dessler (1989) and Walter Carlasnaes (1987, 1992). Their thoughts are 
mostly based on the social theories of Anthony Giddens, Roy Bhaskar and Margaret S. Archer. (Wight 2006, 77.) 
17 Emirbayer 1997, 281. 
18 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292. The division between substantialist and relationalist approaches to social and 
political analysis, in other words, have been also acknowledged within International Relations. This approach has 
been increasingly recognized in the field and applied particularly to the examination of change in world politics. 
For instance, Nexon’s Struggle For Power in Early Modern Europe (2009) adopts a relational view to the 
theorization of international change.  
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morphogenetic model – a dualist relational approach – has been suggested to be applied to the 
analysis of foreign change by Walter Carlsnaes. Other scholars such as Elisabetta Brighi have, 
in turn, seen the anti-dualist SRA providing a better account of foreign policy development. The 
morphogenetic model and the SRA, thus, represent two more or less competitive versions of 
relationalism (dualism versus duality) that I want to examine here; in order to understand the 
implications of their differences on empirical research, I will have to introduce both. 
Accordingly, Chapter 5.4. “Archer’s Morphogenetic Model meets Carlsnaes’ Tripartite Model” 
will delve deeper into Carlsnaes’ suggestion of applying Archer’s model. This will be followed 
by Chapter 6, which will then mirror the SRA against Archer’s dualism, and finally move onto a 
closer examination of the SRA as applied to foreign policy analysis. In Chapter 7 the strategic-
relational approach will be applied to the analysis of the foreign policy development of the KRG 
post-2003. The narrative will be partly constructed on the basis of Caspersen’s assumptions of 
unrecognized states’ quest for statehood and their tendency towards ambiguous and transitory 
foreign policy conduct. By locating these postulations in the strategic-relational model, I 
attempt to demonstrate the dynamics of the relations between context, action and ideas that are 
responsible for this presumed ambiguity or schizophrenia, as Bengio may call it. Finally, in 
Chapter 8, I will summarize the empirical and theoretical conclusions of the study. Through this 
analysis I will attempt to bring out interesting features of the oscillating foreign policy behavior 
of the KRG as the product of the unique spatio-temporal intersections of strategic action, 
strategically selective context and cognitive templates. It remains to be seen, also, whether the 
developments seen on ground can be conceived of as implying KRG’s permanent alienation 
from Baghdad or mere ambiguous balancing in between Ankara and Baghdad as Caspersen’s 
and Stansfield’s thoughts would appear to suggest.19  
 
CHAPTER 2: THE KURDISTAN REGION IN IRAQ AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR LIMITS OF AUTONOMY  
 
2.1. The Kurdistan Region in Iraq  
 
                                                        
19 Natali, February 28th, 2014. 
8 
 
Because of the lack of time and space, I will only provide a brief background of the Kurdish 
question in Iraq. The Kurds indeed comprise the largest nation in the world without a state of 
their own; estimations vary in between 35–40 million living across Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and 
elsewhere in the world (a diaspora of a couple of million Kurds). The Kurdistan Region in Iraq 
is an autonomous entity recognized by the Iraqi Constitution as a federal state.20 It comprises 
the three governorates of Erbil (the capital), Suleymaniya and Dohuk. The governing 
institutions of the Kurdistan Region – its presidency, parliament and the government are all 
acknowledged likewise. The limits and scope of the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis 
the federal entities are outlined in the Constitution, albeit its interpretations have raised a vast 
array of disputes.  
 
The KRG has been autonomous ever since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurdish uprising, 
and the imposition of a no-fly zone to protect the area from the Iraqi regime’s retaliatory 
attacks. 21 However, following the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the KRG managed to secure a 
constitutional recognition to its status. On the one hand, examining the Kurdistan Region as a 
de facto state may be considered more or less problematic in the light of its recognized position 
within Iraq. On the other hand, based on the long history of the Kurdish struggle for 
independence, their status approximates that of Catalonia in Spain rather than California in the 
United States. I will however, leave this question open at this point, for as we will come to see, 
there is no one definition that can incorporate all de facto states in the world within itself. 
 
Kurds are often said to have “no friends but the mountains”.22 If one is to examine their history 
in general, and that of the Kurds in Iraq, in particular, fluctuation between cooperation and 
conflict with the four surrounding ‘parent states’ has been a general phenomenon throughout 
the nation’s past. For instance, there seems to always have been a trade-off of some sort in 
between cooperation with Baghdad and Tehran. This is also why the Kurdish leadership’s 
policies have been generally conceived of as mere functionalist response to regional balancing 
games. The general assumptions made about de facto states’ oscillatory external relations 
appear to ring true in the case of the KRG as well. Their pursuit of statehood and transitory 
foreign policies become apparent, for instance, in Yaniv Voller’s extensive study on the 
                                                        
20 The Iraqi Constitution. 
21 Natali, 2010, xxiii; 30.  
22 Park 2014, 44. 
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emergence of the nationalist Kurdish movement in Iraq starting from 1958, and its gradual 
development into a de facto state in the 1990s.23 I am, indeed, also interested in examining 
whether this balancing game is evident in the region’s external relations post-2003.   
 
There are two major political parties within the KRG, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The two have been in charge of the autonomous 
region’s politics and economy over the past decades. However, ever since 2009, an opposition 
party Change (Goran) has managed to get an increasing number of supporters, particularly 
within the governorate of Suleymanyia, and succeeded in overriding the PUK in recent 
elections. In spite of the fact that the iron grip of the PUK and KDP has been challenged by the 
opposition, de facto power at the moment is exercised by the KDP and the PUK, albeit by the 
latter ever more decreasingly. The inter-relationship of the two parties has always been 
problematic for a variety of reasons that I unfortunately cannot address in this research 
thoroughly. Nevertheless, one can mention, for instance, disputes over power-sharing and 
economic matters – which also led to a bloody civil war in the 1990s – and external efforts 
(mainly Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara) trying to maintain a division within the Kurdish 
leadership in Iraq to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdistan in the Middle East. 
The relations of the two parties have, however, improved significantly especially after the fall 
of the previous regime. Ever since then, the PUK and KDP have been working together within 
the KRG under the ‘strategic partnership’ conveyed in 2003. Nevertheless, a level of tension still 
remains and there are multiple traces of previous division still observable in their current 
interrelationship.  For instance, while Dohuk and Erbil are clearly under the control of the KDP, 
Suleymaniya (and Kirkuk) are PUK’s strongholds. This is, indeed, how the two parties have 
shared power since the 1990s. Nowadays, with the decreasing influence of the PUK and the 
success of Goran in the recent elections, the former’s hold on Sulaymania seems to be loosening, 
not to even mention its diminishing power vis-à-vis the KDP.  
 
With regard to KRG’s foreign policies, there appears to be a division of labor within the 
leadership of the region: while the PUK has traditionally held the balance in the eastern borders 
                                                        
23 In his recently published PhD thesis “From Rebellion to De Facto Statehood: International and Transnational 
Sources of the Transformation of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement in Iraq into the Kurdistan Regional 
Government”, Yaniv Voller indeed constructs a narrative of KRG’s internal development and external relations 
mainly via the constructivist theorization of Caspersen and Stansfield. 
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of Iraqi Kurdistan (Iran) due to the proximity of its strongholds (Sulaymaniya and Kirkuk) to 
Iran; the KDP has done the job along the northern borders of Kurdistan (Dohuk and Erbil) closer 
to Turkey.24 This division within the KRG points us towards the assumption of the fluctuating 
and schizophrenic nature of de facto states’ external relations; the PUK maintains good 
relations between the KRG and its eastern neighbor (and Baghdad), while the KDP takes care 
of the relations with Ankara. At the same time, both parties work within the same government. 
As a result, we have a more or less ambiguous foreign policy behavior. 
 
In other words, there are two ways to make sense of the relationship between the PUK and the 
KDP at the moment. On the one hand, the division of labor can be perceived of as epitomizing 
the difficult balancing game that de facto states have to face; PUK is trying to keep Baghdad and 
Iran happy while the KDP is keeping Ankara content. As such, their relationship can then be 
considered a silent agreement to limit external powers’ influence on the Kurdistan region. 
Another way to capture the dynamics between the PUK and KDP would be through the 
examination of their relations as intra-Kurdish rivalry; the two parties really disagree – not only 
‘pretend’ to disagree in order to keep Ankara, Baghdad and Iran content – on some issues. While 
one’s interest is with Iran and Baghdad, the other’s is with Ankara. Either way, only rough 
speculations can be made about how things really are in between the KDP and the PUK. The 
most likely interpretation would be that their relationship is characterized by both pretend and 
real disagreement.  
 
Examining this seemingly division of labor within the KRG comprehensively would perhaps 
provide us with a better account of the balancing game the PUK and KDP are enforced to play. 
However, this inquiry is interested in the Baghdad-KRG-Ankara connection only with regard to 
the leadership’s efforts aiming at economic independence via independent energy policies. And 
since this quarrel primarily concerns the Baghdad-KRG-Turkish nexus (rather than Teheran-
KRG-Baghdad), the relations examined will be considered involving principally the KDP. It is 
for this reason that, when referring to the regional government’s relations with Baghdad and 
Turkey, I will necessarily be pointing towards the KDP’s relations with the two capitals. 
Although the PUK is also in good terms with Turkey, KRG’s defiant energy policies can be 
considered as being principally brought about by the KDP rather than the PUK. Once again, the 
                                                        
24 Park 2014, 8; 56–67. Park does not talk of a division of labor, but merely points to the PUK’s orientation towards 
Iran and KDP’s towards Turkey.  
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PUK tends to be more accommodating towards both Tehran and Baghdad – at least in 
appearance – than the KDP. The party has also expressed its concerns over Masoud Barzani’s25 
relations with the Turkish Premier. Just like Goran, the PUK has called for the 
institutionalization of the cooperation between the KRG and Turkey, seeing it now 
approximating personal deals between Barzani and Erdogan rather than inter-governmental 
collaboration.  
 
 
2.2. Natural Resources, Identity and Conflict 
 
One of the most important issues over which the Kurdistan Regional Government and the 
central government in Iraq have quarreled has involved the limits of federalism in questions 
relating to oil and gas. At the heart of the dispute between the two at the moment is power over 
how and by whom hydrocarbon resources are managed; KRG demands to sign oil contracts 
independently, and has done so up until now, while the Iraqi Oil Ministry and central 
government claim this to be illegal, and have taken a variety of measures against the Kurdistan 
Region over the past few years. The details of the conflict will be put under closer scrutiny in 
Chapter 7. Suffice to say at this point that, since the end of 2012 the Kurdistan Regional 
Government and the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad have been locked in a complex web 
of disputes, climaxing recently in the KRG signing a contract with Turkey to export its oil via 
the newly constructed KRG-Ceyhan pipeline26 and the subsequent selling of the oil without the 
approval of Baghdad in late May, 2014.27 The deal came as the last straw for Baghdad, who cut 
off the autonomous region from its share of the national budget as a retaliatory measure 
following the start of oil exports earlier this year. The wages of the public sector were put on 
hold in what was called “a declaration of war on the people of Kurdistan” by KRG’s president 
Masud Barzani. 28  The dispute has not been settled up until the time this research was 
completed. Iraq has filed a case against Turkey in the International Chamber of Commerce in 
an attempt to stop the oil exports while the Kurdish leadership has publicly dismissed Iraqi 
threats as illegitimate.29 However, it seems likely that the KRG and the central government will 
                                                        
25 Masoud Barzani is the Kurdistan Regional Government’s President.  
26 Lee, November 13th, 2013: The pipeline was built in a multi-billion agreement between the KRG and Turkey. 
Another deal has also been made between the two for the construction of a second pipeline in order to increase 
KRG’s export capacity.  
27 Washington Post, May 23rd, 2014. 
28 Natali, February 28th, 2014; Rudaw, March, 3rd, 2014.   
29 See, for instance: Coles, May 25th, 2014 and Arab News, May 24th, 2014.  
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sooner or later achieve a compromise of some kind. Following the recent elections in Iraq, 
Maliki needs an ally to form a coalition government, which will guarantee his grip on power for 
the next four years.30 The Kurds seem like the most likely route to achieve this aim at the 
moment. Chances are, indeed, that the tensions are put on hold for another four years. Maliki 
turns the other cheek at KRG’s unilateral policies while the KRG supports the shite Prime 
Minister for his third term.31 Nevertheless, it is difficult to make any projections at this point, 
particularly following the recent surge of the jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
in the country. Changes are occurring rapidly as Iraq descends into somewhat of a chaos, while 
the KRG’s chances for independence appear to be boosted by the events.32 
 
The quarrel depicted above is by no means first of its kind when looking at the relationship 
between Baghdad and Erbil for the past ten years since the toppling of the Baathist regime. 
Even though the integrity of Iraq has been maintained post-2003, the KRG has continuously 
stressed, that the preservation of the Iraqi state is based on a voluntary commitment by Arabs 
and Kurds to maintain the country united.33 Were the central government not to respect this, 
there would be nothing stopping the KRG from taking a path of its own. Over the past ten years, 
the leadership of the KRG has been trying to further its economic independence from Baghdad, 
in order to loosen the capital’s tight hold on the region with regard to economic issues. At the 
same time Baghdad has used this dependence as a political card of pressure, indeed, with which 
it has been able to confront Barzani’s increasing threats of declaring independence.34    
 
A brief elaboration on the importance of oil and gas resources to Iraq, in general, and the 
Kurdistan Region, in particular, is warranted here.35 Incomes generated by oil exports amount 
to over 90 percent of the Iraqi budget. This number will most likely increase in the following 
years. Moreover, oil is the principal source of foreign investment in the country.36 According to 
                                                        
30 The Guardian, May 19th, 2014.  
31 Natali, May 29th, 2014.  
32 For more see: Naylor, June 15th 2014. 
33 Voller 2013, 70. In the writing of the constitution the KRG, managed to secure an extensive amount of autonomy 
for itself vis-a-vis the federal government.  
34 Barzani has indeed continuously threatened that were it the case that Baghdad pushed the KRG too far, the 
autonomous region would not hesitate to go ahead and declare independence. For more see for instance, Parker 
and Coles, May 13th, 2014.   
35 With regard to the KRG, the questions of oil and gas are tightly linked to those of sovereignty and identity and 
should be, as such, viewed from the perspective of its state-building process. For the Iraqi government, on the 
other hand, the question is more about the maintenance of the territorial integrity and ensuring internal 
sovereignty. This will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 7. 
36 Alkadiri 2010, 1319–1320. 
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a varying number of estimations the Kurdistan Region sits on somewhere in between roughly 
30-60 billion barrels of oil reserves and 22 trillion cubic feet of gas. These resources have been 
gradually discovered by international companies over the ten past years, starting in 2005, but 
especially in between 2007-2008.37 Although the findings amount to a tenth of Iraq’s total 
reserves, the number is significant when looking at the Kurdistan Region’s population of only 5 
to 6 millions, and the revenues these resources are expected to generate for the KRG, almost 
tripling it by 2020.38 According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, Iraq ranks 
in fifth in proven oil reserves of the world; if the autonomous region of Kurdistan were a 
country (excluding the disputed territories), it would, according to these numbers, rank in 10th 
in the world.39   
 
The significance of oil and gas resources to Kurdistan, in particular, is the economic 
independence they can secure for the region, unleashing it from dependence on Baghdad’s 
budget allocation. This, however, requires the revenues of the oil sales to be directly paid to the 
KRG, and not rerouted to it via the federal government. As long as Baghdad has a hold on these 
revenues, declaration of independence will become a risky move not necessarily worth making. 
At the moment Baghdad has indeed consented to the exportation of oil and gas via the newly 
constructed pipeline from the Kurdish fields, as long as the trade goes through SOMO40 and the 
revenues directly to Development Fund for Iraq41. KRG, in turn demands that its share – the 17 
percent guaranteed in the Iraqi Constitution – is directed straight to the Central Bank of the 
KRG, with no redirecting via the central government. 
 
CHAPTER 3: DE FACTO STATES’ QUEST FOR STATEHOOD 
 
                                                        
37 The Oslo-based DNO was the first exploration firm to enter the Kurdistan Region in 2004 (Swint, June 12th 
2014.) International giants such as ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and Gazprom have followed since then.  
38 Mills 2013, 51–52. 
39 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 
40 The State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) is a national company responsible for the marketing of Iraqi oil 
through export-terminals such as those of Basrah and Ceyhan. The company also covers the domestic consumption 
oil products. For more information, see SOMO (Oil Marketing Company). 
41 Development Fund for Iraq was created on the basis of ending the economic sanctions against the country with 
the Security Council Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003. The Fund is under the control of the central government 
in Iraq and it administers accrued revenues of the exports of Iraq’s oil and gas and, for instance, also repatriated 
national assets seized from the previous regime.  (SWFI.)  
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3.1. De Facto States in International Relations Theory 
 
Over the past two decades there has been an increasing amount of literature on de facto states, 
which have generally been perceived of as anomalies, the black holes, anarchic badlands, 
puppets of external patrons and most importantly, sources of instability. Despite a growing 
number of literature on these ambiguous entities, they still constitute the weird-ones-out in the 
Westphalian state system42, generally perceived of being either the proxies or the pawns of 
sovereign states. Recently, however, with the emergence of a number of de facto states 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, more attention has been paid to 
these anomalies of International Relations. There are not many examples of de facto states in 
the international community; in fact, the most prominent scholars have agreed on 
approximately twenty, among which Nagorno-Karabakh, Taiwan and Transnistria are good 
examples.43 The Kurdistan Region in Iraq has been, however, somewhat of an exception among 
other de facto states particularly after the recognition of its autonomous status in the Iraqi 
Constitution in 2005; some refer to it as a de facto state whereas others consider it more of a 
state-within a state. Either way, the fact is that, not only have these entities had a noteworthy 
impact on the regional dynamics in the past, but they will continue to play a significant 
geopolitical, economic and political role in the future of these regions as well.44 This, in turn, 
downplays the arguments claiming the irrelevance of examining a phenomenon, which is more 
or less marginal in International Relations. In fact, as we will come to see in this inquiry, 
studying de facto states and the policies of their leaderships leads us to a better understanding 
of the constantly changing nature of sovereignty and statehood. 
 
The Kurdistan Region is often considered an anomaly due to the inability of International 
Relations theories and different approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis to deliver an 
unambiguous account of its existence. It is viewed as an entity that dwells on the terrains of 
ambiguity and obscurity. This failure to capture existence beyond the narrow conceptions of 
sovereignty and statehood in the Westphalian system has enhanced prejudice towards regions 
                                                        
42 Caspersen 2012, 18, 27; Huntington 1972, vii: Ever since the establishment of the states system as we know it, 
and particularly after the 19th century, statehood required more than mere de facto control of a particular 
territory; recognition by existing states became a necessity for international personality. Following this, in the 
words of Samuel Huntington, ”[…] bias against political divorce, that is secession” became “just about as strong as 
the nineteenth century bias against marital divorce”. 
43 Voller 2012, 8: Scholars such as Scott Pegg, Pål Kolstø, Nina Caspersen are among those identifying such cases 
as de facto, contested or unrecognized states.  
44 Ibid., 9. 
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like Kurdistan as mysterious black holes in the state of limbo – among us yet not a one of us, 
inside yet still outside – included only through their exclusion, as Giorgio Agamben would 
argue.45 The situation doesn’t get any better when looking at the empirical facts on the ground. 
The KRG is in control of its territory, has external relations independent from Baghdad and 
perhaps more cards to play than most of what can be called ‘weaker’ countries in the 
international system. Yet other actors – from states to international organisations and non-
governmental organizations, do not really seem to know how to interact or perceive of this 
autonomous region in a coherent manner. Some have extended their cooperation beyond limits 
imaginable ten years back from now, while others are still rather suspicious with regard to 
interaction with these anomalies past their ‘parent states’. As Dov Lynch has argued: “[…] 
current international approaches lack coordination and strategy, work against each other and 
sustain status quo”.46 There seems to be, indeed, some sort of reciprocal schizophrenia when it 
comes to the relationship of de facto entities and the international community both empirically 
and theoretically. Neither the concept in theory nor the empirical facts on the ground seem to 
be established, institutionalized or tangible enough for interaction between the two be 
prominently made sense of.  
 
When it comes to theoretical accounts concerning de facto states, the issue has been viewed 
from two different perspectives. On the one hand, there is a group of studies focused on a 
system-level examination, which utilizes such entities in the investigation of the international 
states-system. Among the most significant examples are Scott Pegg’s International Society and 
the De Facto State (1998) and Deon Geldenhuys’ Contested States in World Politics (2009).47 On 
the other hand, there is another tradition centered on examination of the domestic dynamics 
and external relations of de facto states. Within this latter tradition de facto states’ identities are 
put under careful scrutiny in an attempt to theorize the link between such entities’ internal 
development and foreign policies. The most significant efforts aiming at this particular kind of 
                                                        
45 Giorgio Agamben (1998) is focused on the relationship between the individual and sovereignty. At the heart of 
his post-modern approach is inclusion through exclusion; an inside can only created by excluding something from 
it. Sovereignty necessitates the exclusion of some forms of life in order to create an ideal inside. While Agamben’s 
theory does not elaborate on de facto statehood, his thoughts on inclusive exclusion may generate interesting 
insights on how the Westphalian system of sovereign states necessitates the exclusion of other forms of political 
organization.   
46 Lynch 2004, 10.  
47 Pal Kolstø’s “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-states” (2006) also deserves mentioning. 
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theoretical understanding include those of Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield. 48  The 
theoretical postulations of the two will come to play a significant part of this inquiry.  
 
 
3.2. The De Facto State as a Concept 
 
In his extensive study on the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq, Yaniv Voller, defines 
the de facto state as a “[…] political entity whose leadership has wide autonomy in both its 
domestic and foreign policies, has established institutions that usually characterize 
independent states, and which perceives itself as deserving full legal and institutional 
independence”.49 Scott Pegg, has in turn defined them as “[…] those separatist entities that have 
gained autonomy and been successful in the processes of state-building, but failed in securing 
international legitimacy”.50 To be more precise, according to him a de facto state is an, 
 
“[O]rganized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree 
of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient 
capacity to provide government services to a given population in a specific 
territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period 
of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with 
other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread 
international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, unable to achieve any 
degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of 
international society.”51 
 
 
Geldenhuys, disagrees with Pegg. According to him de facto states cannot be considered entirely 
illegitimate in the first place as Pegg’s definition seems to assume, because through trade, 
international aid and other channels, they are in constant interaction with the international 
society. 52  These entities, indeed, control their territories, participate in the international 
economy and cooperate with other states, a good example being the KRG. However, and this is 
important to note, since de facto states do not enjoy the protection brought with norms of non-
intervention, according to Caspersen, they can be depicted as existing within a Hobbesian 
rather than a Kantian or a Lockean world: self-reliance, especially militarily, is an integral part 
                                                        
48 Caspersen, 2012; Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011. 
49 Voller 2012, 1. 
50 Pegg 1998, 13. 
51 ibid. 
52 Geldenhuys 2009, 26–28. 
17 
 
of their existence.53  
 
It is somewhat difficult to locate the Kurdistan Region in Iraq within any of these 
categorizations, particularly in Pegg’s, since KRG has not declared independence from Baghdad. 
De facto entities, which have not declared formal independence but, however, function “[…] as 
independent entities and display aspirations for independence”54 – such as the KRG – have not 
been for instance, included in Caspersen’s list of de facto entities. Such entities are perceived of 
as “incremental secessions” instead. 55 Caspersen attributes the decision to exclude de facto 
states, which have not declared independence, from her examination to the simple fact that 
their status is recognized and accepted by the parent state and, therefore, they do not face 
external threat. It is however questionable whether one can claim that the KRG is not facing 
external threat because of a mere fact that the Iraqi constitution has recognized its autonomous 
status. Pegg, who initially also excluded such entities from his definition of de facto statehood, 
has however, argued later for their inclusion. It is indeed important to note that in spite of 
formal declaration of independence these de facto states face similar challenges and function 
both internally and in their foreign policies – to a great extent – like entities, which have 
declared formal independence, but yet remain unrecognized.56 This is why Caspersen, albeit 
not examining the Kurdistan Region as one of her examples, still refers to it, in order to 
demonstrate some of her hypotheses. Either way, the Kurdistan Region in Iraq poses a 
challenge to all the definitions given to de facto statehood, and this is mainly because the nature 
of its existence is in a constant state of flux and transformation. In fact, any effort aiming to find 
a set of inherent elements that define actors such as the KRG and their behavior, are doomed to 
fail because, as we will come to see in this inquiry, agency is constantly transformed and 
reproduced in action. 
                                                        
53 Caspersen, 2012, 8.  
54 Ibid., 9. 
55 Alexis Heraclides (1991, 1) has defined incremental secession as ”[…] political activity of a violent or non-violent 
nature, which is aimed at independence or some form of self-rule short of independence from autonomy to a loose 
binational or multi-state federal system”. There is no formal declaration of independence, which makes secession 
a process rather than an outcome. Caspersen lists the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as an incremental secession up until 
it gained recognition from Baghdad in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.  
56 Caspersen 2012, 9–10. 
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3.3. The Act of Balancing – Schizophrenia as a Peculiarity of De Facto 
States?   
 
Barry Bartmann and Nina Caspersen argue that de facto states are inflicted with a legitimacy 
crisis, which is related to their contested sovereignty. What this crisis leads to, is constant self-
justification, which becomes a priority in their foreign policy conduct. The political behavior of 
the leadership of such entities can, therefore, be understood as a constant pursuit of 
legitimacy.57 Voller argues that the study of de facto states must always be viewed as an inquiry 
on national liberation; most of today’s de facto states have emerged from the separatist goals 
of national liberation movements. Their failure to achieve sovereign statehood and 
development into de facto states, in turn, has resulted from the dynamic relationship of their 
domestic and the international contexts. In fact, he defines de facto states as a “[…] more 
advanced stage of secessionist struggles”.58 It’s a phase in between an armed struggle against 
the parent state and the emergence of an independent state, which may, however, never occur. 
The aim of independence may remain unchanged throughout the transformation but strategies 
change: with the emergence of de facto statehood, state-building becomes the center of 
attention for the leadership instead of armed struggle. The KRG is not the only example of this; 
in most of the de facto state cases, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Sprska and 
Transdniestria armed struggles managed to overthrow the central government in some of their 
claimed territories, following which an administrative vacuum was left to be filled. Out of 
necessity, these movements then had to turn into administrative governments. 59  To cut 
Caspersen’s constructivist story short, one can make sense of the foreign policy behavior of de 
facto states in the following manner. 
 
Non-recognition ought to be taken as the starting point of the examination of these entities for 
two different but interlinked reasons. Firstly, de facto status creates an incentive for national 
liberation movements to engage in state-building. The leaderships of de facto states need to 
build a state – an effective war machine as Charles Tilly has argued – and gain recognition for it 
                                                        
57 Bartmann 2004, 15–16. 
58 Voller 2012, 58. 
59 Ibid., 56–57.  
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in order to survive.60  The issue of survival is more acute for these entities than for sovereign 
states, because de facto states are not protected by the norm of non-intervention.61  What 
building a state means in practice, is the achievement of territorial control and a monopoly on 
violence, provision of public services – in order to preserve internal legitimacy – and the 
building of a nation.62  There are external and internal sources influencing this process. The 
external sources include, for instance, the prevailing normative structure of the international 
system (the hegemonic norms) that sets the frames to what kind of entity is created. The 
requirements of potential parent/patron states also influence the state-building process. 
Internal sources are related to the legitimacy of the leadership in the eyes of its domestic 
constituents. Even if the executives of the region were not in a need of public support and were, 
indeed, driven by greed rather than grievance or collective interest, they still need to provide 
public services and democracy in order to avoid the emigration of the population, which is a 
prerequisite for the maintenance of the de facto state.63  
 
Secondly, and also paradoxically, non-recognition as an idea forms a constraint on this very 
process of state-building as well as the entity’s external relations with the international 
community. The de facto state leadership is indeed caught in between a difficult balancing 
game. Sometimes the two goals of state-building and recognition pull the leadership of these 
entities to different directions. Non-recognition forces them to deal with the constant threat of 
resurrection of war by maintaining a strong defense system. This will be done at the expense 
of democracy and capacity-building in other sectors of the state. The legitimacy of the 
leadership in the eyes of its domestic constituents is compromised here and as a consequence 
the de facto state may be paradoxically weakened.64 What is more, internal legitimacy requires 
the constant selling of the idea of full international recognition in order to keep the domestic 
front united. What, according to this line of theorization, differentiates de facto states from 
sovereign states is, indeed, the fact that their survival is dependent on this delicate balancing 
act. In its foreign policy conduct, the leadership may be satisfied with the status quo and not 
even want to pursue full recognition but “abandoning the goal of recognition may well upset 
                                                        
60 Caspersen 2013, 77. 
61 Voller 2012., 90. 
62 Caspersen 2013, 52–53; 77. 
63 In “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (2004) Hank Collier and Anke Hoeffler have argued that it is greed rather 
than conflict driving conflicts over natural resources.  
64 Ibid., 107. 
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the balance” they need to keep, argues Caspersen.65 Pursuit of statehood as an idea becomes 
essential for the survival of these de facto states. 
 
Caught in this complex balancing act in between different external pressures and internal 
demands, the leadership of these entities are trying to do everything at once, that is, “square 
the circle”.66 It is for this reason that their foreign policy conduct becomes ambiguous and 
transitory.67 Once again, this assumed fluctuating and transitory foreign policy development – 
in pursuit of economic independency from Baghdad – is what I want to examine in this research, 
beginning from the toppling of the Baathist Regime and ending up to the current situation at 
hand. My attempt is to point to the factors that one should direct their attention towards, when 
trying to explain how the KRG has managed to “square the circle” via its foreign policies in the 
energy sector. At the same time it may be also possible to point out how KRG’s agency is 
continuously redefined through its foreign policy relations. I will put these thoughts on hold for 
a brief moment and move on to address foreign policy analysis in general.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS VIA SUBSTANTIALIST 
MODELS 
 
4.1. Foreign Policy as a Unit of Analysis 
 
 
C.F. Hermann defines foreign policy as “[…] a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by 
authoritative policy-makers (or their representatives) directed towards entities outside 
policymakers’ jurisdiction”.68 Kjell Goldmann, Walter Carlsnaes and Kalevi Holsti give wider 
delineations of the sphere, including also the unintended consequences of the deployment of 
these programs. Carlsnaes indeed distinguishes between foreign policy outcomes and foreign 
policy action. He defines the domain, however, also as governmental actions “[…] manifestly 
                                                        
65 Ibid., 115–116.  
66 Ibid., 111. 
67 Ibid., 111–112. 
68 Hermann 1990, 5.  
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directed towards objectives, conditions and actors […] which clearly lie beyond their sphere of 
territorial legitimacy”.69  
 
In spite of these quite simple, yet more or less broad, definitions, foreign policy is indeed an 
ambiguous sphere. It is a field considered to be at the borderline of Political Science, typically 
perceived of as being concerned with unit-level analysis (usually the state), and International 
Relations – traditionally associated with system-level theorizing. 70  It comes, thus, as no 
surprise that FPA has been termed as “No Man’s Land” by Robert B. Farrell. James Rosenau, 
Richard Ashley and David Campbell have also pointed to the peculiarity of this realm in political 
analysis.71 Rosenau for instance, has stated that: 
 
“To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that 
affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under 
certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is 
shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two 
intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the 
other […] Foreign Policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable 
generalizations […] Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory”.72 
 
Foreign policy has, indeed, not been theorized per se, which is why it is conventionally referred 
to as analysis rather than theory.73 In line with this notion, Waltz, for instance argues, that 
theories address the consistent logics of ‘autonomous realms’, which cannot include much, 
unlike analyses. Since foreign policy is driven both by internal and external factors, it cannot be 
thought of constituting a separate realm a-la-Waltz, which is also why, notes Gideon Rose, “[…] 
we should not strive for a truly theoretical explanation of it”.74 There are similar arguments 
against conflating the domains coming from Wendt, who agrees with Waltz that systemic 
theorizing should not be mixed with foreign policy analysis.75  As we will come to see, the 
                                                        
69 Carlsnaes 1987, 70; Carlsnaes 1992, 260 and Goldmann 1989, 104: Domestic politics, in turn, is defined, as 
governmental actions directed towards the sphere of territorial legitimacy. As such, the nexus between the two 
concerns interaction between horizontal and vertical politics.  
70 See, for instance, Farrell (1966); Wallace (1971); Rosenau (1987); Campbell (1998); cf. Brighi 2007, 105.   
71 Brighi 2013, 10. 
72 Rosenau 1966, 98–99; Hudson 2007, 15. 
73 Brighi 2013, 15; an argument made by Fareed Zakaria, a neoclassical realist. 
74 Rose, 1998, 145.  
75 Wight 2013, 36–37: Waltz’ account argues for clear demarcations between FPA and IR particularly because of 
the reductionist stance he thinks political analysis concerned with unit-level analysis are taking. Theories of IR can 
and should be not theories of foreign policy. Alexander Wendt (1999, 11) also seems to be accepting the 
distinction: “Theories of international politics are distinguished from those that have as their object explaining the 
behavior of individual states, or theories of ‘foreign policy’. It is important that IR do both kinds of theorizing, but 
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distinction Waltz and Wendt make is essentially based on their substantialist perception of 
social and political reality which take entities such as states as given instead of examining their 
constantly fluctuating and transforming agency through their relations.  
 
This distinction between foreign policy and International Relations is highly contested and 
those who disagree with Waltz and Wendt, also stress the importance of theories to FPA. For 
example Valerie Hudson, argues that FPA, in spite of and – paradoxically – because of its 
multifactorial, multileveled and inter-multidisciplinary nature, can be theorized and linked 
with International Relations. Moreover, she argues, FPA forms an integral part of IR. This is 
because of the fact that it takes the decision-making of human beings – instead of the behavior 
of ‘black-boxed’ political communities such as states  (presumed to be unitary and rational) – 
as its unit of analysis. FPA, therefore, provides the means to a key theoretical intersection 
between ideational and material factors in state or state-like entities’ behavior due to its ability 
to examine the human agency in political conduct. 76  Carlsnaes likewise has argued that 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis are not two distinct realms of inquiry; 
theories of IR should not be distinguished between from those of foreign policy as Wendt and 
Waltz suggest. 77 Such sub-disciplinary fault lines lead to nothing but the inability to address 
the mutual constitutiveness of the domestic and the international spheres.78 Scholars rejecting 
the divide between FPA and IR are usually those in support of relationalist understandings of 
reality, such as Colin Hay, Bob Jessop, James D. Fearon (1998) and Walter Carlsnaes (2002). 
 
4.2. What is at Stake in Foreign Policy Analysis?  
 4.2.1. Foreign policy understood via different levels of analysis – the substantive divide 
 
Theorized per se or not, a political analysis of the foreign policy development of an entity – be 
it a regional government, a state or a political party – has to answer the question of how to 
account for action and its consequences. As such it is first and foremost concerned with the 
variables responsible for political behavior, and even more importantly the interaction 
                                                        
their dependent variables, aggregate behavior versus unit behavior, are on different levels of analysis and so their 
explanations are not comparable.”  
76 Hudson 2007, 7.  
77 Carlsnaes 2002, 331.  
78 Hay 2002, 5. This is a fundamental issue with regard to the inquiry at hand, for it is this demarcation line, that 
both Hay’s strategic-relational model and Caspersen’s de facto state theorization are trying to overcome by 
highlighting the interconnectedness of the internal and the external. 
23 
 
between them.79  Answering the research question posited by this research – “How can we 
explain Kurdistan Regional Government’s foreign policy development post-2003?”, may initially 
lead us to the dichotomy between the international and domestic sources of foreign policy, 
simply because this divide is where the nucleus of the debate between foreign policy analysts 
essentially lies. Let me briefly elaborate on this general conceptualization of the field based on 
a distinction between different levels of analysis, which have been unable to incorporate and 
accommodate foreign policy. 
 
The domestic-international divide within foreign policy analysis epitomizes the more general 
epistemological debate concerning different levels of analysis – levels of explanation, that is.80 
The dispute is based on a disagreement on the level chosen to explain world politics. Some 
scholars point to unit-level variables such as the individual properties of states’ leadership or 
the collective identity of the nation, whereas others refer to systemic factors of the international 
context such as the distribution of power. Scholars do not agree on the number, definition or 
the intersection of the different levels of analysis explaining political outcomes. This 
disagreement has, in turn, had fundamental implications on the position of foreign policy in 
between domestic and international politics. As Elisabetta Brighi and Walter Carlsnaes have 
argued, the levels of analysis –debate has completely sidelined foreign policy.81 In the words of 
Carlsnaes, “[…] most of the time it [foreign policy] is simply ignored in these debates and 
discussions, or politely dismissed with reference to the distinction between system level and 
unit level theories, the former pertaining to international politics proper, the latter ‘merely’ to 
the behavior of individual states”.82  
 
The disciplinary development of IR centered on systemic factors and that of domestic politics 
focused on unit-level variables, was eventually reflected in the emergence of theories of Foreign 
Policy as well. Following a brief overview of the development of the domain over the past 50 
years or so, Carlsnaes distinguishes between two broad traditions reflecting the levels-of-
analysis -discussion: the first approach gives primacy to domestic factors – Innenpolitik – in the 
explanation of foreign policy. In spite of stressing different independent variables, all the way 
from cognitive to bureaucratic factors, the proponents of this tradition “[…] all share a common 
                                                        
79 Brighi, 2013, 11. 
80 The levels-of-analysis has been addressed by David Singer, Kenneth Waltz, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith.  
81 Brighi 2013, 12–13; Carlsnaes 2002, 331–334. 
82 Carlsnaes 2002, 331. 
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assumption – that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country’s internal 
dynamics.”83 Kantian liberalism and Marxian socialism are good examples of this approach. . 
The second tradition is epitomized in the primacy given to material-systemic level factors. 
Following Carlsnaes and Rose, one can term this line as that of Aussenpolitik or Realpolitik. 
While not denying the importance of domestic factors, their emphasis is, however, on the 
primacy of the systemic factors of security and power politics. Rose identifies the three variants 
of realism (classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism) as symbolizing Realpolitik.84 
 
The analytical boundary drawn between international and domestic politics – on the basis of 
which foreign policy has come to be conventionally conceptualized – is however, based on a 
fundamentally problematic assumption. According to Carlsnaes, this questionable perception 
assumes it to be possible to determine the nature and function of the boundary between the 
domestic and the international, when it, in fact, is not.85 It is for this reason that Carlsnaes views 
addressing different approaches to foreign policy via the international-domestic divide as 
unfruitful. Instead, he suggests, one should approach disagreements between foreign policy 
analysts on the basis of two more fundamental questions that are meta-theoretical rather than 
substantive in their nature.86 In fact, he argues, the root of the problem with comparative study 
of foreign policy lies in “[…] shortcomings of a fundamentally metatheoretical nature”.87 While 
these meta-theoretical questions have been dismissed by some scholars as useless and 
obscuring, there have, also been arguments in support of them. These supportive claims have 
pointed to a major benefit in meta-theoretical considerations; namely, their ability to go beyond 
traditional paradigmatic positions that the substantive views cannot. 88  The first meta-
theoretical question addressed by Carlsnaes concerns the ontological foundation of social 
systems, whereas the latter the epistemological orientation of the analysts.89 I will now move 
on to the introduction of the two questions and the taxonomy introduced by Carlsnaes based 
on the assumptions they entail. 
 
                                                        
83 Rose 1998, 148. 
84 Ibid., 145–146; Carlsnaes 2002, 334. 
85 Carlsnaes 2002, 334.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Carlsnaes 1987, ix; Knudsen 1989, 99. 
88 See for instance Dunne, Hansen and Wight (2013) & Sil and Katzenstein (2010). 
89 Ontologies are essentially political claims about how the analysts conceptualize the world they are studying, 
epistemologies concern possible ways of attaining knowledge, methodologies are related to how researchers 
choose their analytical tools and, finally, methods are techniques for gathering and analyzing data (Hay 2002, 93.) 
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4.2.2. Foreign Policy understood via the ASP and modes of analysis - the meta-theoretical 
divide 
 
Foreign Policy Analysts may agree on their unit of analysis, foreign policy, which is defined by 
Carlsnaes as actions, “[…] which are expressed in the form of explicitly states goals, 
commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on 
behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – 
both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond 
their territorial legitimacy.”90 However, they disagree on two fundamental meta-theoretical 
issues. Both of these issues overlap and penetrate the domestic and international divide, but 
are essentially based on meta-theoretical presumptions rather than substantive ones.91  
 
The first meta-theoretical question: the ontologies of individualism versus holism 
 
The first question concerns causation and explanation in IR and Foreign Policy and is 
manifested in the opposition between Durkheimian holism and Weberian individualism. This 
discussion has come to be known as the agent-structure debate.92 According to the most basic 
understanding, at the heart of the disagreement is whether the dynamics of social systems are 
viewed as being founded on individuals and the intended as well as unintended consequences 
of their interactions; or alternatively on rules of the self-reproducing structures.93 Individualists 
claim that all social and political action is reducible to agents, whereas holists argue that 
structures function independently from agents and are not reducible to them.94 Implicit (or 
sometimes explicit) assumptions regarding agency and structure have resulted in major 
disputes on how it is exactly that political conduct should be explained in relation with context. 
This debate, has, in turn led to the fact that same empirical observations have been regarded as 
either the result of agential (individualism) or structural (holism) factors.  
                                                        
90 Carlsnaes 2002, 335. 
91  The domestic-international divide epitomize criterion based on the substantive nature of foreign policy (a 
fallacious one according to Carlsnaes), whereas the two issues of ontology and epistemology are based on the 
meta-theoretical nature of the domain (Carlsnaes 2002, 334.) 
92 The dynamic interplay between agents and structures came to be seen as integral particularly in accounting for 
political change and stability, in general, and in foreign policy behavior, in particular. (Stroker and Marsh 2010, 
212; Carlsnaes 1992, 256.) Although initially considered as the sphere of philosophers and sociologists, political 
scientists and International Relations theorists alike have recently also felt the need to address their own 
understanding of the ASP, Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Relations (1999) being one of the most 
quoted examples within IR and Walter Carlsnaes, indeed, within Foreign Policy Analysis (Hay 2002, 89; Carlsnaes 
1987, ix.) 
93 Guzzini 1998, 197; cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 335. 
94 Wendt 1999, 26; cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 335. 
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Prior to introducing the second meta-theoretical question, I need to briefly elaborate on an 
important point explicitly discussed by Colin Wight and implicitly addressed by Carlsnaes. It 
concerns the relationship between levels of analysis represented by the domestic-international 
divide in foreign policy analysis, and the agent-structure debate epitomized in the individualist-
holist debate. What has been, and still is, typical to many scholars in our field, is the tendency 
to conflate between these two questions. 95 It is highly important to distinguish between the 
two problems because failure to do – as in the case of Hollis and Smith96 – has significant 
consequences on how we make sense of social and political reality. The debate on different 
levels of analysis concerns the substantive nature of foreign policy, whereas the agent-structure 
problem its meta-theoretical character.97 The implications of this confusion are perhaps most 
clearly manifested in the ways that different levels of analysis have been conventionally linked 
to the agent-structure relationship; international system (structure) – nation-state (agent); 
nation-state (structure) – bureaucracy (agent). What appears to be a structure on one level 
turns out to be an agent on another.98 Agents and structures are defined differently depending 
on the analyst’s point of view.  
 
The problem here is in the inability to understand that the agent-structure problem refers, in 
the words of Colin Wight, to “[…] how social parts relate to social wholes” and that, as such, it is 
a problem present on all levels of analysis.99 No matter, which level we choose our independent 
variables from – be it regime types or cognitive factors (domestic sources a-la-Innenpolitik) or 
alternatively, the distribution of power or international institutions (international sources of 
foreign policy a-la-Realpolitik) – the agent-structure problem will always be featured. Wight, 
has tried to clarify the strict line that should be drawn between the ASP and levels of analysis 
by outlining three levels of analysis; the international, the nation-state and the bureaucracies. 
However, the ordering between them is presented as vertical rather than horizontal.100 What 
is unique about his approach is that it disaggregates different levels into their component parts 
in an attempt to understand how they interpenetrate. The thought is based on Heikki 
                                                        
95 Wight 2010, 116.  
96 It was, indeed Alexander Wendt who criticized Hollis and Smith for conflating levels of analysis with the agent-
structure debate (Wight 2010, 116). 
97 Carlsnaes 2002, 335. 
98 Wight 2013, 38. 
99 Ibid., 102–106. 
100 Ibid., 37. 
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Patomäki’s101 notion of connecting different levels of analysis so that the individual features in 
all of them as a positioned actor in relation with its context.102 The individual becomes the agent 
situated in a multi-layered context consisting of the nation-state (or de facto state), 
bureaucracies and the international system. Since agency relates to structure at all levels, the 
agent-structure problem becomes an unavoidable issue in spite of the level chosen to explain 
one’s explanadum – in our case the foreign policy development of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government – with.103 Through this reconceptualization, Wight manages to demonstrate that 
the two questions of levels of analysis and the ASP are, thus, not one and the same. Regardless 
of whether I choose to explain KRG’s foreign policies with domestic factors such as the 
leadership’s perceptions and misperceptions104 of their environment, or instead with systemic 
variables, such as the distribution of power manifested in balancing games, I will have to still 
address the ASP.  
 
To cut the long story short, when explaining foreign policy, two separate questions can be 
asked. The first one is substantive in nature; whether it is domestic or international variables 
or both that I should attribute KRG’s foreign policy behavior to. The second one is meta-
theoretical in nature; whether it is agents, structures or their inter-action that are responsible 
for the leadership’s foreign policies (the ontological agent-structure problem). Just like 
Carlsnaes, I am concerned with the latter question; hence the taxonomy I am about to introduce, 
partly based on ontological positions with regard to the agent-structure relationship. 
 
                                                        
101 For more on Patomäki’s ideas on the level-of-analysis debate, see for instance, Patomäki 2002, 73–95.  
102 Wight 2006, 110–118. Colin Wight argues though that there is no need for a distinct individual level because 
the individual features on all levels. What is more, he argues that placing the individuals on each level is of central 
importance because it demonstrates that different levels of explanation of a particular unit of analysis interact 
through the differing ”positioning” of these individuals. For instance, the individual is situated in the international 
political system, in the economic capitalist system as well as in the bureaucratic system of the state.    
103  According to Wight (2006, 25–27; 210–219), the empirical application of this theoretical assumption, is 
however, not feasible: to examine how an agent’s decision is constructed in relation to all of these structures 
simultaneously in a single study is simply unachievable. However, what is important to acknowledge is that an 
agent is a socially positioned individual located within a structured structuratum – a complex web of interacting 
and intersecting structures within an entity we know as the social world. While these structures overlap, none of 
them determines or is primary with regard to the other. Bob Jessop would assumedly disagree with this view, 
claiming that it is possible for one system to interfere with the dynamics of other structures more than they can 
interfere or disturb its dynamics. (Jessop 2007, 22–37.)  
104 For more see Jervis (1976). 
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The second meta-theoretical question: methodological/epistemological “understanding” versus 
“explaining” 
 
Let me now get back to the second meta-theoretical question discussed by Carlsnaes. The 
individualist-holist divide led to the fact that some gave causal weight to the structural context 
beyond the control of agents, whereas others reduced action to the interactions of purposeful 
agency.105 These ontological presumptions, in turn led to particular epistemological questions 
among theoreticians. They were related to how agency was treated – either via interpretative 
or objectivist lenses – naturalism versus interpretativism – corresponding to “understanding” 
and “explaining” a-la-Hollis-and-Smith. As we will come to see in the next chapter, the adopted 
epistemologies were determined by ontological positions. Carslnaes considered the two modes 
of analysis as an epistemological question on whether one is to focus on human agents and their 
interaction from inside or from outside.106 Colin Wight, on the other hand, viewed the question 
as a methodological one. 107  Both of them, nevertheless, agreed that explaining and 
understanding were two different but complementary forms of knowledge, which should not be 
seen as conflicting approaches to political or social inquiry.108  
 
4.2.3. The Fallacy of Substantialism: Carlsnaes’ taxonomy based on the meta-theoretical division 
 
Ontological problems cannot be solved empirically 
 
The examination of the first question invoked by Carlsnaes – the ASP – has often been deemed 
irrelevant for political analysis. The explanation given is that, sociologists spent 200 years to 
solve the issue, but ended up no further than to stating what Marx did already in the 19th 
century – man make history, but not in conditions of their own choosing. Since the arguments 
have not been able to arrive at much more than this, argue the skeptics, then what is the point 
of reigniting the futile discussion over and over again? Some of the critics miss a fundamental 
                                                        
105 Hay 2002, 94; Structure refers to the ordered, albeit not predictable (if structuralism is not extended to a degree 
that it becomes equal with determinism), nature of political behavior. Conduct is not predictable because of the 
existence of agency, which is a concept lacking in natural sciences (in which there are only material things not 
reflexive social facts). In the context of this inquiry, agency refers to political conduct; ”[…] ability of the actor to 
act consciously, and in doing so, to attempt to realize his or her intentions”, clarifies Hay. 
106 Carlsnaes 2002, 335. 
107 Wight 2006, 257–270. 
108 Ibid., 273; Carlsnaes 2002, 335: Carlsnaes indeed asserts that Hollis’ and Smith’s perception of there always 
being two stories to tell is not uncontroversial.  
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point here: the idea is not to solve the issue, for ontological problems cannot be solved 
empirically.109 Ontologies are essentially faith-based political arguments on what exists in the 
world. 110  The agent-structure problem cannot be, therefore, adjudicated within “[…] an 
ultimate empirical court”, argues Hay.111 Even Wendt seems to miss this point in arguing that 
the disagreements between holists and individualists can be settled,  
 
“[…] only by wrestling with the empirical merits of their claims about human 
agency and social structure…These are in substantial part empirical questions”. 
[italics added].” 112  
 
Ontology cannot be brought in to solve empirical disputes113, because it does not give one the 
correct proportions of agential and structural ingredients for an adequate explanation of social 
action. The limit of social ontologies needs to be, therefore, recognized. Even meta-theoretical 
stances going beyond explaining action either via agents or structures – namely dialectical 
approaches such as critical realism which – can only argue that an adequate explanation of a 
political effect or outcome ought to include both agents and structures. However, these 
ontologies cannot give us correct proportions of each of the components; that decision is left to 
be determined in an empirical analysis. 114  Therefore, it is important to note that, different 
perceptions of the ontological question of agent and structure cannot be falsified nor certified 
because they do not make necessary empirical assertions.115 Avoiding the pitfall of giving “[…] 
empirical license for ontological claims and assumptions”, becomes crucial here.116 Ontologies 
only provide us with a conceptual framework to help us make sense of the social system. The 
rest is open to empirical study, in which the particular political phenomena – located in space 
and time – are situated.  
 
 
                                                        
109 Hay 2002, 89–96. 
110 On the basis of  the thoughts of Zizek (1999, 158), Wight (2006, 2) writes that; “Politics is the terrain of 
competing ontologies. Politics is about competing visions of how the world is and how it should be. Every ontology 
is political. If there were no ontological differences there would be no politics.” 
111 Hay 2002, 92. 
112 Wendt and Shapiro 1997, 181; cf. Hay 2002, 92–93. 
113 Hollis and Smith, Colin Wight, Colin Hay and Walter Carlsnaes are among the many who agree on this. Walter 
Carlsnaes examines the question from the perspective of foreign policy analysis. 
114 Hay 2002, 93–94. 
115 Hay (ibid., 83–84), considers falsifiability in general a problematic way to distinguish between ”science” and 
”non-science”. See Jackson (2011, 14) for more on falsifiability.  
116 Hay 2002, 93. 
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The fact that the ASP cannot be solved analytically does not, however, deem the whole question 
irrelevant for the study of political science and international relations. The case is actually quite 
the opposite, because as we mentioned earlier, ontological commitments determine 
epistemological orientations, which, in turn, have consequences with regard to the 
methodologies applied in an empirical research of a concrete problem.117 Once again, while 
acknowledging the fact that different ontologies (individualist, holist or dialectic) 
generate different methodological frameworks of analysis, it is important to understand 
the difference between the two questions. As Carlsnaes argues, the “[…] ontological 
problem of object conceptualization needs to be separated from the methodological 
problem of how to study this reconceptualized object”.118  
 
KRG’s foreign policy in the meta-theoretical divide  
 
Carlsnaes argued that, because of their reduction of action to individuals and their interaction, 
individualist ontologies led to the reducing of the epistemological issue to choosing in between 
treating agents as objective maximizers of utility (eg. rational choice theory119) or as reflexive 
and interpretative agents in chase of their own subjective goals (eg. hermeneutics). No account 
was made for the existence of structures that were not reducible to the sum of agents’ 
interactions. The collectivist ontology, in turn, resulted in treating agents’ action as the 
objective pursuit of interests (Wallerstein’s world-system’s theory) or a process of socialization 
(bureaucratic and organizational theories such as Graham T. Allison’s120), in which agency was 
reduced to functionalist response to social order. No account was made for the existence of 
agents not reducible to structures. All of these four approaches thus treated agents and 
structures in terms of causal reduction of one to the other. Action was explained with reference 
to structures and vice versa; hence neither of the two became problematized or theorized for 
that matter.121 Choosing in between treating agents as either interpretative or rational meant 
an opposition between two modes of analysis elaborated on above – “understanding” versus 
“explaining” action. The link between these ontological commitments and epistemological 
                                                        
117 Jackson 2011, 25–30. 
118 Carlsnaes 1992, 267; Wight 2013, 35.  
119 Rationalists indeed treat interests as given by the structural logic of the situation  
120 This approach is, however, also collectivist because as Jeffrey C. Alexander (1988, 270) writes; ”[…] micro-
processes may well become central points of empirical interest […] but only because phenomena such as 
personalities and interaction are conceived as central ’conveyor belts’ for collective facts.  
121 Carlsnaes 1992, 248–250. 
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choices indeed generated four types of perspectives or explanatory frameworks to the study of 
International Relations and Foreign Policy outlined below, as conceptualized by Walter 
Carlsnaes: 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The taxonomy as adopted from Carlsnaes in “International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis” 
(2007). I have added a demonstrative example of KRG’s decision to stay within Baghdad instead of declaring 
independence in 2003, when it had the chance to do so. 
 
Carlsnaes’ categorization is by no means the only effort made in the field, and it overlaps with 
some others, such as those of Kjell Goldmann (1989) and Peter Gourevitch (2002). However, 
following his taxonomy for now, we can see how the “structural perspective” would make sense 
of KRG’s foreign policy development as constant objective responses to structural rules of the 
game. For instance, Waltzian neorealism would assume that, in the anarchical and conflictual 
self-help system, the KRG is forced to socialize and compete with other players in order to 
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survive. 122 At the risk of annihilation it, then, not only becomes similar to other units in the 
system (i.e. engage in ‘internal balancing’) but it will also be forced to rationally respond to 
external, objective constraints (i.e. engage in ‘external balancing’)123 regardless of its internal 
conditions. 124 As such, the regional government’s decision to strike a deal with Turkey to 
construct an oil pipeline without the consent of Baghdad, would be simply viewed as a “[…] 
rational effort […] to solve externally-imposed security problems.”125 In spite of Waltz’ own 
insistence that his theory is not one of foreign policy (and multiple accounts on why exactly 
neorealist ideas cannot be applied to foreign policy analysis126), there are also opinions that 
challenge this position127 and claim that Waltz can be, in fact utilized in and applied to FPA. 
James Fearon, has for instance argued that:  
 
“There is a straightforward and important sense in which neorealist and other 
systemic theories are indeed theories of foreign policy. Namely, the things that 
structural realist theory seeks to explain – such as balancing, the probability of 
major power war, or a general disposition to competitive interstate relations – are 
either foreign policies or the direct (if sometimes unintended) result of foreign 
policies.”128 
 
Either way, it is worth noting, that Waltz’ argument is based on the distinction he draws 
between the three images of reality or levels of analysis. While recognizing the individual and 
the state-level, he argues, indeed, that the international system can and should be examined 
independently from them – in the Durkheimian sense of ‘social-facts-can-be explained-with-
other-social-facts’. 129  One cannot, for instance, invoke the political system of a unit or 
properties of the individual to understand the operation of patterned material relations of 
difference. According to him, structural patterns of the international system function 
independent of the type of the political system at the unit-level, and more importantly – of the 
                                                        
122 Waltz (1979) claims indeed that systemic constraints set the limits of political action through two principal 
mechanisms; socialization and competition, which he calls ”successful practices”.  
123 These constraints would be determined by KRG’s position in the system, which in turn depends on how much 
power it has vis-a-vis Turkey and Baghdad. Actors in the same position as the KRG would be confronted with 
similar material constraints.   
124 This is also why most neo-realists affirm (albeit fallaciously) that outcomes at the international level – such as 
balance of power, war or peace – should be studied without having to return to foreign policy.   
125 Goldmann 1989, 105. 
126 One good example is Elman (1996a, 1996b). See also Colin Wight 2013, 36–37. 
127 Among examples are Baumann et al. (2001), Lebow (2001), Mouritzen (1996). 
128 Fearon 1998, 292–293. 
129 Waltz 1979, 77–78; "Structure has to be studied in its own right as do units". 
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perceptions actors have of them. 130  Carlsnaes and other efforts aiming to go beyond the 
deadlock of holism versus individualism, of course, reject such distinction between levels of 
analysis. 
 
Neoclassical realists would state that the impact of the anarchical system is not as 
straightforward as neorealists assume it to be; the influence of the distribution of power 
affected KRG’s foreign policy decisions only through intervening variables at the unit-level, 
such as leadership’s perceptions of the threats they were confronted with. Just like realists, 
neoliberal institutionalists would also take the state or – the de facto state in our case – as given, 
and view the KRG as an egoistic value maximizer, whose interests were given by the anarchical 
international context.131 The only difference between the two approaches would be that, while 
in the former KRG’s foreign policy behavior is assumed to be constrained by the configuration 
of power capabilities – for instance, how much power KRG has vis-à-vis Turkey or Baghdad – 
in the latter, the leadership’s cooperation with Turkey is not attributed to the distribution of 
power alone, but instead to the positive effects of functional regimes (namely provision of 
information and mutual rules), which reduced mistrust and motivated cooperation between 
the KRG and Turkey. Organizational process approaches would, instead point to internal 
structures as constraints on action. In this case the KRG’s foreign policy decisions would be 
understood as being constrained by the decision-making system within the autonomous region 
– a domestic factor indeed, which Gourevitch would designate as the “second image 
reasoning”.132  In all of these cases, however, analysts would be adopting a naturalist mode of 
analysis treating actors as if they functionally responded to objective constraints set by the 
context. 133  If examined via this box, KRG’s foreign policy analysis would be reduced to 
involuntary and automatic reactions to the structural imperatives of its surroundings.  
 
                                                        
130 Waltz 1979, 74: Waltz notes accordingly that, ”[…] because structures select by rewarding some behaviors and 
punishing others, outcomes cannot be inferred from intentions and behaviors”. This is a position that I am seeking 
to challenge via the relationalist understandings of foreign policy, which relativizes the existence of agents and 
structures. 
131 In fact, Moravcsik (1997, 537) considers neoliberal institutionalism as a variant of realism. 
132 Gourevitch 2002, 110: The second image refers to the unit-level in Waltz three-level categorization. The first 
image is the individual characterized by individual psychology; the second is the state indeed, characterized by 
institutions and socio-economic structures; the third image is the system in which action is determined by anarchy. 
According to Waltz the levels can be theorized as well as examined independent from each other. 
133 Brighi 2013, 23–24. 
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“The agency-based perspective” would attribute the autonomous leadership’s foreign policies 
to individuals and their interaction, but would, likewise, treat agents objectively. For instance, 
cognitive or psychological approaches would analyze KRG’s foreign policy decisions through 
Barzani’s beliefs and perceptions as well as the ways in which he processes information, instead 
of attributing his conduct to the objective structural constraints – domestic or international – 
surrounding him. As such, the representatives of leadership are assumed to be more or less 
resistant to the constraints imposed by the surroundings, albeit conditioned by their cognitive 
and psychological capabilities.134  
 
Bureacratic approaches, such as those introduced by Graham T. Allison, also reject the primacy 
given to structural imperatives and attribute action, instead, to individuals. They stress the role 
of the “pulling and hauling that is politics”, resulting in unique organizational outputs. 135 If 
analyzed from this perspective, KRG’s foreign policy decisions would not be attributed to 
preferences given by structural factors (the interest in survival in the case of realism). The 
bureaucratic approach would not, for instance, claim that KRG’s decision to stay within Iraq 
necessarily resulted from the fact that the entity’s leadership possessed less power than 
Baghdad. It would, instead, attribute the decision to the disputes between the PUK and KDP, 
which eventually lead to the triumph of one view over the other. What resulted from this battle 
was a unique outcome not determined by KRG’s position vis-à-vis Baghdad but, instead, by the 
victory of the views suggesting to stay within Iraq over the views advocating separation. 
However, just like in the cognitive approaches, the decision-makers in the bureaucratic 
approaches, once again, come to be treated objectively. This is mainly because the interests 
they are seen to represent are indeed sectional or factional rather than purely individual; hence 
the famous dictum of “where you stand depends on where you sit”.136  
 
Liberal approaches represented, for instance, by Andrew Moravcsik give primacy to individuals 
and social groups over politics. This is indeed called “the bottom-up view”, according to which 
actors define their interests independent from politics.137 The liberalist view would suggest 
that KRG’s foreign policy behavior can be attributed to its preferences reflecting the interests 
                                                        
134 As we will come to see similar structural conditions do not imply similar foreign policy behavior because of the 
simple fact that actors interpret their surroundings differently. 
135 Allison and Zelikow 1999, 256; cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 338. 
136 Carlsnaes 2002, 338.  
137 Moravcsik 1997, 524–533; cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 330. 
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of a subset of its society; for instance the commercial (as such, the decision to build a pipeline 
would be attributed to the economic gains associated with it) or the ideational (the same 
decision would be attributed to the ability of the pipelines to contribute to KRG’s nationalist 
agenda) subsets. The only constraint the KRG is presumed to be confronted with, is the 
preferences formulated by other actors in a similar manner, and not for instance KRG’s position 
within the distribution of power in the system.  
 
Approaches based on “social-Institutional perspectives” manage to take into account the role 
of social and normative structures instead of merely highlighting material conditions of action. 
(System) constructivists138 are among the most prominent approaches that have done so. They 
are, however, not addressed here mainly because of their inability to accommodate foreign 
policy within the strict line drawn in between different levels of analysis. Carlsnaes 
distinguishes between thin and thick constructivists, locating Wendt139 in the former and the 
rule-oriented constructivists represented by Nicholas Onuf in the latter. These approaches 
stress the primacy of ideational and normative factors in constituting actors’ identities and 
interests, and as such, in defining what constitutes proper behavior for a given actor. They take 
issue at rationalist assumptions, which treat foreign policy behavior as rationalist response to 
structural conditions.140 If one is to follow this tradition, it would attribute KRG’s decision to 
stay within Iraq to what the leadership considered as proper behavior taken into account its 
role in the system as a de facto state, and not, for instance on considerations based on national 
interest; The KDP and PUK did not declare independence because they saw that it would not be 
accepted by the international norms which reject all forms of secession. Alternatively, the KRG 
stroke a deal with Turkey because it considered such action to be accepted by the international 
community.    
 
The discursive approaches criticize objectivist holists within the cognitive tradition for their 
naturalistic treatment of language. They argue that beliefs and perceptions actors hold are 
always conditioned by discourses structurally conditioning actors’ perceptions of their 
surroundings. In the words of Henrik Larsen, “[…] the framework of meaning within which 
                                                        
138 Gourevitch (2002, 310) refers to holist constructivists such as Wendt as ”system constructivists”, who do not 
include domestic accounts. 
139 However, since Wendt makes a distinction between domestic and international variables of political conduct, 
his theory is considered unfeasible to address foreign policy by Carlsnaes, and as such, not addressed in further 
detail.  
140 Carlsnaes 2002, 340. 
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foreign policy takes place is seen as the basis of the way in which interests and goals are 
constructed.”141 Discourses are understood to be constructive of reality. As such hegemonic and 
dominant discourses fundamentally influence the way actors come to perceive of the world. 
The foreign policy analysis of the KRG, would begin from the meanings the KRG leadership gives 
to the events surrounding it and analyze its decisions based on these meanings. The 
leadership’s decision to sign international oil companies with PSCs is viewed from the meaning 
that the regional government gave to this action. Nevertheless the meanings given would not 
be attributed to individuals, but instead structural factors, since these meanings are considered 
to be more or less determined by hegemonic discourses delineating possible ways to filter 
reality. Once again agential action comes to be reduced to structural factors.142 
 
Approaches based on an “interpretative actor perspective” highlight that foreign policy 
decisions are essentially based, in the words of Hollis and Smith, 
 
“[…] on how individuals with power perceive and analyse situations. Collective 
action is a sum or combination of individual actions.”143 
 
While the hermeneutic traditions examine interpretative actors ‘top-down’, attributing KRG’s 
understandings of its context to the structural constrains imposed on it by language, the 
interpretative approach, instead, treats decisions as reasoned rather than rational, viewing 
actors from ‘bottom up’, instead. To achieve consensus, actors are viewed as following not the 
logic of consequences or appropriateness but instead the ‘logic of arguing’. 144  In so far 
interpretative individualism is concerned, argumentation focuses on making counterfactual 
assessments. It would, for instance, suggest that, had the KRG executives not reasoned or made 
the choices the way they actually did, the history of this period would have been different. 145 
Had the KRG not viewed signing International Oil Companies with Production Sharing 
Contracts (that Baghdad did not approve of) as benefitting it more than taking orders from 
Baghdad – both equally possible – history would have turned out to be rather different.  Albeit 
this kind of descriptive-analytic form has been subjected to various criticism for its lack of 
                                                        
141 Larsen 1999, 453, cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 340.  
142 This is a fundamental critique targeted at the structuralism of the hermeneutic tradition, for instance by Colin 
Wight. 
143 Hollis and Smith 1990, 74; cf. Carlsnaes 2002, 341. 
144 Carlsnaes 2002, 341. 
145 Ibid. 
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theoretical vision, it has also been utilized for instance by Thomas Risse to demonstrate 
“communicative action” between actors.146  
 
4.2.4. An effort to go beyond the meta-theoretical division: The Tripartite Model  
 
There have been a variety of attempts147 to integrate individualist and holist ontologies in 
foreign policy analysis, while combining both modes of analysis – understanding and explaining 
– have proved to be more complex.148 According to Carlsnaes of the four “rock-bottom” types 
of explanations, “interpretative individualism” comes closest to combining purposive action 
and social structure. Based on this assumption, he introduces a tripartite model outlining a 
framework for comparative foreign policy analysis. He argues that any effort aiming at a 
synthetic framework capable of going beyond both dichotomies has to be abstract enough not 
to substantively presuppose explanation in favor of one type or a certain combination of 
empirical variables – such as, for instance, domestic structure or international system. 149 
Following this dictum, he introduces a framework into which locates the four conventional 
approaches. By doing so, he manages to go beyond the causal reduction of agents to structures 
or vice versa as well as beyond treating agents either interpretatively or naturalistically.150  
 
The tripartite model is based on an important distinction Carlsnaes makes between the level of 
action and the level of observation. The conceptual framework places emphasis on the former 
– the meaning-world of foreign policy actors: it is from the world of the actor “[…] that we have 
to extrapolate theoretically not to it that we can willfully impute our own theoretical 
constructs”, argues Carlsnaes.151 His model deserves a brief introduction, not only because it is 
widely recognized within the field, but also because some of its propositions overlap with the 
strategic-relational approach, whereas others clearly differentiate it from the analytical model 
I am about to apply to KRG’s foreign policy analysis. Carlsnaes’ framework is illustrated in 
Figure 2 below. 
 
 
                                                        
146 ibid., 341. 
147 See for instance, Jack Snyder (1991). 
148 Carlsnaes 2002, 341. For instance Hollis and Smith (1990) have claimed that there are always two stories to 
tell, which cannot be combined into one narrative. This is a position I am seeking to challenge with this inquiry.  
149 Ibid., 342. 
150 For a detailed account, see Carlsnaes 1987, 71–116.  
151 Carlsnaes 1987, 44. 
38 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The tripartite model – explaining foreign policy action, as adopted from Carlsnaes 1992, 254. This model 
consists of intentional, dispositional and structural dimensions of explanation. When analyzing foreign policy 
action, the preferences on the basis of which actors act, need to be outlined first. This will be followed by causal 
statements on how these preferences were constructed by underlying perceptions and values; immediate goals 
are always a means to further goals. Finally additional causal claims need to be made with regard to how the 
previous steps were influenced by structural and institutional conditions. Carlsnaes’ model manages to achieve an 
epistemological balance in between naturalistic and interpretative understandings of agency. What is more, it 
adopts a complex notion of causality, not reducing it to strict determination. 
 
According to the framework depicted above, in order to explain a specific foreign policy 
decision, we need to first look at the immediate reasons for such action; the preferences and 
choices of the actors. When examining the “intentional dimension” – it is quite irrelevant as well 
as impossible to delineate what or whose the particular interests invoked are: it suffices to 
acknowledge that foreign policy is always motivated by an interest or another – be it statist or 
organizational, greed or grievance a-la-Collier-and-Hoeffler. A fundamental point is being made 
here, indeed, because it implies Carlsnaes’ commitment to neutrality with regard to substantive 
theories of International Relations or Foreign Policy when examining foreign policy choices: 
one cannot, for instance, say in advance if foreign policy actors are driven by the will of power 
to ensure their survival (realism). 152   It is only within the intentional dimension that a 
conceptual framework for the explanation of motivations can be outlined. For instance, to 
analyze Kurdistan Regional Government’s perception of national interest we would indeed 
need to step into the next dimension.  
                                                        
152 Carlsnaes 1987, 90; Carlsnaes 2002, 242.  
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The analysis can be deepened by examining the values and perceptions that informed the 
particular intentional behavior depicted above. Choices differ from motivations in the sense that 
the former refers to “ […] reasons for an actor’s decision in the face of a particular choice 
situation, while ‘motivation’ points to a condition or state of affairs, which an actor intended 
either to change or to maintain”. 153  The second dimension – “the dispositional” – indeed 
involves examining, why an actor was “cognitively disposed” towards a specific intention rather 
than another. This is to say, that actors choose something in order (teleological dimension) to 
achieve an intention which they have because of (causal dimension) this and that. In our case a 
choice would, for instance, explain why the KRG decided to sign an oil contract with Turkey and 
neglect Baghdad’s opposition to the contract (operational objective) instead of, for instance, 
negotiating some sort of a deal with Maliki’s government. The choice can be attributed to 
rational calculation and interpretative reasoning that such a move would lead to economic 
independence. Motivations (interests), in turn, would try to explain why the leadership of the 
region had an intention to achieve economic autonomy in the first place, instead of wanting to 
continue cooperation with Baghdad. For the choices we need to give teleological explanations, 
while the motivations require causal explanations. As such, getting to the origins of KRG’s 
intentions requires a thorough examination of its values (including norms) and perceptions.154 
Values vary and compete (eg. independence versus Iraqi federalism), but for an intention to be 
constructed, the conflict of values have to, either be, settled creatively; accepted followed by 
the making of trade-off choices; or its existence and significance completely denied.155 Either 
way, unlike in the “intentional dimension”, where motives and a range of possible decisions to 
be taken are given, values in the “dispositional dimension” are not predetermined. Conflicting 
norms have to be settled within the mind of the decision-makers in order for them to be able to 
construct an intention. 156 
 
With regard to perceptions as a dispositional factor affecting intentions – and thus foreign policy 
action – Robert K. Merton has argued that, 
 
                                                        
153 Carlsnaes 1987, 88. 
154 Ibid., 93. 
155 This vision adopted by Carlsnaes, is indeed Alexander L. George’s (1980) conception of how leadership can deal 
with value-complexity and uncertainty.  
156 Carlsnaes 1987, 93–94. 
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“[…] men respond not only to the objective features of a situation, but also, and at 
times primarily, to the meaning this situation has for them. And once they have 
assigned some meaning to the situation, their consequent behavior and some of 
the consequences of that behavior are determined by the ascribed meaning.”157 
 
Carlsnaes distinguishes between two questions involved with perceptions. The first question 
involves distortions of reality and other cognitive limitations related to information processes, 
which imply that decision-making follows ‘psycho-logic’ rather than ‘formal logic’. With regard 
to the former, it needs to be noted that the decision-maker’s view of reality does not necessarily 
correspondent to the “objective features of the situation”.158 Actors construct reality through 
assigning and ascribing meanings to their surroundings. For instance, KRG may construct 
Baghdad’s strategies within a particular framework, describing their action as the outcome of 
a carefully calculated policy plan: “Baghdad wants to curtail our autonomy” or “This is a 
declaration of war against the Kurdish people” would be such reality constructions, which may 
but also may not, necessarily correspond to the real situation at hand. The second category of 
cognitive constraints focuses on how the intentions of opposing parties are perceived by the 
leadership. Politics being a terrain where complete knowledge of others’ intentions is indeed 
impossible, there is always the chance of misperception – a subject closely elaborated on by 
Robert Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976). Political leaders 
do, indeed, often act on the basis of images, which are complete misunderstandings of the real 
conditions of their action. For instance, Alexander George describes policy-makers as 
consistency-seekers159; it is easier for the KRG to hold an image of Baghdad as an adversary 
than to change it to a good-willing strategic partner. Another important remark with regard to 
cognitive information processes is the tendency of actors to emphasize variables within the 
intentional dimension when justifying or explaining their action, whereas they usually refer to 
the dispositional variables when referring to other people’s actions. Once again, when 
examining the KRG, we can clearly observe such a pattern: Maliki’s centralizing government 
wants to weaken Kurdish autonomy.  
 
Furthermore, the values and perceptions within the “dispositional dimension” are mutually 
interactive; they reinforce and transform each other. Particular values or norms – such as the 
drive for full independence – may “[...] shape the definition of situations and contribute to the 
                                                        
157 Merton 1957, 421; cf. Carlsnaes 1987, 96. 
158 Carlsnaes 1987, 98. 
159 Ibid., 100–101. 
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process of selective perception”.160 A nationalistically oriented leadership determines the way 
Baghdad or Turkey is perceived of. Accordingly, foreign policy decisions will be based on these 
perceptions.  
 
The third dimension involves evaluating the structural conditions – both internal and external 
– for action. Carlsnaes refers to the factors within this category as “[…] indirect and cognitively 
mediated rather than in the form of directly causal variables”. 161  He does not elaborate 
intensively on this dimension but asserts that the significance of situational-environmental 
factors lies only in how they affect foreign policy actors. They include both natural (non-human) 
as well as ideational (human) conditions. However, even in the case of natural constraints a 
direct line cannot be drawn in between, for instance geopolitical conditions and particular 
types of foreign policies. The link has to be constructed through the cognitive actor – “[…] the 
foreign policy decision-makers of a given state are in some sense or other cognitively 
constrained by factors of this kind, inasmuch as it is the apperception of these, which affects 
their foreign policy actions”.162 Natural constraints are not independent variables in foreign 
policy analysis and to treat them as such leads to what he terms as ‘ecological fallacy’. He 
includes even those cases in which these constraints define a set of possible actions to be taken, 
that amount to almost one possible choice. Thus, for instance, the landlocked position of the 
KRG, which necessitates choosing in between Turkey or Baghdad as an export route for its oil, 
becomes an effective constraint only after going through the cognitive filters of leadership. 
 
With regard to the third dimension, Carlsnaes distinguishes between objective conditions – the 
“concrete givens of the situation, be they geographical, geopolitical, economic, demographic, 
technological” and organizational setting – the abstract and structural decision-making systems 
within which the leadership produces foreign policy decisions.163 The former includes both 
internal and international factors making up for the material conditions, whereas the latter 
concerns the (social) institutional setting within which the leadership of an entity is embedded.  
 
To cut the long story of the link between the three dimensions of foreign policy explanation 
short, one can summarize them in a single equation. The reason for a government’s action can 
                                                        
160 Ibid., 102. 
161 Ibid., 5.   
162 Ibid., 107. 
163 Ibid.,109–110. 
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be explained in terms of its stated foreign policy doctrine (a set of principles). The relationship 
between the two is teleological. These doctrines are a consequence of or caused by belief 
systems – the perceptions and values (operational codes) of these foreign policy decision-
makers. Belief systems are indeed causal – on the one hand in relation to doctrines, and on the 
hand in relation particular foreign policy actions. Finally, belief systems have been formed 
within “[…] the particular foreign policy organization and decisional environment of the state 
in question”. 164  What is interesting about Carlsnaes’ model, is that it can accommodate each of 
the four approaches introduced earlier in his taxonomy. The causal link between the structural 
and the dispositional dimensions can be examined, for instance, via the “social-institutional” or 
“structural” approaches in the taxonomy introduced earlier, while the causal patterns between 
dispositional and intentional dimensions can be studied via the agency-based approaches. 
“Interpretative actor” approaches come in handy when looking into the teleological link 
between intentions and actual foreign policy decisions. In other words, according to Carlsnaes, 
the different approaches of the taxonomy become feasible for the study on foreign policy as 
long as they are located within the right spots in the synthetic model he has developed.  
 
As demonstrated above, Carlsnaes conceptual framework has the potential to realize a fruitful 
foreign policy analysis of, for instance, KRG’s decision to stay within Iraq after the fall of the 
Baathist regime instead of declaring independence. The construction of an explanation of 
foreign policy action within the intentional, dispositional and situational dimensions can 
indeed take an institutional perspective without having to exclude the interpretivist 
epistemology. There aren’t always two stories to tell as Hollis and Smith 165  implied – 
interpretative agents appear to be a part of the same story, in which also objective structures 
play a part.  
 
4.3. Conclusions 
 
This chapter was an attempt to capture the substantialist approaches to foreign policy analysis.  
I began by an overview of foreign policy as a unit of analysis (4.1.). This was followed by the 
introduction of the conventional way of addressing foreign policy through the international-
domestic (substantive) divide. Considering this fixation on different levels of analysis as 
                                                        
164 Ibid. 103–104. 
165 Hollis and Smith 1990, 7. 
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obscuring a more important meta-theoretical division within the field, I decided to abandon the 
study of foreign policy through the substantive view. Following Carlsnaes, I introduced foreign 
policy through two meta-theoretical issues separating analysts; the ontological agent-structure 
problem and the epistemological/methodological question of different modes of analysis (4.2.). 
Acknowledging the insufficiencies of these substantialist approaches via illustrative examples, 
I ended up presenting Carlsnaes tripartite model, aiming to fill in for the defects of the 
substantialist ontologies of individualists and holists. However, I have concluded that due to a 
variety of reasons, the tripartite model cannot serve the purpose of this inquiry and will, 
therefore, not be applied in this research. The most important of these reasons is its inability to 
capture the dynamic relationship between agents and structures over time. This fundamental 
defect will be examined further in Chapter 5.  
 
CHAPTER 5: EXAMINING FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT VIA 
THE RELATIONALIST MODELS  
 
5.1. Dynamic Statics of Inputs and Outputs Versus the Diachronic Analysis 
of Processes  
 
The previous chapter focused on the multifaceted debate between individualists and holists in 
foreign policy analysis. As a solution to their deadlock, Carlsnaes presented an abstract model 
capable of accommodating the approaches in a single conceptual framework. However, this did 
not provide the means to address agential and structural dynamics involved in foreign policy 
development. Carlsnaes was still faced with a fundamental issue here: how to accommodate 
change in foreign policy through the dynamic interrelationship of actors such as the KRG and 
their context. While he recognized that the problem with the four rock-bottom types of 
explanatory frameworks was not so much in their epistemologies as it was in their black-boxing 
ontologies, Carlsnaes could yet not capture the idea of foreign policy change – a question I am 
seeking to answer in this inquiry. His tripartite model only enabled synchronic analysis. No 
matter how deep or sharp of an image this model gave one, it still could not conceptualize its 
object of study in motion but ended up, instead, isolating it from the wider processes of 
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change.166  Carlsnaes was well aware of this problem.167 To apprehend development, he had a 
few options, out of which two demonstrate the differences between substantialist and 
relationalist analysis of foreign policy change most clearly: dynamic statics and diachronic 
process analysis.168 While the substantialist assumptions of holists and individualists made 
sense of change via the former, the relationalist models approached the question via the latter. 
The main difference between the two was that in substantialist conceptualizations of change, it 
was the variables that did the acting and caused change whereas in relationalist models it was 
the complex interdependencies that contingently, yet path-dependently led to change. Let me 
examine dynamic statics first. I will return to diachronic conceptualizations of change in 5.4. 
“Archer’s Morphogenetic Model meets Carlsnaes’ Tripartite Model”. 
 
If the tripartite model made sense of change following the substantialist assumption of entities 
preceding rather than anteceding the relations they were embedded in, the acting elements 
causing change would be agents and structures rather than their relations. Such substantialist 
visions would explain change as billiard balls slamming into each other until change was finally 
produced in the last collision. This type of an account would necessitate moments of rupture or 
and either/or choice in which changes occur.169 Methodologically this would mean viewing 
different foreign policy decisions as static snapshots; to explain change two or more such 
snapshots would be chosen and compared to see whether and why they were different; hence 
“dynamic statics.” Such models would not, however, address the process of how one got from 
one snapshot to the other.170 Making sense of KRG’s foreign policy development via dynamic 
statics would be realized in a following manner. In snapshot 1 KRG’s decision to stay within 
Iraq would be examined via the tripartite model to see the intentional, dispositional and 
structural explanations behind the decision. In snapshot 2, KRG’s decision to grant IOCs with 
                                                        
166 Hay 2002, 146–147. 
167  In his own words, the tripartite model could account for snapshots of particular foreign policy decisions 
treating them “[…] as ultimately constrained by a number of given situational-structural factors (both domestic 
and international), some presumably similar in all the cases analyzed, others specific to each country” (Carlsnaes 
1992, 266). 
168 Hay (2002, 147–150) introduces three different analytical strategies for conceptualizing change; synchronic 
analysis, comparative statics and diachronic analysis. The first one cannot capture change at all for it can only 
examine single snapshots of reality. Comparative statics are also problematic because they presume temporality 
of change in advance – they pre-handedly assume a change and then examine whether or not it has really 
happened. As such the methodological strategy only becomes a reflection of a change that is already assumed to 
have taken place. Diachronic analysis examines change via interdependent relations unfolding over time – 
contingently, yet path-dependently.  
169 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 299. 
170  Ibid., Albeit not referring to Carlsnaes in particular, Jackson and Nexon, indeed, criticize these models of 
dynamic statics for not being able to account for development and change over time.  
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PSCs would be similarly filtered through the tripartite model. The two snapshots would then 
be compared to see where the differences responsible for change (if there is any) lay – in the 
intentional, dispositional or structural dimensions or perhaps all of them. Consequently the 
answer to the question of “How can we explain foreign policy change of the KRG?” would be 
given by pointing to changes in these different dimensions.   
 
The problem of adopting an analytical strategy like this lies in its incapability to capture 
development in motion, as the result of agential and structural factors over time. In other 
words, snapshots cannot be genuinely connected so that foreign policy development becomes 
examined as a process in motion, in which former decisions (snapshot 1) have an impact on 
subsequent situational-structural conditions and the dispositional dimensions of forthcoming 
decisions (snapshot 2). In the words of Jackson and Nexon in dynamic statics “[…] the assertion 
of change fills in for any account of change” 171  Just like the deficiencies associated with 
synchronic analysis, Carlsnaes also recognized those accompanying this type of dynamic 
statics, which is why he, in his later writings, suggested the tripartite approach to be located 
within diachronic models.172 As mentioned above, I will delve deeper into Carlsnaes’ suggestion 
in “5.4. Archer’s Morphogenetic Model meets Carlsnaes’ Tripartite Model”, but before that, a 
brief account of relationalism in foreign policy analysis is warranted. 
 
5.2. Relations Before Entities 
  
As we saw in Carlsnaes’ illuminating four rock-bottom types of foreign policy explanations, 
holists and individualists were ill-equipped to challenge the essence of their pre-given entities; 
none of these models could question agents and structures simultaneously, in a single 
framework. This paralysis, indeed, led them to the causal reduction of one to the other; agents 
and structures became black-boxed instead of being understood as constantly moving and 
changing objects of social inquiry. The main reason for the impasse can be attributed to the 
substantialist view that these two ontologies had of reality. Their presumptions gave 
precedence to entities at the expense of their relations, which is why they could not 
accommodate the idea of change adequately either.173 It is also for this reason that the holists 
                                                        
171 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 299.  
172 Carlsnaes 1992, 263–264. 
173 This became manifested in the previous chapter through a closer examination of dynamic statics. 
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and individualist were unable to meet each other at any point and were usually considered 
being mutually exclusive. As Jackson and Nexon have argued, paradigmatic debates in IR have 
focused on methodological and epistemological questions, which have obscured the more 
essential ontological dividing line between them; namely the line between substantialism and 
relationalism. One had to return to the most basic ontological principles regarding the 
relationship of agents and structures in order to capture what was really at stake in social and 
political analysis.174 The problem with most of IR theories was that they were substantialist in 
a sense that they either black-boxed the state, the individual or the ethnic group as a primitive 
given.175 No matter what the black-boxed entity, as Jackson and Nexon argued, “[…] the basic 
ontological move [was] exactly the same – units come first, then like billiard balls on a table, 
they are put into motion and their interactions are the patterns we observe in political life.”176 
As demonstrated above, approaches to foreign policy analysis were inflicted with the same 
disease. Entities were entities before they entered relations with other entities.177  
 
Drawing on the works of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley (1949), Mustafa Emirbayer 
developed a typology of two forms of substantialism reflecting the essentialist positions 
described above; “self-action” and “inter-action”. In the former entities act under their own 
powers, be it de facto states, ethnic communities, individuals or social structures. In 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis the methodological individualisms and 
holisms depicted in Carlsnaes’ taxonomy correspond to this type of substantialism based on 
self-action.178 Whether KRG is treated as a rational maximizer of given utilities or as a norm-
follower, does not change the fact that all political decisions made by it is reduced to the pre-
given agents (the KRG indeed) and their interactions with other agents (the leadership of 
Turkey, Baghdad). 179  In methodological structuralism, in turn, whether structures are 
considered being material constraints (such as the distribution of power) or social and 
normative conditions of action (such as international norms of sovereignty), does not change 
the fact that they are treated as self-subsistent and exclusive sources of action independent 
                                                        
174 Hay 2002, 116. 
175 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 307–308. 
176 Ibid., 293. 
177 Ibid.  
178 Ibid., 292–293; Emirbayer 1997, 283–286. 
179  In Carlsnaes taxonomy the former refers indeed to the ”agency-based perspective” and the latter to the 
”interpretative actor perspective”.  
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from KRG’s agency.180 Neither individualism nor structuralism can accommodate the idea of 
agents and structures continuously changing through their relations; change in agents’ 
behavior is causally attributed to structures and change in structural patterns causally 
attributed to agents. As we saw in in Carlsnaes’ taxonomy, KRG’s agency itself did not change 
throughout its actions; it was only the preferences (“structural” and “agency-based 
perspectives”) or norms (“social-institutional” and “interpretative actor perspectives”) guiding 
its foreign policy decisions that altered, causing changes in its behavior.181 KRG as such did not, 
at any point change any of its assumed essential attributes. 
 
The second variant of substantialism – “inter-action” is more prevalent in IR and FPA; entities 
do not generate their own action but are instead “[…] the empty settings within which causation 
occurs”.182 In this form of substantialism the KRG or Turkey do not act per se; it is their variable 
secondary attributes, such as the power they possess, that change and are – as such – 
responsible for the acting. However, once again the entities’ primary attributes remain 
unchanged throughout these interactions. 183  Just like in “self-action”, the essence of these 
billiard balls is not problematized, but taken as given. This is one of the fundamental defects of 
Wendtian constructivism, which is supposed to be based on the relationalist sociology of 
Bhaskar. His assumptions reject any changes in the constitutive or primary properties of the 
state agent; “[…] they remain states with the requisite attributes which define them as states 
(territory, international recognition etc). 184  This kind of substantialist approach to the 
examination of de facto states is highly problematic, because their definition, nature, authority 
and powers are in a constant state of flux.185  
 
The central problem of substantialism is the either/or distinction through which it views 
reality. This does not only apply to the conceptualization of agents and structures but is 
apparent also elsewhere within the discipline; action is either rational or interpretative, 
knowledge is either socially constructed or corresponds to the world, social outcomes are the 
                                                        
180  In Carlsnaes’ taxonomy methodological individualisms and holisms that treat agency naturalistically 
(”structural” and ”agency-based perspectives”) are epitomized in different variants of rational choice theory.   
181 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 293. 
182 Emirbayer 1997, 286. 
183 Waltzian neorealism is a good example of this; states’ powers change but states, as such, do not change. 
184 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 293–294. 
185 Artens, August, 13th, 2013. I will return to the question of power as conceptualized by relationalist models, in 
general, and the SRA, in particular, at a later phase.  
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result of either action or structures.186 The impasse of this kind of substantialism can be aptly 
overcome by adopting a relationalist mode of analysis; instead of examining pre-given entities 
as constant units – be it agents or structures or their “inter-action” – one should focus on 
processes of social transactions as logically preceding entities that constitute them. Only then 
can the individualist-holist deadlock be overcome, the two components of reality truly related 
and, as such, their pre-given essences principally questioned.187 Let me delve a bit deeper into 
the relationalist sociology. 
 
According to the relationalist approaches neither structures nor agents have a true essence or 
an intrinsic nature so that they can be examined separately from the relations they are 
embedded in. It is through relations that entities gain and transform their nature and meaning; 
in social sciences, there is, in other words, no natural kinds. Instead of being subordinate to 
entities as Aristotle assumed, relations are assumed to logically precede them. 188  Stephan 
Fuchs has summarized the basic assumption of relationalism aptly in the following manner:  
 
“Things are what they are because of their location and movement in a network 
or system of forces; they do not assume a fixed and constant position in the 
network because of their essential properties. A network is a field of relationships 
between nodes that vary with their relationships. A cell becomes part of the liver, 
not the brain, not because its inherent nature is to become a part of the liver, but 
because a complex interaction between the selective activation of its DNA, and 
the network of other cells to which it becomes linked, makes it so"189  
  
Relationalist approaches, thus, claim that entities are entirely embedded in processes and 
relations, so that they do not have an internal core separate from the transactions they are 
embedded in.190 As noted in the introductory chapter, there are a great number of different 
versions of relationalism, all of which I cannot address in this inquiry. My attempt is only to 
shed light on two of them, which view relationalism particularly through the agent-structure 
debate; Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach invoked by Walter Carlsnaes and the less 
known effort in the field – the strategic-relational approach – developed by Bob Jessop, Colin 
                                                        
186 Fuchs 2001, 12-13. 
187 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 291–292. 
188 Fuchs 2001, 12–13. 
189 Ibid., 16. 
190 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 297–300.  
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Hay and David Marsh.191 As mentioned in the introductory chapter, I have chosen the two 
because they can be considered as two competitive versions of relationalist analysis of foreign 
policy development; the former being a dualist and the latter an anti-dualist model. Archer’s 
morphogenetic approach will be introduced via the critique she has targeted at a fellow 
relationalist – Anthony Giddens – whereas the SRA, in turn, will be presented via the critique 
Bob Jessop and Colin Hay have targeted at Archer.   
 
In spite of their dissimilarities, the morphogenetic approach and the SRA are both based on Roy 
Bhaskar’s critical realism; instead of assuming a relationship of mere efficient causality 
between agents and structures, they begin with Bhaskar’s system theory in order to 
incorporate the vision of a dialectical interplay between agents and structures as mutually 
constitutive components of social reality.192 As relationalist models, they both aim at adopting 
a complex view of causality and incorporating the two modes of analysis – understanding and 
explaining in a single framework. Even more importantly, when it comes to the 
conceptualization of change in foreign policy over time, the two approaches are capable of 
accommodating the notion of development as a continuous process. Realizing the framework it 
provides for diachronic analysis, it is for no reason that Carlsnaes has turned to the relationalist 
model of Archer to make sense of foreign policy change.193 This inquiry, however, utilizes only 
the SRA to the analysis of the development of the KRG’s foreign policy. The main reason for 
rejecting Carlsnaes’ suggestion is the misleading dualism of Archer’s analytical model he is 
advocating. Suffice it to say at this point that the SRA has aptly avoided a few pitfalls Archer has 
stumbled upon. Unlike Archer’s the morphogenetic approach, Jessop’s anti-dualist version of 
relationalism can capture the spatio-temporal co-extensivity of agents and structures. At the 
heart of the SRA’s ability to overcome the deficiencies present in Archer’s model, is its analytical 
relativization of agents and structures. Jessop reformulates of the two components of reality as 
“strategic action” (agents) and “strategically selective context” (structures). As such, according 
to Elisabetta Brighi, who has applied the SRA to the foreign policy analysis of Italy, foreign 
policy development becomes viewed as a “[…] dialectical interplay between the actor’s own 
strategy (based on the assessments of the leadership), on the one hand, and the strategically 
                                                        
191 Brighi 2013, 33. 
192 Ibid., 24 
193 Carlasnaes has recognized the impact that relationalist thinkers such as Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer have 
had on IR theory as “tremendous” indeed (Guzzini 2013, 81–82). 
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selective context (the multiple selectivities of the environment), on the other.”194 I will focus on 
the SRA in Chapter 6. Let me move on to the general introduction of the relationalist system 
theories.   
 
5.3. Introducing the Dialectical models to the Agent-Structure Problem 
 
5.3.1. Points of Agreement 
 
The critical implications of individualist and holist ontologies on both IR theory as well as 
Foreign Policy Analysis indeed led to the introduction of dialectical social ontologies, which 
attempted to go beyond the reductionist boxes of the matrix introduced by Carlsnaes above. 
These system theories criticized the substantialist deadlock of viewing agents and structures in 
terms of causal reduction of one to the other, and recognized the need to address their mutual 
constitutiveness; the two components of reality were not causally linked but, instead, co-
determined. 195  As Jackson and Nexon argued, agents instantiated structures through their 
action, while those structures simultaneously constrained and enabled agency.196 Among these 
dialectical synthesis efforts, those of Anthony Giddens and Roy Bhaskar/Margaret Archer 
remain the most notable, yet highly contestable efforts.197  
 
The structuration theory of Giddens and the critical realism of Bhaskar both conceptualized 
society as an autopoietic system, maintained by the interplay of both agents and structures:198 
reality was Janus-faced.199 Agents were situated in a structured context, which, on the one hand, 
imposed uneven constraints on them and, on the other, provided opportunities to realize their 
interests. Over time actors, however, transformed and developed that context through the 
intended and unintended consequences of their actions.200 Social world became conceptualized 
as a self-producing mechanism in which micro-structures fed into the macrostructures 
                                                        
194 Brighi 2013, 37. 
195 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295.  
196 Wendt 1987, 360–361: It is important to note at this point that, the dialectical stance does not compete with 
neorealism, liberalism or world-systems theory, but with their individualist and holist social ontologies, which 
take either agents or structures as given without theorizing them. Mistaking constructivism for a substantive 
theory has, indeed, been usual within our field: constructivism is however, a social ontology, not a theory of 
International Relations. 
197 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295.  
198 Carlsnaes 1992, 256–257. 
199 Archer 1995: 65–66. 
200 Hay 2002, 116–117. 
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reproducing or transforming the system. 201  “Our life passes by in transformation”, argued 
Giddens.202   
 
While recognizing the reality and the role of potentially unobserved structures generating 
agents, these system theoreticians, refused the functionalist tradition of reducing agents to 
“structural dupes” who did nothing but realized systemic imperatives.203 There was indeed a 
level of practical reason and consciousness behind the motivation and intentionality of agents, 
which also had to be accounted for. Nevertheless, they argued, social action could not be 
reduced to mere individual facts and interactions either.204 Bhaskar elaborated on this clearly 
when suggesting that, 
 
“We do not create society – the error of voluntarism. But these structures which 
pre-exist us are only reproduced or transformed in our everyday activities; thus 
society does not exist independently of human agency – the error of reification.”205 
 
Since structures did not operate independently of the motives and reasons actors had for why 
they did what they did, society became, as he argued, “[…] the unmotivated consequence for all 
our motivated productions”.206 
 
Most importantly, these dialectical theoreticians called for diachronic analysis to capture the 
relationalism depicted in their ontologies. As such, system theoreticians opposed to mere 
synchronic neo-positivist theorization of ‘rules of the game’ or dynamic/comparative statics, 
which could not capture reality in motion. With a commitment to diachronic analysis they tried 
to incorporate this complex process of macro- and micro-phenomena feeding into each other 
as described above. For instance, by replacing the concept of “structure” with “structuration”, 
Giddens tried to demonstrate the processual nature of synchronic structures. He claimed that 
the process of dynamically produced and reproduced structures over time could be captured 
only by diachronic analysis.207  
 
                                                        
201 Maturana 1987, 349: Autopoietic systems produce their own components and are autonomous organizations.  
202 Giddens 1979, 3.  
203 This is a concept used by Anthony Giddens (1979) who criticizes the inability of individualist and holists to 
address the interdependence of action and structure.  
204 List and Spiekermann, 2013, 629; Brighi 2013, 13. 
205 Bhaskar 1989, 4.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295.  
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5.3.2. Points of Disagreement in Ontology and Methodology: Structural Dualism Versus 
Structural Duality 
 
At this point it is essential to note that, in spite of a common ontological core necessitating 
diachronic analysis, the two approaches of Giddens and Bhaskar differed with regard to how 
they conceptualized the relationship between agents and structures responsible for the 
structuration process.208 The former argued that agents and structures comprised a duality. 
They were the metals in the alloy from which the coin – society indeed – was forged.209 Based 
on her reading of Bhaskar, Margaret Archer, instead argued for the ontological and analytical 
distinction between agents and structures – structural dualism. She termed her own approach 
the emergentist view: even though reality was attributable to both agents and structures, one 
had to be careful not to conflate structure with agency but instead examine their interplay over 
time as “two emergent strata of social reality”.210 According to Archer and most of the critical 
realist camp, dissolving structures and agents into a vague structuration theory – a structural 
duality – the way Giddens had done, was to adopt an elisionist view. 211 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, social ontologies were significant to the extent that they determined 
methodologies applied in empirical analysis.212  I attempted to demonstrate this via the critical 
implications of individualist and holist approaches to foreign policy analysis, which necessarily 
reduced the question of agency exclusively either to individuals and their interactions or to 
structures. Just like the ontologies of these substantialist approaches led to their distinctive 
methodologies (individualist and holist), so did the dialectic ontologies of the relationalist 
system theories. System theoreticians like Archer, Giddens and Wendt, indeed, suggested 
different methodologies to capture the processual nature of reality depicted above, albeit they 
all agreed on the superiority of diachronic analysis. This inquiry is particularly interested in the 
empirical utility of the two different analytical models developed by Margaret Archer and Bob 
Jessop. For, as we came to see, in spite of their more or less similar ontologies based on 
                                                        
208 Hay 2002, 117. Stroker and Marsh (2010, 215) have also pointed out that in spite of mutual agreement on some 
central tenets, there were some major disagreements among the invokers of the dialectic approach indeed. Marsh 
argues that, “[…] the most important issues in the literature on these meta-theoretical issues revolve around the 
debates within the dialectical position”. What is heating the discussion even further is the fact that the dialectical 
social ontology has been less applied in empirical research, unlike its structuralist and individualist counterparts. 
209  This is opposed to being the flip-sides of the same coin. 
210 Archer 1995, 60.  
211 Archer 1985, 226–229; Carlsnaes 1992, 258; Howarth 2013, 138–139. 
212 As Archer argues indeed; ”Since theories are propositions containing concepts and since all concepts have their 
referents (pick out features held to belong to social reality), then there can be no social theory without an 
accompanying social ontology (implicit or explicit).” (Archer 1995, 12.)  
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Bhaskar’s critical realism, Jessop and Archer had different conceptualizations of how the agent-
structure relationship should be operationalized in an empirical study. These disagreements 
are at the heart of the differences underlying their suggested methodological models for the 
analysis of social reality. 
 
Let me get back to the different relationalist ontologies for a moment. As noted above, Giddens’ 
structural duality invoked the ontological inseparability of agents and structures.213 However, 
the methodology he suggested for the empirical operationalization of his ontological 
assumption, could not deliver an adequate account of this duality. For Giddens, namely, claimed 
that the structuration process should be empirically studied via the methodological bracketing 
of either agents or structures to examine the other.214 Alexander Wendt followed the lead of 
Giddens’ methodological suggestion. He argued that since the dialectical social ontology was 
based on the inclusion both principal units of analysis – agents and structures 215 – scientific 
research aiming to operationalize such ontology had to be capable of capturing both elements 
as well. A viable methodology would, on the one hand, provide a “[…] synchronic model of the 
organizing principle (rules of the game), logic, and reproduction requirements” of the 
structures and, on the other, a “[…] historical account of the genesis and reproduction of the 
structure”.216 Social inquiry needed to be able to include both the questions of why something 
happened (synchronic/structural analysis) as well as how something became possible in the 
first place (diachronic/historical analysis). Where structural analysis focused on finding law-
like regularities or rules of the game, which set the frames for agential action, historical analysis 
concentrated on the explanation of the socially constructed nature of these patterns.217 We can 
see that in Wendt’s suggestion, structural analysis concerned itself with neo-positivist causal 
explanations on ”[…] how incentives in the environment affected behavior”, and that, as such, 
it took identities and interests as given. Historical analysis, in turn, focused on constitutive 
accounts of the origins of these identities. 218  By presenting these two different analytical 
                                                        
213 Giddens’ central argument is that structures can only be instantiated in action.  
214 Hay 2002, 124. . In other words, he advises an analytical distinction between the two – which is exactly what 
Archer suggests to be done in her morphogenetic model claiming to be addressing the deficiencies of Giddens. 
215 Wendt 1987, 365.  
216 Ibid. 
217 ibid. Structural theorization and process theorization, which rationalism and constructivism are examples of, 
are therefore not incompatible; they simply ask different questions. 
218 Wendt 1999, 367: Examining context of action – the incentives for an actor to act in a particular manner – 
requires the bracketing of agential action and vice versa. Therefore, argued Wendt, when rationalism as a 
“methodological convenience” examines actors’ behavior at a particular instant, based on their given identities, it 
does not deny agency. The case is quite the opposite: the moment these decisions are made is the embodiment of 
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strategies, Wendt tried to demonstrate how the dialectical ontologies – unlike their 
individualist and collectivist counterparts – did not necessitate reductionist methodological 
positions. They could, instead incorporate both modes of analysis – “understanding” and 
“explaining” – the two forms of knowledge necessary for the demonstration of the processual 
nature of reality.219  However – and this is an important point – Wendt argued that the two 
questions of why and how could not be examined simultaneously. The relationalist ontology he 
had adopted had indeed brought him methodological difficulties, which he decided to ‘solve’ by 
following Giddens. Wendt suggested that in order to study rules of the game (structures) one 
had to temporarily take players (agents) as given; and in order to study how agents came to 
possess the identities and interests they had, one had to temporarily bracket the rules of the 
game (structures).220  However, as we will come to see, this “solution” proved to be rather 
unsatisfactory, because it was still unable to capture the temporal co-extensivity of agents and 
structures. Both Wendt’s and Giddens’ methodological suggestions rested on – according to the 
SRA – a erroneous assumption of dualism, according to which agents could be examined 
separately from the structures they were embedded in and vice versa. 221 
 
Instead of beginning with what was Giddens’ greatest weakness – the incompatibility of the 
suggested methodology of bracketing with his ontological duality– Margaret S. Archer decided 
to start with the methodology suggested by Wendt. 222  Fixated on her critique targeted at 
Giddens’ assumedly fallacious ontology, she argued that structural duality cannot 
accommodate Wendt’s suggestion of historical analysis (of the social construction of 
structures): Wendt’s analysis necessitated the separation of agents from structures, which 
                                                        
agential practice – the identities and interests are reproduced or transformed with those decisions. This is the 
process which only constructivist theorizing can grasp, that is, how particular identities and interests become 
treated as given through reproduction. 
219  The dialectical ontologies such as that of Wendt and Archer acknowledged the importance of the 
interconnectedness of the two questions, which is also why Waltz was perceived of as a reductionist. It is indeed 
the case Waltz’ Man, State and War, is entirely based on the separation of the two questions. His distinction is 
based on a methodological structuralist position, which conceptualizes structure as law-like regularities causally 
affecting the behavior of actors through socialization and competition. This is not to say that he denies the 
relevance of unit-level causes, but merely that the system-level causes can be examined independently from them. 
His claim that there is no need for a theorization of the interrelationship between the two he has been the mostly 
criticized aspect of his writings (Wight 2010, 129–130). Waltz’ main problem lies with the materialistic conception 
of structure he adopts, which does not acknowledge that structures may have also constitutive, not only causal 
effect on agents.  
220 Wendt 1987, 33–35; 184–190; 367–378. 
221 Hay 2002, 124. However, whereas Wendt’s ontological theory – being based on Bhaskarian structural dualism 
rather than Giddens’ structural duality – is compatible with the methodology (bracketing) he suggests; Gidden’s 
structuration theory is not.   
222 Hay 2002, 123.  
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Gidden’s structuration theory could not accommodate, because it did not distinguish between 
the two.223 Archer argued, that the structurationist theory lacked a conception of structuring 
over time, which was of great importance to Wendt’s historical analyses of temporal relations 
between agents and structures: that is, how rules of the game are constructed and reproduced 
over time; “[…] because agency and structure, are according to Giddens two sides of the 
same thing, the bracketed elements must be coterminous in time; it follows from this that 
temporal relations between institutional structure and strategic action logically cannot 
be examined.”224 Giddens’ ontology could not be empirically tested because the methodology 
of bracketing he suggested ignored time, the utmost important factor in conceptualizing 
structuration as a temporally unfolding process.225 Giddens’ structuration theory was, thus, 
deemed to be of no use in realizing Wendt’s creative empirical ambitions.226  What is ironic here 
is that Giddens, in fact, suggested exactly what Wendt did as well. In spite of Archer’s claim that 
the problem with Giddens was analytical rather than ontological227, we can see clearly here, 
that Archer’s critique was targeted at the assumedly fallacious ontology of duality collapsing 
agents and structures together. She did not pay much attention to the real problem with 
Giddens’ thoughts; the erroneous nature of the methodology suggested by him.228 Archer, was, 
in other words, not that troubled with whether or not Giddens managed to deliver in 
methodology what he promised in ontology – that is, whether or not bracketing as an 
operationalizing method succeeded in carrying the structurationist ontology into a viable 
methodology. Instead, her focus was on defending a structural dualism against Giddens’ false 
assumption of structural duality. 229 Being too focused on formulating an (dualist) ontology that 
could accommodate Wendt’s methodology, she began with an unwarranted critique of Giddens’ 
                                                        
223 Archer 1995, 15–16. She appealed to Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity, which she then 
associated her morphogenetic approach with, as an explanatory social methodology. 
224 Ibid., 87–88. 
225 Archer 87–88. 
226 Carlsnaes 1992, 256–259. 
227 Archer 1995, 87–88: Her attention was on the fact that structuration theory was based on the notion of the co-
terminous nature of agents and structures in time, which could not be tested by bracketing. The problem was not 
ontological but analytical. Methodological bracketing required the ignorance of time, which was essential to 
ontological duality. It is for this reason that Archer came to suggest a model of her own that could incorporate time 
as a variable in social analysis. 
228 Hay 2002, 123. This is where according to Hay Giddens’ weakness lies: his inability to deliver in methodology 
what he promises in his ontology. The main problem of the suggested methodologies in the field has been to 
capture the processual nature of reality. Most of the suggested analytical models, such as that of Wendt, Giddens 
and Archer – are faulty exactly because they are incompatible with their assumed ontologies. This is where the 
SRA has centered its focus on; the inability of these relationalist theoreticians to deliver in methodology what they 
promise in ontology. 
229 Wight 2013, 123. 
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assumed subjectivist bias or voluntarist methodological stance: according to Archer the 
structuration theory’s focus on processes did not allow any explanatory autonomy for agents 
and structures.230 This in turn led to Giddens’ failure to acknowledge the structural constraints 
imposed on agents independent of their knowledge of it.231 It was for this reason that Archer 
developed an analytical model separating agents from structures temporally – in order to be 
capable to examine their autonomous explanatory roles. While this morphogenetic approach 
was introduced as an analytical tool – it was in fact an ontological statement in support of the 
problematic dualism criticized by the SRA.232 In the next chapter, I will introduce this model as 
represented by Archer. I will, yet, not focus the critique targeted at it from different directions, 
particularly from the viewpoint of the SRA.  
 
5.4. Archer’s Morphogenetic Model meets Carlsnaes’ Tripartite Model 
 
Archer claimed that her morphogenetic approach came as a response to the inability of the 
structurationist model to translate the mutual constitution of agents and structures into a viable 
methodology. According to her, the bracketing suggested by Giddens necessitated the 
ignorance of time, which was, however of great importance to capture ontological duality. To 
“solve” this problem, she added time as an external variable and argued for the analytical 
separation of agents and structures temporally.233 What resulted was a model of structuration 
over time: structures logically predated actions, which transformed them, so that new 
action was initiated within a new context.234 The relationship between action and structures 
became sequential so that conditions inherited from the past affected present actions and were 
subsequently transformed (at least to a certain extent) in ‘structural elaboration’. Archer’s 
analytical distinction was, however, essentially an ontological assessment, because Archer 
                                                        
230 However, the demarcating lines in between the two perceptions are not as clear as it might seem at first. The 
disagreements depend in some parts to the radicalizing interpretations of Giddens. For instance, John Mingers 
(2004, 411) criticizes Archer and her fellow critical realists for erecting “[…] something of a straw man in their 
characterization of Giddens who would not hold some of the most extreme positions that they impose on him.  
231 Howarth 2013, 138–143. 
232 King 1999, 200; Hay 2002, 124. 
233 Her ”analytical” distinction, however, hardened into an ontological one, as we shall see (King 1999, 200; Hay 
2002, 124). 
234 Archer 1985, 60. 
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claimed that agents and structures resided in different temporal domains.235  The model is 
demonstrated below in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Agent-Structure Problem as Conceptualized by Margaret Archer (Adopted from Carlsnaes 1992, 
260). According to Archer the methodological bracketing Giddens suggested could not take time into account, and, 
as such, was ill-equipped to address when it was that structures were transformed instead of being reproduced or, 
in other words, when it was that agency accounted instead of structures. Accordingly, Archer found Giddens’ 
assumption that “[…] the possibility of change is recognized as inherent in every circumstance of social 
reproduction” more or less problematic (Giddens 1979: 210). To answer the question of when it was that 
structures prevailed over agents, Archer introduced the above depicted morphogenetic model as an alternative to 
Giddensian bracketing; she added time as an external variable to separate agents from structures. The 
“morphogenetic sequence” demonstrated endless cycles of ‘sequential structural conditioning’’social 
interaction’’structural elaboration. Instead of claiming that structures persisted only because they represented 
the will of the powerful as Giddens did, Archer suggested that rules of the game (structures) prevailed because of 
three main reasons: they temporarily resisted to collective pressures to change, they represented the interests of 
the powerful or were psychologically supported by the population.  
 
What Archer suggested to be done in order to solve the epistemological issue that Giddens’ 
duality according to her failed to do, was to penetrate the dynamics of the relationship between 
agents and structures. Doing so required the uncovering of the cycles depicted above by 
breaking them up into intervals. When it came to action, agents entered into previously 
structured conditions: their ”[…] knowledge about it, attitudes towards it, vested 
interests in retaining it and objective capacities for changing it”, had already been 
                                                        
235 King 1999, 200; Hay 2002, 124: This is indeed an interesting point because Archer suggests that the separation 
of agents and structures is merely analytical. However, in her later works she seems to be recognizing the necessity 
of an ontological dualism for her analytical separation. Furthermore, she has argued for the consistence of her 
work with Bhaskar’s critical realism – an ontological dualist (Archer 1995, 135–41; 157). 
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distributed and determined by the rules of the game.236 A central remark that Archer 
made was that structural elaboration occurred in time, as a slow process in which action 
entered context, context changed, and subsequent action entered a new context. 
Furthermore, where Giddens attributed the transformation of the rules of the game to 
the reflexive knowledge and behavior of agents, Archer viewed that structures changed 
after action had entered them.237 Social reality was reducible to agents and structures, 
not just one of them. “The whole is implicated in the parts in two senses“, argued Archer, 
“[…] it emerges from them and it acts back upon them”.238 We can see here, how she 
tries to highlight her (assumedly) relationalist approach to social reality; change can be 
understood only through the examination of relations, not via the intrinsic nature of 
things. However, as we will come to see in the critique targeted at Archer in Chapter 6, 
because of locating agents and structures in different temporal domains, her model 
came to do exactly what the relationalists criticized substantialists of doing: that is, it 
studied pre-given entities (structures and agents) prior to examining the relations they 
were embedded in.239  
 
Nevertheless, Walter Carlsnaes followed the footsteps of Archer and applied the morphogenetic 
approach to his tripartite model. The aim was indeed to transform the conceptual framework 
so that it could capture the dynamic interplay of agents and structures in social and political 
change over time. Carlsnaes justified this move by the immense potential he saw in Archer’s 
(once again, assumedly) relationalist morphogenetic cycles to address the dynamics of change. 
Accordingly, he listed a variety of advantages it entailed for foreign policy analysis in the 
following manner.240  
 
                                                        
236 Archer 1995, 240. 
237 Hence Archer’s critique targeted at Giddens’ individualist methodology. Since Giddens attributed change to the 
reflexive knowledge of agents, he failed to see that change was instantiated not by entities (substantialism) but 
instead within relations (relationalism).  
238 Archer 1995, 246-247. 
239 Based on Bartelson’s (1995, 48) critique Jackson and Nexon (1999, 295) argue that ”[…] by treating them 
[agents and structures] analytically as autonomous at given points of time, their ’mutually constitutive’ relationship 
is left to the causal unfolding of interaction of separate elements.” [italics added]. 
240 Brighi 2013, 25: Brighi has also argued that in order to be able to account for foreign policy change, Carlsnaes’ 
tripartite model needs to be modified. 
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Archer’s cycles, first of all, managed to include both agents and structures as codetermining 
action. This solution, in turn led to incorporating both intended and unintended consequences 
of action: foreign policy action became distinguished from foreign policy outcomes, which was 
the second advantage of adopting the critical realist approach invoked by Archer. What this 
meant was that, foreign policy outcomes could incorporate also the unintentional 
consequences of action, which were of particular importance when analyzing the implications 
of behavior on the context within which further action would take place. A particular foreign 
policy act became entangled with its complex structural consequences. Having mixed together, 
these elements then, in turn constituted “ […] future dispositions of actors and hence also their 
intentions and subsequent actions”.241 The third implication concerned the discourses, which 
mediated in between the “dispositional” and “intentional dimensions” of his tripartite model. 
Ideas and perceptions were something that Archer herself did not elaborate closely on, but 
which Carlsnaes, instead, put a great emphasis on.242 He argued, that acknowledging the fact 
that the rules of the game were socially constructed over time, was not the only element in 
which the prominence of ideas became apparent, albeit an important one. What needed to be 
also taken into account, was the constitutive influence of these structures on the way agents 
perceived of themselves at present.243 In other words structures had constitutive effects on 
agents because they constructed their identities and interests – an aspect that, for instance, the 
methodological structuralism of Waltz could not accommodate.244 An illustrative example of the 
constitutive influence of structures on agents would, for instance, indicate that, had it not been 
for the hegemonic ideas of international recognition and sovereignty in the current 
Westphalian state system, the entire identity of the KRG as a de facto state would not have made 
any sense. As such, and accordingly, had it not been for the constitutive effects of this institution, 
KRG would not have formulated its foreign policies the way it had done for the past ten years. 
To cut the long story short, one could say then that agents constructed structures over time, 
while these structures, in turn, constituted actors’ perceptions of themselves at present.  
 
The fourth implication of Archer’s understanding was related to the previous one. The 
discursive categories, such as the notion of sovereignty, involved the constitutive effects of 
                                                        
241 Carlsnaes 1992, 261. 
242 An advocate of the SRA, Elisabetta Brighi, has indeed noted that Archer’s treatment of agency is more or less 
naturalistic.  
243  Carlsnaes 1992, 261–262. In the case of Carlsnaes’ model, the discursive concepts are signified in the 
relationship between dispositional and intentional factors (Carlsnaes 1992, 261).  
244 Wight 2013, 96.  
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structures on agents. Implicit within this assumption was, however, also a causal claim: the 
discursive aspects that informed actors’ identities and behavior – as demonstrated in the 
previous example – also structured international institutions by either transforming or 
reproducing them.245 As such, the outcome of agential action, whether reproducing or trying to 
change pertaining understandings of international institutions, included more than only 
intentional actions and unintended consequences of those acts. Outcomes in social reality were 
a function of how all players in the field played the game – whether they submitted to 
reconstitution or aimed towards the alteration of dominant institutions. This point is of 
particular relevance to the study of de facto states. It, therefore, deserves a minor drift from the 
main issue of concern. 
 
If one is to follow Caspersen, Stansfield and Pegg, the internal development, transformation and 
fluctuating foreign policies of these entities are indeed heavily influenced by the lack of 
sovereignty, which as an idea is indispensable for the maintenance of their existence. De facto 
states are driven by the notion of an internationally recognized statehood. This is a clear 
implication of the constitutive effect of structures (sovereignty) on agents’ (KRG) identity, 
interests and actions. However, as mentioned above, this assumption also entails an implicit 
causal claim. Here is why. Since it is driven by the notion of sovereignty, the KRG, continuously 
invokes the idea of statehood both to its internal and external audience. Doing this, in turn 
reproduces the dominant role of sovereignty as an international institution. The mutual 
constitutivity of agents (the KRG) and structures (international states system) becomes 
indicated rather clearly here. Even though this inquiry is not focused on the persistence of 
sovereignty as an international institution, it is indeed important to note how both the 
international society, as well as de facto states themselves, engage in a constant reproduction of 
this institution through their dichotomizing discourse of ‘full sovereignty or no sovereignty’. 
What is interesting with regard to the case of the KRG, is that, in spite of the fact that the realities 
on the ground seem to imply the need for a reconceptualization of sovereignty as an institution, 
the discursive practice of de facto states and other players in the field seem to be ironically 
reconstituting the institution against those empirical realities. Sovereignty has indeed, 
remained a question of either/or, which is also why de facto states perceive of themselves being 
in a constant state of flux and transformation (=the constitutive effect of sovereignty as a 
                                                        
245 Ashley 1984, 273–274: Richard Ashley has, indeed, argued that, for instance, sovereignty is “[…] a practical 
category whose empirical contents are not fixed but evolve”.  
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structure). Due to the constant reproduction of the idea of sovereignty, the grey area 246 
between full sovereignty and no-sovereignty has not been institutionalized enough to make any 
sense to the actors, nor has it been able to constitute a desirable “mode of existence” to sell to 
the domestic constituents or the international community, let alone base ones interests on. The 
interesting question here is, for how long can the discursive practices paradoxically 
reconstitute a specific understanding of sovereignty, which conflicts with empirical realities on 
the ground? I will return to this subject in the examination of the SRA in Chapter 6. 
 
However, let me get back to foreign policy analysis for now – the main concern of the research 
indeed. So far Archer’s morphogenetic approach has provided us with the conceptualization of 
how foreign policy outcomes are to be explained, on the one hand, with reference to the 
continuously constraining and enabling structures and, on the other, with regard to action 
which reproduces those structures over time. Agency has become the link in between concrete 
actions and structural properties or institutional rules. As we saw above, when it came to the 
Kurdistan Regional Government, or any other entity for that matter, Carlsnaes’ tripartite model 
proved to be a viable tool for the explanation of their conduct qua specific foreign policy actions 
or decisions. The model could, however, only offer a static snapshot of certain actions as a 
product of both structural and agential factors. Had the aim of this research been, indeed, to 
explain the KRG’s decision to sign a multi-billion dollar contract with Turkey, the model – 
because of its epistemological potentialities – would have perhaps served the interests of the 
inquiry more than well. Nevertheless, my objective was to demonstrate the dynamics present 
in the foreign policy development of the region, as a series of interrelated and complex events, 
in which action was not only constrained by structures, but which also itself reproduced and 
potentially transformed these structures. The tripartite model was simply unable to address 
such dynamics, because it only accounted for the constraining effects of structural factors, while 
ignoring the systemic properties of foreign policy actions – or in other words, their reproductive 
or transformative characteristics. In the words of Carlsnaes, until one could conceptualize that 
agents and structures causally conditioned each other over time, “[…] the problematic nature of 
explaining the dynamics of foreign policy change itself remained unsolved.”247 What the tripartite 
model could not capture was the fact that through the intended and unintended consequences 
action (reproduction/morphostasis or transformation/morphogenesis), foreign policy conduct 
                                                        
246 With a ”grey area” I am referring to the domain inhabited by de facto states. 
247 Carlsnaes 1992, 256. 
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in fact, affected these structures. Here is where Carlsnaes saw Archer’s morphogeneteic cycles 
underlying his tripartite model.248 They connected the static snapshots and demonstrated how 
present choices were conditioned not only by contemporaneous structural conditions, but also 
by earlier choices and the impacts they had had on these structural conditions. The significance 
of Archer’s model, thus, became manifested when one tried to conceptualize “[…] 
developmental patterns or cycles – that existed between structure and action in a given foreign 
policy system”.249 Actions were thus, not only affected by structures so that AB, but through 
intended and unintended consequences of political conduct, actions further affected those 
structures so that BC and CD. As such, rather than approaching the question of change 
through snapshots of dynamic statics, Carlsnaes could in the words of Jackson and Nexon “[…] 
deploy a fuzzy logic in which processes unfold over time”.250 
 
 
Figure 4: Locating the tripartite model in Archer’s morphogenetic cycles. The figure is adopted from Carlsnaes 
(1992, 264). Particular foreign policy actions still remain the dependent variables of the inquiry to be explained 
with reference to intentional (1) and dispositional (2) dimensions. However within this modified framework, the 
structural (3) dimension is no longer merely a constraining factor on action but a sphere influenced by previous 
political action (hence the “systemic properties” of foreign policy action). 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
The present chapter aimed at introducing the relationalist approaches to foreign policy analysis. 
I began with the inability of Carlsnaes’ tripartite model to address change were it to follow the 
substantialist way of making sense of change in foreign policy: dynamic statics (5.1.). As an 
alternative I suggested – just like Carlsnaes himself – diachronic analysis via the relationalist 
                                                        
248 Ibid., 266. 
249 Ibid., 267. 
250 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 308. In arguing this, Jackson and Nexon are not particularly referring to Carlsnaes, 
but comparing between the static dynamics of substantialism and diachronic analysis of relationalism, in general. 
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approaches to social reality. Following this, I dug a bit deeper into the essence of these 
approaches to scientific inquiry, represented by the so called “system theories” (5.2.). I began 
with a general introduction to these dialectical models via Giddens, Bhaskar and Archer (5.3.), 
followed by a closer examination of the morphogenetic approach (5.4.). Archer’s model was 
introduced particularly because it was the dialectical model suggested by Carlsnaes to be 
applied to the analysis of foreign policy development. However, as I noted in the introductory 
chapter, Archer’s ontological and analytical dualism has been challenged by the anti-dualist 
SRA, which accuses it for a failure to capture relationalism genuinely. Norbert Elias critique of 
essentialism sits in rather aptly with the critique targeted at Archer, “[…] we can often only 
express constant movement or constant change in ways, which imply that it has the character 
of an isolated object at rest”. 251 I will now, finally, move to a closer examination of the strategic-
relational approach that I am attempting to apply in this inquiry.  
 
CHAPTER 6: THE STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL MODEL AS AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
6.1. Beginning with the Critique of Archer: The Fallacy of Dualism 
 
Colin Hay’s discussion of the strategic-relational approach begins with Anthony King’s (1999) 
critique of Archer’s ontological dualism and her unwarranted accusations targeted at 
individualists. Archer, who in her emergentist252 ontological dualism appears to be an adamant 
invoker of relationalism, and opposed to the substantialist reductionism of Durkheimian 
collectivism and the interpretative tradition of Weberian individualism, is, in fact, an 
ontological individualist herself, argues King. The fact that according to King and the SRA 
Archer is, an ontological individualist, is an important point I want to highlight here, because it 
forms the basis of the disagreement between the anti-dualist and the dualist versions of 
relationalism.  
 
                                                        
251 Elias 1978, 111–112; cf. Jackson and Nexon 1999, 300. Archer’s morphogenetic model’s treatment of agents 
and structures seems to, indeed, imply as if they were “isolated objects at rest”. 
252  I am highlighting emergentist, because Archer views her approach as an alternative to the deficiencies of 
Giddensian elisionism, as introduced in Chapter 5.  
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The reason for the accusation King has targeted at Archer is quite simple. Archer’s notion of 
society as the interplay of agents and structures is based on the assumption that agents are 
constrained by external structures, which are autonomous and existing prior to agents entering 
them; hence the charges of substantialism targeted at Archer.253 According to Archer, these 
structures cannot, therefore, be reduced to the sum of individuals’ actions as individualists 
claim. Constraints are of three types: numerical, relational and bureaucratic, argues Archer.254 
They emerge from the interaction of individuals and become objective constraints either on 
subsequent generations (numerical) or as objective constraints confronting everyone at 
present as well as in the future (relational and bureaucratic). Through the theoretical concept 
of structures as “emergent properties” Archer locates objectivity within the very practices of 
the individuals. Society becomes perceived of as an emergent entity, which enables a successful 
implementation of Mandelbaum’s maxim:  
 
“[…] one need not hold that society is an entity independent of all human beings in 
order to hold that societal facts are not reducible to individual behaviour.” 255 
 
However, appealing to emergentism256 – which assumes that structural elaboration is agential 
action – is incompatible with Archer’s view of autonomous and pre-existing structures, 
irreducible to agents. How could structures be autonomous, indeed, if they resulted from 
agential action? Through a thorough examination of the three types of constraints confronting 
individuals, King, manages to argue that structures are indeed, contrary to what Archer claims, 
reducible to the interaction of either people at other places at other times (numerical and 
bureaucratic) or to other people creating new social properties at present time (relational).257 If 
we, for instance, take a look at relational structures such as the relations of production or 
distribution of power in the international system – both can be reduced and attributed to actors’ 
                                                        
253 Once again, through her analytical distinction between agents and structures temporally, Archer treats the two 
components as if they could be studied apart from the relations they are embedded in – a mistake that the 
relationalists claim substantialists keep on doing.  
254 King 1999, 208: She suggests literacy rate as an example of “numerical” emergent properties (independently 
existing structures); relations of production as that of “relational” emergent properties and roles as that of 
“bureaucracies”.   
255 Mandelbaum: 1973, 230. 
256 Emergentism indeed refers to the emergence of structures out of agential action. 
257 Structures are indeed not reducible to one individual but they surely can be reduced to the sum of all individuals 
either at a different time or at present. By making this claim King proves real Archer’s fear: structures are reducible 
to the interaction of individuals, which is why they are always in a danger of disappearing unless one is to claim 
that structures refer to some metaphysical aspect of reality. This is, indeed, a claim which Archer consciously 
avoids making. 
65 
 
interaction. What is more – and this point is also of particular importance to the understanding 
of structure adopted by the SRA – if emergent properties can be indeed reduced to the 
interaction of people, then ‘structures’ can never appear the same for two actors, because what 
seems to be an objective structure for me is in fact only the product of my own interaction with 
other actors. Take the distribution of power, for instance. It is a formation based on material 
inequality, which is, however, not an objective constraint faced similarly by all. It is rather a 
spatio-temporal condition of action that results from no more than the sum of all the actors’ 
position in relation to each other.258  Consequently, King argues: “It is wrong to assume as 
Archer does that social conditions confront everyone and are at some emergent point 
independent of everyone acting together”.259  
 
The ultimate error that Archer makes here is that she views structures from the perspective of 
a single actor and then goes on to make an ontological claim of dualism (structures and agents 
are two different aspects of reality, separate from each other) on the basis of that perspective. 
She refuses to refer to structures as a metaphysical aspect, even though such a claim is 
necessary for her to be able to maintain her ontological dualism.260 From the vantage point of 
a single actor, context may be indeed be perceived of as an objective structure but when 
examined from the point of view of an analyst, one can see that constraints consist of nothing 
else than that actor itself interacting together with other actors, constantly reconstructing, 
transforming and renegotiating the context, which appears as objective to them indeed.  To cut 
the long story short, what the morphogenetic approach does, is, that it takes the position of 
certain actors in the present time and transforms whatever occurred before them (the 
construction of the Westphalian system, for instance) – or anything, which confronts them 
independently of their knowledge and practice of it (balance of power, or relations of 
production) – into a structure, which is given an independent and a separately existing role.261 
Were Archer to de-center her perspective, she would actually realize that the constraints that 
one actor faces are indeed nothing more than other actors. Consequently she would also 
                                                        
258 As we will come to see at a later point, balance of power from the viewpoint of the SRA, is therefore something 
to be determined in post hoc analysis. (Jessop 2007, 45.)  
259 King 1999, 213. A “structure” of material inequality consists of agents situated differentially with regard to each 
other. 
260 Ibid. 206–207. 
261 In other words she converts “[…] the temporal priority of other people’s actions” or the sum of their present 
action “into the ontological priority and autonomy of structures.” (ibid., 8.) 
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understand that the individualist ontology she is criticizing is the one she herself is invoking 
too.262  
 
What is interesting about Archer’s critique of individualists, is the fact that it is based on a 
fundamental misinterpretation of the central tenets of the interpretative tradition, once again 
the drawing of a straw man similar to the one drawn from the structuration theory of Giddens. 
While the tradition rejects structural determination it does not deny the existence of social 
constraints such as the influence of the material distribution of goods in society or the influence 
of history and past experiences on present action.263 Archer clearly conflates the interpretative 
tradition with arbitrary idealism. Individualists, however, do acknowledge that single actors 
cannot “ […] transform the material legacy of the past and certainly by merely interpreting the 
situation differently”.264 They only argue that material conditions are nothing more than the 
result of the continuing interrelations of people: 
 
“Material differences are the product of knowingly unequal material exchanges 
between people in the past which are repeated in further knowingly unequal 
exchanges in the present”. 265 
 
This is an ontology completely in line with Archer’s emergentist view – ‘structures’ emerge 
from agential action – but one, which she however paradoxically overturns with the assumption 
of pre-existing and autonomous structures. Structures in the words of King are, thus, not 
autonomous, certainly not pre-existent and definitely not causal. They may appear as such to 
an individual actor, but for a political analyst to treat them as being a thing autonomous from 
agency will lead to nothing more than their reification.266  He continues that, as such, any form 
of dualism, which refers to structures as objective and pre-existing entities, is actually referring 
to properties, which can at all times be reduced to individuals and their interaction.267 
 
King concludes his critique of Archer by suggesting that, when conducting a political or a social 
inquiry, depending on the constraints one is examining, particular actions need to be situated 
in their wider social and historic context, acknowledging, nevertheless, the fact that structures 
                                                        
262 ibid., 200–205; 222–224. 
263 Ibid., 218–220. 
264 Ibid., 221. 
265 Ibid., 222. 
266 Constraints are based in the practices and beliefs of other individuals, rather than on objective causal powers.  
267 Ibid., 222.  
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are indeed nothing more than the product of individual interaction here and now. However, to 
examine particular instances of action at a particular time, the analyst can usefully refer to these 
“constraints” or the background of that instance as “structures”. 268 
 
It is on the basis of this argument that Bob Jessop and Colin Hay end up arguing for the 
utilization of structures and agents as mere heuristic tools in political analysis. Just like King, 
they assert that assuming structures to be objective and pre-existent entities is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of social reality, because it gives an existence to ‘structures’ separate from 
the existence of agents. Furthermore, in making this assumption, it also defines the concept 
itself erroneously, which does nothing but reify the conditions that are in fact dependent on 
actors for their reproduction. Since structures are ontologically reducible to agents, there is no 
sense in separating them from agents other than analytically, for heuristic purposes. Archer’s 
analytical dualism in the morphogenetic model, however, hardens into an ontological dualism, 
doing exactly that: separating agents from structures not only analytically but also 
ontologically. It is for this reason that her model cannot capture the genuine interdependency 
of agents and structures. King’s conclusion sits perfectly in with the strategic-relational 
approach’s starting point: 
 
“Consequently, it may be more useful to rename this methodological notion of 
structure in now half-forgotten Gramscian language and refer to it as ‘organic’ 
background […] – a phrase which usefully communicates the shifting interactive 
and unfinished nature of the background which we frankly mistake with the term 
‘structure’.269  [italics added] 
 
 
6.2. The Reconceptualization of the Agent-Structure Relationship in 
Methodology 
 
In the previous section I outlined Archer’s misperception of structure and its implications on 
empirical inquiry. The present chapter will focus on introducing the strategic-relational 
approach. However, since this model – just like morphogenesis and the modified tripartite 
approach to foreign policy analysis – is also based on a relationalist social ontology – repeating 
the points where the three agree will become redundant. Such issues include, for instance 
                                                        
268 Ibid., 222–223. 
269 Ibid., 223–224. 
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assumptions on; the self-sustaining nature of social reality and the interplay of agents and 
structures reproducing and transforming it; the distinction between (foreign policy) action and 
(foreign policy) outcomes – and hence the inclusion of both intended and unintended 
consequences of action in foreign policy analysis; the role of cognitive factors or ideas as the 
bridge between environment and action (Archer, however, treats the discursive realm 
insufficiently when compared to the immense emphasis put on it by Carlsnaes and the SRA); 
the focus on political leadership rather than the state, which is indeed related to the fact that 
political entities are not black-boxed or treated as individuals as has been done in the case of 
Wendtian constructivism.270  
 
Although neither Jessop nor Hay specifically refer to Carlsnaes in developing the SRA, the two 
approaches overlap on a variety of points, which will become apparent throughout the 
introduction of the strategic-relational model. My attention will be, nevertheless, more on the 
points where they differ and the implications these dissimilarities have for a conceptual study 
of foreign policy development. Also worth mentioning is that, while the SRA is not a model 
explicitly developed for the analysis of foreign policy, as a methodological tool established for 
the understanding of the relational nature of reality, it is, however, fully capable of addressing 
what is really at stake in foreign policy analysis: the meta-theoretical issues introduced by 
Carlsnaes.271  
  
The strategic-relational approach was initially developed by Bob Jessop based on an interest – 
in his own words – in post-war German politics, post-war French economics and post-war 
Chilean biology, or more precisely, modern systems theory introduced in Chapter 5. Jessop has 
argued that curiosity in German politics led him to adopt a relational methodology to 
conceptualizing the state as a social relation rather than a unified ensemble.272 This thought 
initially came from Nicos Poulantsaz, who had been the first one to explicitly identify the 
relational nature of the state, albeit the idea was already implicitly inscribed in the works of 
                                                        
270 The rejection of the state-black-boxing is indeed referred to as the Snyder approach in FPA. Richard Snyder 
indeed argues that foreign policy analysts need to focus on the subjective definitions of decision-makers. Context 
is taken into account only when it can be demonstrated that they have indeed gone through the cognitive 
dimension and influenced these leaders. (Gustavsson 1999, 80.) 
271 Elisabetta Brighi has, indeed, applied the SRA to the analysis of Italy’s foreign policy development throughout 
the 20th century. However, she focuses on connecting the international and domestic sources of foreign policy via 
the SRA, while I am not particularly interested in making such analytical distinctions.  
272 Jessop 2007, 36–37; Jessop, 2005, 42–43. 
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Marx and Engels.273 Interest in economics and the endurance of capitalism, in turn, resulted in 
the close examination of the system’s socially embedded and regulated nature, and hence, in 
the study of institutionalism. Finally, systems theory – elaborated on above through Giddens, 
Bhaskar and Archer – directed Jessop’s attention towards the investigation of self-reproducing 
subsystems within social reality. This interest involved the examination of how economic, 
political or legal systems were, in spite of their autonomous development and internal logics, 
still mutually interdependent. The material interdependency, in turn, implied that it was 
possible for the logics of one system to dominate the overall co-evolution of the complex web of 
interdependent systems – ‘historical blocs’274 – so to speak. According to this understanding, a 
structure causing more problems for other substructures than they could cause for it, could be 
designated as a dominant one. In virtue of its dominancy, it could regulate and control the 
development of an entire system comprising all the self-organizing mechanisms. Jessop 
identified the capitalist structure as one such autopoietic system dominating the “[…] self-
organizing ecologies of self-organizing systems”. 275 Accordingly, he re-termed Marx’ “capitalist 
dominance” with “ecological dominance”.276 The question is, how are any of these three issues 
of the state as a social relation, the reproduction of systems and system dominance related to 
the development of the SRA or – even more importantly – to the study of the foreign policy 
development of the KRG?  
 
The answer lies at the intersection of these three issues, which eventually led to the gradual 
development of the SRA. The approach was originally introduced as a reformulation of Marxist 
materialist determinism aiming at capturing the relationship between capitalism and the state 
as the result of contingent necessity rather than straightforward determinism.277 However the 
SRA was developed further both by Jessop himself and some other prominent scholars, for 
instance Colin Hay, to reformulate it as a general understanding of the way agents and 
                                                        
273 Jessop 2007, 56. Marx is indeed also considered a relationalist.  
274 Jessop (2007, 46–47) defines the concept as the ”[…] mutually implicated, structurally coupled, and historically 
co-evolving ensemble of economic, political and socio-cultural relations, the construction of which depends on the 
activities of organic intellectuals and collective projects as well as on the gradual and emergent co-adaptations of 
institutions and conduct. 
275 Ibid., 22-37. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Jessop (ibid, 56–59.) indeed attempted to go beyond both the instrumentalist and the epiphenomenalist views 
of the state in its relation with power.  
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structures related to each other.278 Jessop attributed the wide-ranging applicability of the SRA 
to the fact that it was grounded in basic ontological problems of social life rather than in the 
frameworks within which it initially emerged – state theorization and subsequently, for 
instance, in the gender selectivities of the state or globalization’s impact on states. These 
applications merely further confirmed the fact that the model’s nucleus lay in a fundamental 
reconceptualization of the ASP, based on an anti-dualist relationalist understanding of reality. 
In fact, the SRA was eventually established to accommodate the strategic-relational 
relationship between, not only agents and structures in particular, but also to other dualities 
such as path-dependency and path-shaping, the material and the discursive and spatiality and 
temporality. Throughout its development over the past three decades or so the meta-
theoretical arguments of the SRA have proved to survive and become more and more 
established with each application.279 What is more, the gradual removal of the approach from 
the theoretical issues through which it was initially developed, has also paved the way for its 
application in foreign policy analysis by Elisabetta Brighi and, now, in this inquiry indeed. 
 
Jessop’s attempt to generalize the SRA was based on the criticism targeted at the neo-Weberian 
theories by Stewart and Holmwood in Explanation and Social Theory (1991).  The two took 
issue at the failure of these social theories to address social reality creatively and progressively. 
From a critical realist viewpoint, Jessop then attempted to solve some of the problems 
addressed by Stewart and Holmwood arguing that, if their aim was to capture the dialectical 
construction of society in a viable methodology, a model which was only capable of 
incorporating the notion of “[…] an emergent, contingent, but still determining, social structure 
and the actions selected by more or less well socialized agents”, was not enough, because it 
amounted to nothing else but “[…] dualism masquerading as a duality”. 280  It is no mystery that 
Jessop was referring to Archer here, or to be more precise, to her failure to suggest a 
methodology capable of capturing the relational nature of reality. He argued that, as long as 
social structure was seen as emergent and determining, regardless of the actions and subjects 
it was supposed to constrain, one could not address duality genuinely. As we saw in King’s 
critique, in spite of her commitment to the relational and dialectical understanding of social 
                                                        
278 In what Jessop (ibid., 38) himself calls the first phase of the development of the approach he extended the idea 
of the relational nature of agents and structures to critical political economy and what later came to be known as 
cultural political economy  
279 The SRA has been applied to a variety of empirical issues. Among the most recent examples are Lagendijk 
(2010), Brighi (2007), Ioris (2012), Clark and Jones (2012), Zhwau (2013), Heigl (2011).  
280 Jessop 2007, 40–41. 
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reality, Archer’s ontology and analytical strategy (the morphogenetic model) had adopted an 
unhelpful and polarizing dualistic dichotomy of absolute external constraints and unrestricted 
subjective action.281 Locating agents and structures in different temporal domains had, indeed, 
led Archer to do exactly what Wendt and Giddens had proposed to be done – bracket one in 
order to study the other.282 This separate examination of agents and structures, in turn, had 
reinforced the notion that the two components of reality had distinct essences – a substantialist 
position indeed. 283  Jessop argued, accordingly, that, just like the oscillating in between 
individualism and structuralism (to reveal the blindspots of each) had not been able to go 
beyond the impasse inflicting these substantialist approaches284, neither had the mechanical 
combining of agents and structures (to produce some sort of a complete picture of the 
development of autopoietic systems as Archer had done), been able to do so.285  Temporal 
bracketing only led to treating structures as objective, autonomous and causal, whereas agency 
ended up being perceived of as random intervening or disrupting moments to the otherwise 
faultlessly functioning and enduring external constraints.286 Archer’s ontological dualism could 
not help but to translate into a methodology incapable of incorporating the relational nature of 
agents and structures. The problem with Archer – as introduced in Chapter 5 – and this is 
indeed an important point – was the fact that, instead of suggesting a methodology capable of 
capturing ontological duality, she had changed the direction of the game and transformed the 
anti-dualist relational ontology into a dualist, (supposedly a “relational”) ontology, to better 
accommodate her dualist (or more or less substantialist) methodology.287   
 
Jessop reverted the question right back where it originally was. He, suggested that a genuine 
duality could be created only “[…] by dialectically relativizing (as opposed to mechanically 
relating) both analytical categories”.288 It was obvious that Archer’s ontological dualism could 
                                                        
281 Ibid., 123.  
282 This is exactly what Giddens had suggested in the first place and which Archer was intent on avoiding but ended 
up committing to it herself as well.  
283 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295. 
284 I attempted to show this in Chapter 5 by demonstrating that, even if located in Carlsnaes’ tripartite model, the 
substantialist approaches of individualism and holism could not address the mutual constitution of agents and 
structures over time within a single analytical framework.  
285 Jessop 2007, 33–34. 
286 Hay 2002, 126: Hay writes that Archer’s notion seems to imply ”[…] residual structuralism punctuated only 
periodically yet infrequently by a largely unexplicated conception of agency.” 
287 As such, Archer, just like Giddens, she had replicated analytical dualism. Nevertheless, Archer can be given extra 
points for the consistency that Giddens lacks: her dualist analytical model corresponded to the also dualist 
ontology she suggested, whereas Giddens’ dualist methodological bracketing did not correspond to the anti-dualist 
ontology he suggested. (Hay 2002, 124.) 
288 Jessop 2007, 123.  
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not accommodate such a perspective, because it was committed to the study of agents and 
structures as independent elements, each with emergent properties of their own. Jessop 
rejected this arguing that structures did not precede agency nor did they cause action. The two 
were interwoven and dependent on each other for their existence. Once again, the separation 
of the two components had to be made only analytically, not ontologically.289 The SRA, in other 
words, took Giddens’ fallacious methodology a step further: neither of the metals from which 
the coin was forged could be seen or examined separately – what was observable was only the 
“[…] product of their fusion”.290  Consequently, instead of centering their focus on agents or 
structures – which were only theoretical abstractions – Hay and Jessop indeed concentrated on 
the products of their fusion; the processes in which the two were spatio-temporally interlinked. 
The existence of agents and structures came to be “[…] relational (structure and agency 
mutually constitutive) and dialectical (their interaction was not reducible to the sum of 
structural and agential factors treated separately)” 291  and “[…] that each moment in this 
dialectical relation contained elements from its ‘other’”. 292  Structural constraints never 
functioned objectively, but always “[…] temporally, spatially and were agency- and strategy-
specific”. 
 
To create a methodological model capable of incorporating such an anti-dualist relational 
vision, Jessop replaced the abstract concepts of agents and structures with strategic action and 
strategically selective context, which was later also adopted by Colin Hay. This was done so that 
agency was brought into structures generating a structured context (an action setting) and 
structures into agency creating a contextualized actor (a situated agent). 293 Accordingly agency 
became “[…] a strategic actor operating within a structure turned a strategically selective 
context”.294 The ambiguous conceptual dualism, pointing towards a substantialist rather than a 
relationalist view of reality295, was aptly overcome via a new conceptual pairing, a ‘double 
relativization’ as demonstrated below in Figure 5. 
 
                                                        
289 Hay 2002, 125.  
290 Ibid., 127; Holland 2012, 33-34.   
291 Hay 2002, 127. 
292 Jessop 1985, 340–343, cf. Jessop 2007, 34. 
293 Brighi 2013, 36. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Once again, dualism points towards a substantialist view of reality, because it gives ontological independency 
to structures and agents.  
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Figure 5: From dualism to duality: the strategic-relational approach. The figure is adopted from (Jessop 2007, 41.) 
 
The essence of this analytical model lies in the fact that it turns the abstract into concrete and 
better reflects the way actors appropriate their environment, which in turn, delineates the 
boundaries of possible actions they can take. As was closely examined in Chapter 5, the 
relationalist understandings of the social reality agreed on the importance of including both 
agents and structures in scientific inquiry, but disagreed on exactly how the two ought to be 
related in an analytical model. 296 This particular reformulation of the agent-structure problem 
by Jessop, introduced in the matrix above, is indeed one such suggestion offered as an 
alternative to Archer’s dualist vision of independently existing agents and structures. In the 
following, I elaborate on how and why Jessop ended up in this anti-dualist conceptualization of 
the inter-relationship between agents and structures.  
 
The double relativization was conducted in two phases. Firstly the dichotomy of structures 
(social facts) and agents (free will) was overcome by relating partly socialized agents to the 
emergent social structures. This was indeed what Archer had already done, but was yet not 
                                                        
296 Hay 2002, 94. 
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enough. The second step was to relocate the partly socialized agents in the strategically 
selective context, and the emergent social structures into the structurally oriented action of 
strategic agents. Four major consequences followed from this reconceptualization.  
 
Firstly, context became strategically rather than structurally selective. Its strategic selectivity 
consisted of two elements. The first one was the ‘structural moment’ referring to a given spatio-
temporal context, which could be transformed by a given agent(s) pursuing a particular 
strategy during a specific time period. The second element was the ‘conjuctural moment’, which 
in turn, included features of the given spatio-temporal context that could be modified by 
specific strategies. The structure, thus, became strategically selective in the sense that not all 
outcomes or strategies were possible in different situations.297 However, outcomes of action 
were never determined by the structure of the particular situation per se either. It was the 
unique point of intersection of the structural moment and the conjunctural opportunity, with 
the particular strategic actions located in specific place and time that determined outcomes, not 
a sequential logic of either one preceding the other (as Archer had suggested indeed); “[…] 
structural constraints always operate selectively; they are not absolute and unconditional but 
are always temporally, spatially, agency- and strategy-specific”, concluded Jessop.298 
 
Action, in turn was strategic in the sense that actors were consciously oriented towards their 
environment when trying to choose the best strategy to realize a set of given interests. They 
were capable of reformulating their own identities and interests depending on strategic 
calculations they made of the situation they were embedded in. An important observation was 
that strategic actors did not have complete knowledge of the complexities of their context, but 
still acted strategically primarily based on the values, ideas and perceptions (and 
misperceptions) that they had of the strategic selectivities of the environment they were 
embedded in. Sometimes these beliefs facilitated their capacity to realize given objectives while 
at other times they held up against the fulfillment of intentions, depending indeed on the exact 
point of intersection between particular action and its specific context.299  
 
                                                        
297 Jessop 2007, 40-41. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Hay 2002, 212. 
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What was the most important thing to take note of here was that, the perceptions held by actors 
were, the point of intersection between strategic conduct and strategically selective context. 
The two were reconciled by discourse: ”[…] ideas provide the point of mediation between actors 
and their environment”, argued Hay.300 Strategic actors’ point of access to the multilayered and 
structured context was always ideational, which is why ideas needed to be placed at the center 
of political analysis.301 It was also important not to confuse this claim with idealism because 
according to the developed versions of SRA ideas, too, just like strategies were constantly 
selected for and against by the context (discursive selectivity); it was assumed by Hay, that, in 
order for particular beliefs to be able to inform strategic action they need to resonate with the 
context at least to some extent. At the same time, however, whether or not they corresponded 
to the real conditions of action, ideas exerted their influence on the development of the 
context.302 The SRA was certainly not the only approach to realize the significance of belief 
systems or “cognitive templates”, as Hay called them; as we saw in the case of the tripartite 
model as well, perception (constructed views and images of reality) was a “dispositional” factor 
that causally affected the intentions of actors.303 One of the central arguments of Carlsnaes 
happened to be, indeed, the fact that foreign policy analysis should begin with the “intentional 
dimension” focusing on the level of action rather than the level of observation.304  
 
Accepting the notion that ideas were the point of intersection between actors and their contexts 
implied that they were given an independent role in the causation of political outcomes 
regardless of whether or not they were based on misperceptions. 305 Beliefs were just as real as 
material objects.306 If they led to material outcomes – as they usually did – then it followed that 
the ideal and the material were dialectically related – another ontologically dualistic separation 
relativized analytically by the SRA: 
                                                        
300 Hay 2002, 209–210. 
301 Ibid., 213. 
302 Ibid., 214. 
303 Carlsnaes 1987, 98–99; Carlsnaes 2002, 343. 
304 Guzzini 2013, 5: Beginning with the level of action can be indeed attributed to Carlsnaes’ Weberian-Schutzian 
interpretivism, which requires to go through the meaning-world of the analyzed actor to understand and explain 
its actions. However, the level of action is not alone sufficient to understand the dynamics involved with foreign 
policy development over time. 
305 Hay 2002, 210. 
306 Hay 2002, cf. Jessop 2007, 49; Hay argues indeed that, ”[…] the ideas we hold about our environment (about 
what is feasible, possible and desirable, for instance) have substantive effects. Moreover, they do not do so 
independently of that environment itself – both the effects themselves and the ideas we fashion in the first place 
are mediated by the context in which we find ourselves. Consequently, as with the question of structure and 
agency, whilst it may be useful to distinguish analytically between the material and the ideational, it is important 
that an analytical strategy does not set into an ontological dualism.” 
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“In sum, a dialectical understanding of the relationship between the ideational and 
the material is logically entailed by a dialectical understanding of the relationship 
between structure and agency”, concludes Hay. 307  
 
Continuing on the interdependency of ideas and the material, I want to shed further light on an 
important observation made by Hay: discursive selectivity. The concept is related both to 
strategic selectivity as well as the cognitive templates through which actors filtered their 
context.  Hay argued that contextual selectivities did not only confront actors’ material position 
in relation to their environment, but also the ideational policy paradigms the political leadership 
chose to navigate the world with. Discourses had an important role mediating social 
construction.308 In other words, the meanings actors gave to their context – the discursive 
construction of policy paradigms or normatively oriented “cognitive shortcuts” – influenced the 
likelihood of success in realizing interests. This, indeed, demonstrated the mutual constitutivity 
of discursivity and materiality. Hay argues that, for policy paradigms to be able to survive and 
continue functioning as cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world, they 
have to “[…] retain a certain resonance with those actors’ direct and mediated experiences”.309 
Therefore these policy paradigms were only relatively independent from the material. “Just as 
it imposes a strategic selectivity, then, then the context also imposes a discursive selectivity, 
selecting for and selecting against particular ideas, narratives and construction”, concluded 
Hay.310 If the two did not resonate, one was confronted with a crisis – a concept Hay linked to 
the occurrence of paradigm change.   
 
Jessop developed this critical realist idea further in his examination of cultural political economy 
arguing that semiosis 311  was never purely intra-semiotic so that it involved merely the 
interaction of signs and meanings; it had an external reference as well. To study semiotics apart 
from their extra-semiotic contexts was to engage in “semiotic reductionism”.312 In other words, 
without linking the ideas to their external context, social causation became incomplete. On the 
other hand “[…] if material transformation [was] studied apart from its semiotic dimensions 
                                                        
307 Hay 2002, 210. 
308 Jessop 2007, 48. 
309 Hay 2002, 211. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Jessop defines as “the intersubjective production of meaning”. 
312  This is indeed a clear manifestation of Jessop’s commitment to ontological, epistemological as well as 
methodological commitment to critical realism. 
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and mediations, explanations of stability and change risked oscillating between objective 
necessity and sheer contingency”.313  While texts produced meanings and were involved in 
generating structures – such as the sovereign states system – this production was never 
independent from the constraints imposed on it by the emergent, non-semiotic qualities of this 
structure or from the inherently semiotic factors.314   
 
Let me get back to the consequences of Jessop’s reconceptualization of the agent-structure 
relationship after the brief distraction above. The second implication of the reformulation of 
the agent-structure relationship was related to the first one. The dual understanding of 
strategic selectivity as a ‘structural constraint’ and ‘conjunctural opportunity’ meant that, there 
was a chance of given spatio-temporal contexts being structural constraints for particular 
strategies, while at the same time forming conjunctural opportunities predisposed for 
transformation by some other strategies.  What is more, what was a short-time structural 
constraint at a specific place for certain strategies, had a chance of turning into a conjunctural 
opportunity over a longer period of time, or if the agent changed its strategies. According to the 
SRA, actors, indeed, had the change to alter the selective impact – structural constraints or 
conjunctural opportunities – that the spatio-temporal context had on them, by forming new 
alliance strategies. Similar was the case with spatial dimensions across which actors could 
likewise operate.315  
 
The third implication was based on the notion of reflexive and strategically calculating agents 
that were capable of learning from their experiences over time. Actors could indeed 
reformulate their strategies according to their changing perceptions of the context. I will get 
back to this point in the application of the SRA to foreign policy analysis in Chapter 6.4.4. 
“Effects of Action: Partial Transformation of the Context and Strategic Learning”. 
 
The fourth consequence involved the challenging of the orthodox conceptualization of power 
as a possession, something that was held by either agents or structures. As Emirbayer argued, 
                                                        
313 Jessop 2007, 51–53. He went on then to demonstrate his case by implying how semiosis was constitutive in 
securing the conditions for accumulation, that is, constructing capitalist economy together with extra-semiotic 
elements. 
314 Ibid., 238–242. In the concluding chapter of his inquiry, Jessop indeed links the evolutionary turn in social 
sciences to semiotic turn and articulates on the importance of the strategic-relational model for the examination 
of the development of “social imaginaries” such as sovereignty or the state in the interplay between semiotic and 
extra-semiotic mechanisms. 
315 Ibid., 21–37; 42–46.  
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the relationalist/transactionalist approach to social reality necessitated the reformulation of 
this understanding to address power as a concept of relationship, not one of substance. As such, 
the relationalists viewed that structures or agents did not have power. It was only within their 
interrelations that power became significant.316 Following this understanding of reality, Jessop 
indeed adopted a contextualized examination of power, treating it as a dependent variable to be 
explained, rather than an independent variable explaining action. He relativized the concept to 
actors’ relations: “For the scope of the explanandum (power) will vary with the relative 
tightness of the spatial and temporal definition of the conjuncture in which particular agents 
made a difference and of the field of possible effects and repercussions rippling out over social 
time and space.” 317  Power was always a contextual matter, never given a priori, always 
contingent.318 Balance of power fluctuated constantly and, therefore, became a matter to be 
determined after the actualization of a particular intersection of structural constraints, 
conjunctural opportunities and spatio-temporal strategies.319  
 
6.3. Contingent Necessity in the Unfolding of Social Phenomena 
 
Prior to applying the SRA to foreign policy analysis, there is one particularly important point I 
want to make, in order to avoid confusion in further discussions of the SRA. It is worth noting 
that the entire idea of the approach was based on an effort to address the complexity of the 
world without falling into an infinite explanatory regress. 320  With ontological complexity, 
Jessop referred to “[…] compositional, structural, or operational nature of events, phenomena, 
or other relational objects in the real world.”321 Just like natural events, mutually interacting 
social phenomena also had naturally necessary features or potentialities. These numerous 
potentialities could, of course, not be co-realized, which is why there was necessary 
indeterminacy and unpredictability about the operation of these phenomena – such as foreign 
policy development, for instance. Quoting Nicholas Rescher, Jessop clarified;  
 
“Entities and their relations in the real world not only have more properties than 
they ever will overtly manifest, but they have more than they possibly can ever 
manifest. This is so because the dispositional properties of things always involve 
                                                        
316 Emirbayer 1997, 290–292.  
317 Jessop 2007, 40–43. 
318 Emirbayer 1997, 291–293. 
319 Jessop 2007, 45. 
320 Ibid., 232-233.  
321 Ibid., 2001, 6. 
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what might be characterized as mutually preemptive conditions of realization… 
 The perfectly possible realization of various dispositions may fail to be mutually 
compossible, and so the dispositional properties of a thing cannot ever be 
manifested completely – not just in practice, but in principle.”322  
 
Jessop tried to capture Rescher’s point with “contingent necessity”.323 The concept may first 
appear as an oxymoron. However, when examined closely, argued Jessop, one could see that 
the two words had different referents; contingent necessity implied the “[…] de facto causal 
determination (necessity) of events and phenomena with their ex ante indeterminability 
(contingency). 324  Accordingly, social phenomena – whether sovereignty, globalization, 
capitalism or foreign policy development – were viewed as having resulted from “[…] the non-
necessary interaction among different causal chains to produce a definite outcome that first 
became necessary through the contingent articulation of various causal chains”. 325  The 
question here was, how to grasp such complexity?  
 
With regard to epistemology, the infinite complexity of the world meant that it could not be 
exhausted analytically. Social phenomena could never be reproduced in all of their complexity 
depicted above. Weber, likewise, acknowledged this practical impossibility of following causal 
relationships down to microscopic levels of links between assumedly atomistic components of 
social reality. What one had to do, instead, was to isolate their explanandum (KRG’s foreign 
policy development) out of that complexity – or in the words of Jessop – choose “simplifying 
entrypoints” to complexity.326 Subsequently the dependent variable, in our case KRG’s foreign 
policy development, had to be explained with reference to specific causal precedents: How 
particular causal processes or their junctures produced the apparent outcomes of KRG’s foreign 
policy development, which would not have otherwise occurred?327 
 
To capture complexity in methodology, one had to develop a method capable of appreciating 
contingent necessity.328 The SRA introduced above was Jessop’s suggestion of one such method.  
Whatever an analyst chose to explain – the state, KRG’s foreign policy, capitalism, the European 
                                                        
322 Rescher 1987, 116; cf. Jessop 2007, 227-228. 
323 Jessop 2007, 225–227. 
324 Jessop 2007, 229. 
325 Jessop 2007, 229.  
326 Ibid., 229–230. 
327 Jessop, December 2nd, 2013.  
328 Jessop 2007, 225–233. 
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Union or globalization – they had to define its “[…] material, social, and spatio-temporal limits”. 
It was necessary to do so simply because of the fact that the world was too complex for an 
outcome to be perceived of as resulting from a single causal mechanism that could be isolated 
and pointed at objectively. Whatever one tried to rationalize, a strategic-relational conjunctural 
analysis pertinent to specific actors, interests, identities, spatio-temporal prospects and 
strategic goals became necessary.329 Thus the SRA perceived of different explanandums such 
as the capitalist relation, or – in our case – KRG’s current foreign policy development, as spatio-
temporally located conjunctures, the necessary products of nothing more but contingent 
interactions in between various causal mechanisms both in the past as well as in the present.330  
 
To cut the long story short, Jessop’s suggested method told us that different settings in social 
reality involved a complex matrix in which agents were differentially located and, as such, their 
strategies unequally selected for and against, depending on the intersection of their given 
strategies with the particular context they were embedded in. Within this matrix there was a 
hierarchy of potential powers, which was determined by the actual possibilities of influencing 
elements in that context. Balance of power in such a complexity was, therefore, always 
determined post hoc, through the actualization of strategies. It was never a pre-given matter 
that could be studied apart from its context, as substantialists seemed to assume. 
 
6.4. The Application of the Strategic-Relational Approach to Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
6.4.1. Strategically Selective Context, Foreign Policy Strategy and Political Paradigms  
 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated some of the central concepts related to the 
reconceptualization of the agent-structure problem. In this chapter I will outline in closer detail 
how a strategic-relational approach could be applied to the study of foreign policy development 
at the intersection of a strategically selective context and strategic action, formulated on the 
basis of hegemonic policy paradigms 331  – cognitive templates, through which the world is 
interpreted and subsequent action formulated. Let me begin by Jessop’s understanding of the 
                                                        
329 Ibid., 231–233. 
330 Ibid., 233 cf. Luhmann 1979; 6,13. 
331 These are the three concepts that Elisabetta Brighi (2013) also uses to make sense of Italy’s foreign policy 
development.  
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relationality of reality in order to be able to construct a relational model of foreign policy 
development on the basis of that understanding.     
 
I want to start by re-emphasizing a point made by King and the SRA: the context within which 
strategic action ought to be examined was nothing but the crystallization of past successful and 
unsuccessful strategies (differential tendencies) of agents with conflicting interpretations of 
the world.332 For Jessop, the state was one such strategically selective context and the different 
political forces within it epitomized distinctive tendencies aiming to triumph over their counter-
tendencies. He argued, accordingly, that the state was the emergent effect of the interaction of 
past strategic selectivities, which – over time – had developed “[…] a configuration 
characterized by a ‘structured coherence’”.333 In other words, Jessop claimed that states had 
come into existence through “[…] evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection and 
retention”, leading to the formation of the structured coherences or historical blocs that they 
were today. These zones of relative stability, in turn, had their tactics or social arrangements334 
that attempted to eliminate conflicts and maintain a measure of coherence by imposing relative 
unity within. The tactics of these self-organizing systems (the state in Jessop’s case) was what 
Jessop referred to as “strategic selectivities” of the context. He defined selectivities as the ways 
in which structured coherences such as the state had “[…] a specific, differential impact on the 
ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-
temporal contexts”.335 The impact was differential because selectivities were dependent on 
what actors’ strategies aimed at: if KRG’s objective was to autonomously export its oil via 
Turkey, hostile relations with Ankara (selectivity) would impose a structural constraint on it, 
whereas hostile relations would be insignificant were the KRG not even to aim at the export of 
its oil through Turkey. As such, outcomes were structurally underdetermined and dependent 
on more or less contingent strategies actors selected. Contexts favored strategies in line with 
their selectivities, while rejecting those opposing them, which led to particular outcomes being 
favored at the expense of others.336  
 
                                                        
332 This was a point missed by Archer yet clarified by King: structures (context) are reducible to action (agents). 
333 Jessop 2007, 37; 46: With a “structured coherence” Jessop refers to a particular setting such as the state, the de 
facto state, the international system or any such configuration consisting of a complex web of mutually 
interdependent systems (economic, political, cultural etc.). For more see 6.2. “The Reconceptualization of the 
Agent-Structure Relationship in Methodology”.  
334 Jessop calls them spatio-temporal fixes. 
335 Jessop 2002, 40.  
336 Hay 2002, 129. 
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As we have learned, the relationalist understanding of reality also necessitated the 
accommodation of the idea of reproduction and transformation – the notion of a dynamic 
process in constant motion. Macro-processes needed the constant input of micro-processes in 
order to survive – hence the implicit assumption of the relational nature of reality here. 
Acknowledging this, Jessop continued that, in order for these “sites of strategy”337 to continue 
existing, it was integral that the tendencies in line with their strategic selectivities became 
continuously actualized in specific spatio-temporal conditions. 338  The activation of these 
particular tendencies did not only mean keeping the specific strategic selectivities of structured 
coherences, such as the state, alive. It also meant a simultaneous limiting of the influence of 
their counter-tendencies, which constantly threatened to disrupt the reproduction of the 
particular selectivities of this system. Historical blocs such as the state were therefore organic 
entities, never finished and always unstable, because their strategic selectivities (constraining 
and enabling elements) depended on their actualization in particular moments at particular 
times. 339 
 
The framework depicted above was a clear manifestation of Jessop’s relationalist 
understanding of reality. Even more importantly, it was a clear manifestation of his anti-dualist 
relationalism rejecting an ontological separation between agents and structures; as we saw, 
reality was presented through the mutual constitutivity of strategy (action) and selectivities 
(context). Now, as was encouraged by Jessop himself and realized by Elisabetta Brighi and Colin 
Hay, the SRA was indeed distanced from its original application on the state to address a variety 
of dualities in different theoretical frameworks. Out of these, the agent-structure and the 
ideational-material dualities have become the most relevant and, as such, the most apparent in 
this inquiry. Furthermore, Jessop argued that the idea of State Power in its entirety was to point 
to the ability of the SRA to address complexity (via relationalism) in other theoretical realms. It 
was therefore, not for no reason that Jessop consciously suggested his relationalist research 
program to be continued by applying it to other empirical issues:340  
 
“[…] the SRA can be used to interrogate other theoretical approaches, emergent 
concepts, and empirical analyses, to highlight their interrelated structural and 
strategic dimensions, and to explore their implications.”341 
                                                        
337 Jessop 2007, 36. Acording to Jessop states are sites of strategy indeed. 
338 With spatio-temporal conditions he meant instances unfolding in particular spaces at particular times. 
339 Ibid., 35–53. 
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Following Brighi and Hay, I, therefore attempt to make a small contribution on my part by 
applying the SRA to the analysis of the foreign policy development of the KRG. What this means 
in practice is that, where for Jessop it was the state that constituted the strategically selective 
context within which actors’ strategies battled; in my case, it is the overall environment of the 
KRG consisting of, for instance, strategy-specific ideational constraints such as the sovereign 
states-system, material geopolitical conditions such as the land-lockedness of the Kurdistan 
Region in Iraq, as well as constraints formulated by the complex intersection of different actors’ 
– in my case mostly Ankara’s and Baghdad’s – strategies. Together these elements will comprise 
“the structured coherence” of this inquiry, which interacts with the autonomous region’s 
strategies, through its spatio-temporal strategic selectivities.342 Just like the state, the KRG’s 
context will also be treated as the product of past strategies and selectivities as well as the 
terrain of present foreign policy strategies. As such, the leadership of this entity will be, 
accordingly, viewed as inhabiting a densely structured system possessing different tactics to 
maintain its relative unity, order or ‘structured coherence’ – just like the state did. These tactics 
will be revealed in the continuously transforming set of selectivities that favor particular 
strategies over others. Most importantly, they will always be relational to the strategies of the 
KRG, never objective, absolute or unconditional with regard to them, (as we saw in the example 
given above on the relationship between the strategy of autonomous export of oil and the 
selectivity of the hostile relationship with Turkey.) Since selectivities will always be relational 
to strategies, the particular position of the KRG in relation to its context will provide a 
conjunctural opportunity for the adoption of certain foreign policy decisions, whereas it will 
form a structural constraint for the adoption of some other decisions. The strategies of the 
autonomous regions’ leadership will be, in turn, oriented toward the selectivities of their 
environment, actualizing them in specific conditions and thereby resisting counter-tendencies 
or alternative strategies.  
 
To cut the long story short, KRG’s foreign policy will be studied as a contingently, yet-path-
dependently unfolding development (contingent necessity), which results from three 
interacting and mutually interdependent factors. The first one is KRG’s strategies formulated 
                                                        
342 Even though I will return to this subject at a later phase, I want to, however, highlight already at this point that 
none of these factors within the context of the KRG, can explain alone its foreign policy development, for it is the 
particular intersection of the selectivities of this context with the ideas of the KRG (on the basis of which it 
formulates its strategies) that lead to foreign policy outcomes. 
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on the basis of its interests. The second factor is the strategic selectivities of an organic context, 
whose reproduction is dependent on the interaction of different actors’ strategies. The third 
one is the cognitive template through which the KRG interprets the selectivities of its context 
and formulates its foreign policy strategies. Furthermore, when within the state strategic 
selectivity (and discursive selectivity, for that matter) is manifested in how elites promote 
specific actions or narratives at the expense of others 343 , the strategic (and discursive) 
selectivity of KRG’s context reveals itself, similarly, in – for instance – how the prevailing 
international norms tend to favor particular discourses/paradigms, such as that of sovereign 
statehood, over others. The model as illustrated by Colin Hay can be seen below to make sense 
of the process of foreign policy development over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Strategic and discursive selectivity as adopted from Hay 2002, 212. 
 
6.4.2. The Formulation of Strategies 
 
 
                                                        
343  Alternatively, in capitalist relations strategic selectivity was implicated in how particular interests and 
strategies in line with the system’s general perceptions of interest were selected for. 
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Actors are strategic in the sense that they are perceived of being reflexive agents aware of the 
context within which they are embedded as well as capable of monitoring the consequences of 
the strategies they deploy. Political conduct is oriented towards achieving particular goals, 
albeit by no means predetermined.344 The interests foreign policy actors possess are dependent 
the perceptions they have of the strategic selectivities of their context as well past experiences 
with regard to the success and failure of previously adopted strategies. Interests are always 
constructed and discursively mediated; hence the imperative role given to ideas. While 
mediating in between internal preferences and the international context, the strategies of other 
players have to constantly be taken into account – hence the relationality of the model in 
conceptualizing context and conduct as mutually constituting – as opposed to Archer’s 
sequential understanding of the two. It is indeed very important to note that the strategies that 
actors adopt is a perceptual matter relating to both the extent and quality of their information 
about their environment and the normative orientation of these actors towards the context 
within which they are situated, argues Hay.345 This is a clear point of overlap between the SRA 
and Carlsnaes’ tripartite model: the latter’s “dispositional dimension” of foreign policy 
explanation also takes note of values and perceptions  constructing the intentions of a 
leadership. 346 The rationalistic behavior of the leadership in the “intentional dimension”, that 
is the strategies they deploy to attain a given set of intentions – is, according to Carlsnaes, 
caused by their normative and perceptual views found in the “dispositional dimension”. These 
perceptions and values, in turn, are in a reciprocal relationship with structural and institutional 
conditions of action to be examined in the structural dimension. However, Carlsnaes’ 
categorization of foreign policy explanation into three separate realms, leads to an inability to 
address the temporal co-extensivity of strategies, perceptions and selectivities within a single 
model.347  
 
As a result of incomplete information, the interpretations actors give to their context are based 
on both consciously and unconsciously constructed images of their context, not necessarily 
responding to the real conditions of their action. A leader may for instance misinterpret its 
relation to the contextual situation it is embedded in or to an opposing party it is engaging 
                                                        
344 Brighi and Hill 2008, 149. 
345 Hay 2002, 194. 
346 Carlsnaes 1987, 98. Carlsnaes terms values and perceptions as the “[…] limitations related to information 
processes”, indeed. 
347 This issue was examined in 5.1. ”Dynamic Statics of Inputs and Outputs Versus the Diachronic Analysis of 
Processes.”  
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with.348 Either way, since foreign policy leaders acknowledge the unpredictable and contingent 
quality of the context they are embedded, the possession of some sort of framework becomes 
necessary for them – be it based on right or wrong perceptions of that context.349 Carlsnaes 
discusses this matter with reference to various meanings actors assign and ascribe to their 
context. Hay, in turn, argues that actors become reliant upon “cognitive shortcuts” – particular 
mappings of the terrains they are embedded in or lenses through which they navigate the 
world. These lenses can be understood as policy paradigms. 350 An example of such a paradigm 
can be economic liberalism/socialism or nationalism/internationalism; hence the value-laden 
nature of these templates. No matter what color the lenses, actors’ access to their context is 
always discursively mediated through specific paradigms. The formulation of strategies on the 
basis of which actors later deploy their policies reflect these understandings no matter how 
misinformed they were.351   
 
Hay puts an emphasis on the prominence of differentiating between his strategic actors and 
those of rational choice theory. For Hay, actors are not necessarily consciously strategic, which 
is why he distinguishes between intuitively and explicitly strategic actions. The former refers 
to routine or habitual strategies based on perceptions (leaving open the chance that they may 
be based on misunderstanding of the conditions of action as was implied above) of the strategic 
context and the likely consequences of particular political conduct. Giddens refers to this as 
practical consciousness. Explicitly strategic action is also based on the perceptions of an actor – 
be it an individual or a leadership of a government. However, unlike in the case of intuitively 
strategic action, in explicitly strategic action actors render explicit their perceptions of the 
context as well as their strategic calculations on the potential consequences and reactions that 
their strategies would entail. As such, we can say that explicitly strategic action consists of a 
conscious construction and reformulation of strategies in an evaluation of different options 
through which intentions and goals may be achieved.352 Hay’s explicitly strategic action can be 
located at the intersection of Carlsnaes “intentional” and “dispositional dimensions” introduced 
earlier; actors both consciously and unconsciously construct their environments in specific 
                                                        
348 Carlsnaes 1987, 98–100. 
349 Hay 2002, 211. 
350 Ibid., Jack Holland (2013, 34) argues that strategic-relational model’s emphasis on policy paradigms can be 
likened to”framing” in IR invoked for instance by Barnett and Balzacq. Hay (2002, 195) himself also refers to 
”framing of political action” when discussing the power of political leadership as preference-shaping and agenda-
setting. 
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ways based on their values and perceptions of that reality. Hay argues likewise that, in practice, 
strategies are formulated with the combination of both practical consciousness and an explicit 
strategy-formation process. Action is always both intuitive as well as explicitly strategic.  
 
6.4.3. Deployment of Strategies within Discursive and Strategic Selectivities 
 
Once formulated, foreign policy strategies are then operationalized in action. The likelihood of 
achieving particular objectives is very much dependent on two matters: first, on how 
strategically placed these actors are on the terrain – how they are positioned in relation to their 
context (strategic selectivity) and, second, on how they give meaning to their context 
(discursive selectivity) – the policy paradigms they possess. With regard to the first issue, the 
context is, indeed, selective of strategies in a sense that at particular times and spaces only 
specific courses of strategic action are available to the foreign policy leadership.353 Among 
these paths to take only a few will potentially lead to the realization of actors’ given intentions. 
354 The ‘structured coherence’ of the context, whose spatio-temporal strategic selectivity varies 
constantly, makes some actions more successful and others sanctioned, depending on the exact 
relational moment between strategic action and contextual moment. However, as Jessop 
suggests, contexts do not cause foreign policy action. They are, instead, invested with manifold 
spatio-temporal strategic and discursive selectivities that are co-existent and indistinguishable 
from strategic action oriented towards them. As I have been trying to point out, context is 
always specific to an actor, choosing for and against its particular foreign policies, never 
conditioning behavior apriori. Since context is indeed never “[…] a single causal mechanism 
with a universal, unitary logic, but is multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, and multiform, it 
does not generate a single, uniform set of pressures” towards actors either.355 Foreign policy 
leaderships will be, consequently, affected differentially by the strategic selectivity of their 
context depending on their position in relation to that context – just like “[…] all states and state 
capacities will be pressured by globalization but each will be affected in different ways” argues 
Jessop.356 
 
                                                        
353 As argued on multiple occasions, the context within which foreign policy strategies are deployed domain forms 
an “[…] unevenly distributed configuration of opportunity and constraint to actors”. (Ibid., 209.) 
354 Ibid., 209. 
355 Jessop 2007, 191. 
356 Ibid. 
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With regard to the second matter (how the discursively selective contexts favor particular 
interpretations given to the context over others) – it is important to note that, sometimes, 
discursive selectivities indeed “[…] may eliminate a whole range of realistic alternatives and 
may, in fact, over time prove to be a systematic misrepresentation of the context in question.”357 
This observation made by Hay is of significant importance with regard to the inquiry at hand. 
Here is why; the paradigm of sovereign statehood through which the KRG – and other de facto 
states for that matter – are assumed to be filtering their context through, is demonstrably based 
on an institutionalized and constantly reproduced misinterpretation of reality358, which favors 
particular strategies and eliminates, in turn, some others – equally realistic – strategies for the 
KRG. Although not explicitly referring to the relationalist approaches to reality or the SRA, 
Caspersen demonstrates this point in an illustrative example. Discursive selectivities in the 
international ideational context select for the idea of sovereign statehood. As such, they favor 
strategies aiming at state-building. It is partly for this reason that national liberation 
movements conventionally choose to transform into administrative governments and further 
into de facto states. It is also partly for this reason that such entities will continue to be driven 
by the idea of statehood in their future foreign policies.359 It is worth noting here that the entire 
survival of these de facto states is assumed to be based on these strategies in line with the 
discursive selectivities of the context; hence the material consequences of ideational structures. 
Were KRG to ignore or fail to read these selectivities off of its context, its entire survival would 
be threatened. The sub-chapter 7.1.2., will delve deeper into this issue of sovereign statehood 
as the cognitive template through which the KRG filters its context.  
  
6.4.4. Effects of Action: Partial Transformation of the Context and Strategic Learning 
 
 
Once conducted, strategic action causes direct effects on the context in relation to which it had 
been formed and within which consequent strategies will occur. 360  The context, albeit not 
                                                        
357 Jessop 2007, 49. 
358  With an institutionalized and constantly reproduced misinterpretation of reality, I am referring to the 
Westphalian state system. 
359Caspersen 2010, 117. I have highlighted the partly because one of the utmost central claims of the SRA is that 
structures do not cause action. As such the ideational structure of the sovereign state system does not 
straightforwardly cause KRG’s state-building process nor its future foreign policy behavior, for the deployment of 
eventual strategies are up to how the leadership interprets the selectivities of its context. An equally viable option 
for the KRG would be to ignore selectivities in favor of sovereignty. This would, however, have critical 
consequences with regard to its survival. 
360 Since strategic action is informed by ideas, we can once again see how ideas exert influence on the context.  
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changed exhaustively, will be altered by that action at least to some extent. It, then, impinges 
back upon the actors responsible for the particular action. As a result these actors’ position in 
relation with their context may indeed change.361 It is, once again, important to highlight here 
that deployed foreign policy strategies have both intended and unintended consequences, which 
makes social reality a path-dependent rather than a preordained structuratum. 362  As 
interpretative actors, foreign policy leaderships are however, able to monitor and reflect upon 
the consequences of their decisions. They assess the impact of their decisions in terms of 
whether or not they led to the objectives that were initially desired. Depending on their 
evaluations, reflexive actors may then, come to revise and modify or completely reject their 
previously constructed interests and strategies, not only based on the changes in their context 
(either independent of their own action or as a consequence of their own action) but indeed 
also as the result of strategic learning. 363   
 
Strategic learning assumes that albeit actors lack complete knowledge of their environment, 
they have the capacity to learn and draw lessons from past experiences. This kind of political 
learning is of particular importance when trying to understand change and development in 
foreign policy. It is essential to note, however, that political learning does not necessarily lead 
to better navigation skills when formulating future foreign policies. The reason is quite simple: 
foreign policy interventions will always leave a unique imprint on their context: consequences 
of action, including other actors’ responses to those policies will necessarily be more or less 
unpredictable.364 What is more, the always present chance of the context changing independent 
of the actors’ own actions, may also alter the position of a political entity in relation to it, adding 
to the already unpredictable and contingent nature of political interaction. However, as argued 
earlier (in 6.4.3.), it is important to note that once foreign policy strategies are deployed, the 
feedback given by the strategically selective context (feedback also referring to whether or not 
these foreign policies can be considered as successful vis-à-vis the objectives they aimed at) 
will come to be dependent on the relative position the consequences of this strategy will put 
the actor into, as well as on the correspondence of the realities of that situation with the beliefs 
held by these political actors.  
 
                                                        
361 Hay 2002, 209–215. 
362 Jessop 2007, 190–191. 
363 Hay 2002, 126–134. 
364 Hay 2002, 211. 
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To cut the long story short, there is a constant interplay between the context and the actor as 
well as feedback from one to the other; foreign policy conduct feeds back to the context, which 
it restructures or leaves untouched. This particular conduct also feeds back into the actor by 
making adaptation possible. 365  The model is indeed labeled relational due to the fact that 
actors’ conduct becomes intelligible when analyzed in relation to their context, whereas the 
context makes sense only if perceived of from the perspective of the particular actor, which is 
when the structure becomes truly “real”. As I have been trying to demonstrate throughout the 
introduction of the SRA, neither actors’ strategies nor its context can be examined in isolation, 
separated temporally when trying to explain foreign policy development.366  
 
6.5. Semiotic Imaginaries as the Consolidators of Structured Coherences 
 
In the three previous sub-chapters (6.4.2., 6.4.3., and 6.4.4.) I attempted to outline the 
contingently unfolding process of foreign policy development within contextual selectivities, 
strategic action and cognitive templates. There is, however, an aspect of the SRA that I want to 
emphasize in particular, which is why I have devoted this entire sub-chapter to it: the role of 
ideas. 367  I have touched upon the importance of beliefs and perceptions throughout the 
introduction of both the substantialist as well as the relationalist approaches to foreign policy 
analysis. However, there are two significant consequences that follow in particular from the 
SRA’s understanding of ideas. I want to address them briefly. 
 
Firstly, acknowledging the importance of ideas raises the question of power. The reason is quite 
simple: those able to provide cognitive filters, through which actors access the context, exert 
significant influence on the development and realization of particular policies. This in turn and 
– secondly – leads to the importance of paying attention to ideational and discursive factors in 
political analysis.368 The concluding remark of Hay gains particular importance with regard to 
the fact that this research examines the KRG as a de facto state driven by the idea of statehood: 
 
“More specifically, it [the importance of ideas] suggests the need to consider the 
dominant paradigms and frames of reference through which actors come to 
understand the contexts in which they must act and, above all, the mechanisms and 
                                                        
365 Brighi 2013, 38. 
366 Jessop 2007, 46. 
367 These two consequences are defined and examined by Hay (2002, 213–215). 
368 Hay 2002, 210–214; Jessop 2007, 47-49. 
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processes by which such paradigms emerge, become challenged and ultimately 
replaced. Periods of perceived crisis – in which the disparities between previously 
unquestioned cognitive frameworks and the ‘realities’ they purport to present are 
starkly revealed – here acquire a particular significance.369 [italics added]. 
 
I have added the italics to emphasize a point of intersection between the strategic-relational 
approach and the de facto state theorization. Now, based on their comprehensive research, 
Caspersen, Bartmann and Stansfield argue that the dominant paradigm driving the foreign 
policies and domestic developments of de facto states is that of sovereign statehood, resulting 
from their contested sovereignty in the Westphalian states system. The idea of full statehood is 
the hegemonic norm driving and constituting the policies of these entities. De facto states filter 
their context through the concept of statehood and formulate their strategies on the basis of it. 
The power of this idea holds them captive determining their internal development and external 
relations. As such the idea of statehood, as argued earlier, is strategically and discursively 
selected for in the international realm.370 At the same time, however, the very persistence of 
that idea is dependent on its actualizations in space and time. Jessop tries to clarify this 
relationalist understanding at the heart of the SRA by arguing that configurations such as 
sovereignty can be seen as having structural and strategic moments.371 Structural moments 
refer to the objective manifestations sovereignty: de facto states’ foreign policy actions aiming 
at achieving statehood actualize the dominance of the system. Strategic moments are, instead 
manifested in the conscious promotion of the idea not only via discourse but also action: De 
facto states, indeed, also consciously promote and reconstruct the idea of “full independence or 
nothing” in their internally as well as externally oriented policies.372 
 
There is an ironic paradox here, however. De facto states’ perceptions and values originating 
from the discursive bias of the context, predispose them towards strategic action aimed at 
achieving complete statehood, in KRG’s case complete autonomy from Baghdad. 373 During the 
course of their foreign policy development, these entities may change and modify their 
                                                        
369 Hay 2002, 214–215. 
370 Ibid., 215.  
371  Jessop 2007, 176–197. When examining structural and strategic moments, Jessop does not talk about 
sovereignty in particular, but instead of globalization. However, as he has argued sovereignty can be examined via 
the SRA  just like any other configuration – be it globalization, the capitalist relation or the state.  
372 Caspersen (2010, 117) argues, indeed, that just like de facto states cannot hold against external threats if they 
didn’t maintain the idea of statehood in their foreign policies, they cannot not hold against the demands of the 
internal audience either, if not for the invocation of this same idea: ”Selling non-recognition to internal audience 
is fraught with difficulty”. 
373 Hence it will only predispose, not cause them to do so. 
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strategies374  (as we will come to see in KRG’s case) but the paradigm through which they 
interpret their context remains the same.375 As such it is assumed that de facto states like the 
KRG formulate their foreign policy strategies on the basis of the idea of gaining full 
independence. Whether or not this is what the leadership of these entities actually aims at is 
irrelevant, because it will invoke the idea anyway considering the fact that it is crucial to the 
survival of the entities they are governing. When realized, the consequences of these strategic 
policies, however, paradoxically select against the achievement of the very same statehood that 
the discursive selectivity was supposed to be encouraging: the international community time 
over time proves to be unwilling to officially accept new members in the club. This, in turn, 
leaves de facto states in a state of ambiguity and confusion: the context is telling them to drive 
towards full statehood but when they do so in order to survive, the feedback given by the 
strategic selectivities of their context clashes against their strategies.  
 
The discursive bias against existence beyond the sovereignty/no-sovereignty dichotomy seems 
to remain intact; the international community cannot accommodate anything in between 
recognized statehood and no statehood. Attempts to De facto states, in turn, paradoxically 
reinforce this bias in order to survive; they are actualizing the strategic selectivities of 
sovereignty with their strategies aiming at the obtainment of full independence. There seems 
to be no way out of this cycle, even though the very existence of de facto states as spaces in a 
constant state of transition challenge the notion of sovereignty and point towards the need to 
accommodate existence beyond the either/or dichotomy of sovereignty. The reality, which this 
discursively favored cognitive template of sovereignty is supposed to be representing, is 
undergoing extreme transformation, while its systematic misrepresentation remains 
paradoxically reproduced time after time. This supposition takes us back to the question 
introduced Chapter 3 on de facto states: for how long can belief systems (semiotic mechanisms) 
that no longer represent realities (extra-semiotic mechanisms) on the ground be 
maintained?376  
 
                                                        
374 This marks the intentional dimension of Carlsnaes indeed. 
375 This, in turn corresponds to the “dispositional dimension” of Carlsnaes. 
376 Jessop 2007, 243. Another interesting research agenda for the development of the SRA suggested by Jessop 
involves the examination of the relative weight of semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms in the emergence of 
new social imaginaries. His preliminary hypotheses suggest that semiotic mechanisms weight more in the phase 
of variation whereas extra-semiotic mechanisms in the stages of retention. Moreover, their weight also seems to 
vary according to the type of social field or institutional order in which these imaginaries emerge. 
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The importance of imaginaries in the reproduction of systems of dominance is immense. 
However, to conclude, I would like to re-emphasize the fact that the aim of this inquiry is not to 
examine the change and development of emergent social facts or institutions such as 
sovereignty through the SRA, although I have touched upon the subject on a variety of occasions. 
My interest and constant elaboration on this issue can be, instead, attributed to an attempt to 
highlight the importance of understanding the mutual constitutiveness of hegemonic ideas and 
material reality in the contingent, yet, path-dependent processes of foreign policy development. 
Nevertheless, while pointing to this “[…] dialectic of discursivity and materiality”, I can also, at 
the same time, demonstrate how sovereignty – as an institution – is constantly being 
reproduced by actors such as the KRG.377 One of the assumptions of this inquiry is, indeed, that 
the foreign policy development of the KRG symbolizes strategic action based on a systematic 
misperception of reality. 
 
6.6. Conclusions 
 
I began this chapter by introducing the critique targeted at Archer’s unhelpful ontological and 
analytical dualism that could not – according to the proponents of the SRA – genuinely capture 
the relational nature of reality (6.1.). As an alternative, I suggested the SRA, which began from 
correcting Archer’s erroneous ontology and suggested an anti-dualist relational approach to 
reality. Accordingly, I elaborated in closer detail on the implications of Jessop’s 
reconceptualization of the agent-structure relationship (6.2.). This was followed by the 
application of the SRA to foreign policy analysis (6.3.). Finally, I dedicated a sub-chapter to the 
examination of the dialectical relationship between ideas and the material through the SRA. I 
did so mainly in order to shed light on the peculiarity of sovereignty examined from de facto 
states’ perspective (6.4.).   
 
Based on the first three sub-chapters I concluded that the SRA did not drift too far away from 
the morphogenetic approach proposed by Carlsnaes. The two seemed to overlap on a variety 
of issues, which was naturally the result of the relationalist view of reality both of them held; 
foreign policy action was clearly distinguished from foreign policy outcomes; both intended and 
unintended consequences were accounted for; the significance of the discursively mediated 
                                                        
377 Ibid., 240–241. 
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nature of reality was highlighted and both agreed on the importance of diachronic analysis.378 
However, there were also fundamental differences in the relationalist ontologies of Archer and 
Jessop, which led to the separation of their methodological paths. Archer’s model could not 
genuinely capture the dynamics of structure and agency responsible for foreign policy 
development within a single framework. In her morphogenetic cycles, she situates the context 
as preceding and anteceding agents’ actions, and, as such, locates the two components of reality 
in different temporal domains. 379 The morphogenetic model suggests that the actor enters a 
pre-structured context, which it then changes with its action and these changes, in turn, will 
form a new structural context into which subsequent actions will enter. Applied to KRG’s 
foreign policy development this would mean that in 2003, the leadership of the region entered 
a pre-existing context consisting of the recently toppled Baathist regime. Subsequently, the KRG 
changed this context by different foreign policy actions aiming towards gaining more autonomy 
from Baghdad. The changed context then reacted to this and further responses were 
formulated. The subsequent cycles would have been examined in a similar manner up until we 
had reached the present time. It is important to note here that Archer’s model would have, for 
instance, fallaciously depicted the fall of the regime as having preceded and caused KRG to seek 
more autonomy. The region’s leadership’s strategies would have been viewed as intervening 
elements in an otherwise independent environment; KRG’s rational actors had entered the 
previously structured domain, on which their interests were based, and then they had acted on 
the basis of those interest. The biggest problem here is that, if one is to follow Archer, foreign 
policy action and its structural environment become sequentially rather than reciprocally 
linked.  
 
The SRA steps in here:  how could one give a genuine understanding of relationality of reality if 
they examined agents and structures independently? One could not locate structures before 
agents in an analytical model if they assumed the two to be ontologically dependent on each 
other! Archer was not a genuine relationalist, would the SRA criticize. Jessop and Hay, therefore, 
formulated a new model to make sense of the situation; one had to examine KRG’s strategies 
(“agency”) in relation to their temporally co-existing contextual selectivities (“structures”); and 
study contextual selectivities (“structures”), in turn, in relation to the temporally co-existing 
                                                        
378 Hay 2002, 149. 
379  Brighi 2013, 34–35: Brighi argues, indeed, that this king of account leads to the treatment of agents and 
structures as if they had properties that were independent from each other. 
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strategies oriented towards them. Applied to KRG’s foreign policy development this would 
mean that KRG’s autonomy-seeking strategies in 2003 were relational to the spatio-temporally 
co-existing strategic selectivities of its context (the conjunctural opportunity brought about by 
the fall of the regime); and the strategic selectivities of the context (the fall of the regime) were 
relational to the autonomy seeking-strategies of the KRG in a sense that the end of the Baathist 
regime became a conjunctural opportunity only when relativized to KRG’s strategy. Both the 
context and action made sense only when examined simultaneously. Neither of these two 
existed independently from each other, pre-existed one another in time, or caused each other.  
 
One more fundamental point sets Archer’s model apart from that of the SRA. Archer examines 
only how contexts respond to actors’ behavior, but neglects the examination of how these 
responses are filtered through the actors’ perceptions, paradigms and narratives, and 
consequently internalized in the political process. It is not only the context, which responds and 
is influenced by foreign policy actions. Effects of action reach actors as well: as monitoring and 
reflexive agents they may change their preferences as a result of the consequences of their 
action; hence the importance of strategic learning emphasized by the SRA.380 Archer’s approach 
indeed has a more or less objectivist treatment of agency, which the SRA manages to overcome 
via the emphasis it puts on the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideational.  
 
Finally, with regard to Carlsnaes tripartite model, I want to highlight that even if situated in 
Archer’s morphogenetic cycles, it still formulates three separate domains of explanation, which 
necessarily comes to be rather problematic if one aims at demonstrating the mutual 
constitutivity of action and context. Although the relationship between the domains can 
incorporate a complex understanding of causality (teleological, causal, etc.), the tripartite 
approach nevertheless assumes a hierarchical relationship between them. For instance the 
material/institutional constraints appear to determine values and perceptions. 381 The SRA, 
instead, makes no such assumptions and manages to capture more coherently the relationship 
between ideas, context and action within contingently unfolding processes. It mostly for these 
above-mentioned reasons that I have ended up choosing the critical realist anti-dualist 
methodology provided by the SRA rather than the dualist model suggested by Archer. 
                                                        
380 Ibid., 38. 
381 Brighi 2013, 25. 
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CHAPTER 7: KRG’S FOREIGN POLICY POST-2003: A STRATEGIC-
RELATIONAL ANALYSIS  
 
 
7.1. Operationalizing the Strategic-Relational Approach  
7.1.1. Plan of Implementation   
 
Over the past ten years the KRG382 has been able to solidify its autonomy and strengthen its 
status not only within Iraq but regionally and internationally as well. As Gareth Stansfield has 
written: 
 
“Were there any proof required of the status the Kurdistan Region of Iraq now has 
on the international stage, the networking activities of its president, Massoud 
Barzani, at the World Economic Forum in Davos at the end of January 2013 would 
give some indication. Only ten years earlier, Barzani would have struggled to be 
received as anything other than the leader of his party, the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP) — and even then, the reception in some quarters would have been 
frosty. Now, in Davos and other places, he is received as the president of the 
Kurdistan Region by international leaders and heads of the world’s largest 
companies.”383 
 
This is indeed a statement made over a year ago, when more than two million barrels of Kurdish 
oil had yet not been shipped for sail from the Port of Ceyhan, without the approval of 
Baghdad.384 With the examination of KRG’s foreign policy development over the past ten years, 
starting from March 2003 and ending in June 2014, I attempt to demonstrate how the current 
status of KRG’s de facto statehood with regard to economic independence or, alternative its 
current situation in terms of the dispute on the limits of its autonomy with Baghdad, and 
economic cooperation in the energy sector with Turkey, came into being at the intersection of 
particular foreign policy strategies, contextual selectivities and the policy paradigm of sovereign 
                                                        
382  In this inquiry, when speaking of the leadership of the KRG, I will be referring to contextually situated 
individuals, who identify with the collectivities they represent and on behalf of which they are acting vis-à-vis “them” 
– other actors. This implies yet another important assumption: no matter how egoistic the acts of these players, 
there will necessarily be elements of obligation and sense of duty when representing a community. Identification 
with the community is, therefore, assumed to be rather deliberate on the part of the leadership of the KRG 
(Carlsnaes 1987, 114.) 
383 Stansfield 2013, 259. 
384 Washington Post, May 23rd, 2014; Reuters, June 6th, 2014. 
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statehood.385   I want to stress the fact that, just like in Chapter 7, I have, here, also taken 
elements from the ideas of both Bob Jessop and Colin Hay to construct the conceptual 
framework through which I will be filtering the development.386 I have also utilized Elisabetta 
Brighi’s, David Marsh’s, Stuart MacAnulla’s – albeit only to a limited extent – conceptualizations 
and of the SRA. 
 
The analysis will be conducted through an analytical separation of the examined period into 
two parts, which will be however linked with each other forming a single narrative. The first 
period will cover 2003-2010, and the second 2010-2014. In both of the episodes, I attempt to 
outline the intersection of foreign policy strategies with their contextual selectivities mediated 
by the cognition of the leadership. In line with the SRA, a particular emphasis will also be paid 
to the intended and unintended consequences of strategies, on both the actors themselves as 
well as their contexts. The idea is then, to link these periods into a coherent narrative of KRG’s 
foreign policy development over time.  This will, in turn, lead me to the empirical and the 
theoretical conclusions of the study in Chapter 8. In the concluding chapter, I will make some 
assessments on the contingently path-dependent nature of the region’s foreign policy 
development and issues, such as, the extent to which the KRG has itself been responsible for 
altering the selectivities imposed on it over time with the unintended and intended 
consequences of the deployment of certain strategies instead of others. I will also delve a bit 
deeper into the intersection of the theoretical conclusions with the empirical ones. 
 
The first period of examination is centered on the events taking place in Iraq in 2003 following 
the overthrow of the Baathist regime. The selectivities, strategies and ideas are examined 
mainly, albeit not exclusively, in relation to that event. The 2003–2010 -phase highlights the 
gradual intensification of disputes between Baghdad and the increasing cooperation with 
Ankara. The second period delves deeper into the economic issues related to the development 
of the hydrocarbon industry. In spite of the fact that KRG’s context comprises a variety of actors 
                                                        
385 The pursuit of statehood can be manifested in its reflections – sometimes via the leadership of the KRG as 
explicit strategic policies they are conducting and, at other times, in their intuitive action. The policy paradigm 
itself can be indeed attributed to the discursive selectivity of the context, which selects for the possession of the 
idea of “statehood” in order to survive, while, however, paradoxically limiting the KRG’s access to the club in 
practice. I examined this issue in further detail in 6.4. “Semiotic Imaginaries as the Consolidators of Structures 
Coherences”. 
386 For instance, the illustrative explanations in Figures 7 and 8 are adopted from Hay, whereas the more detailed 
analysis through concepts such as ”conjunctural moments” and ”structural moments” or ”counter-tendencies” 
have been adopted from Bob Jessop. 
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besides Baghdad and Ankara387, it is the intersection of the interests and relations of these three 
actors, through which I want to examine the region’s foreign policy development within this 
inquiry.  
 
If we go back to the initial question of the research: How to explain KRG’s foreign policy 
development post-2003, the de facto state theorization seems to tell us that the foreign policies 
of entities such as the KRG are driven by their pursuit of statehood, which has resulted from 
their contested sovereignty. Situating this argument within the SRA, we can then argue that 
Caspersen, Stansfield and Bartmann alike make a claim on the cognitive template through which 
the leadership of these entities are filtering their context: de facto states are assumed to be 
driven by the idea of statehood. Their survival is dependent on a delicate balancing game, which 
prevents them from giving up this belief, one of the reasons for this being no other than the 
discursive selectivity of the context in favor the idea. This point was clarified in the previous 
chapter (6.4.). Foreign policy strategies oscillate and fluctuate depending on internal dynamics 
and external conditions, yet the cognitive template is assumed to be set. The suggestion made 
by the de facto theorization is indeed not the only basis of this argument, for, KRG’s aspirations 
to secure as much autonomy as possible from Iraq has been demonstrated in most of the 
inquiries on the region. 388  This argument has a couple of implications with regard to the 
conceptual analysis I am about to conduct.  
 
First of all, it means taking the policy paradigm through which KRG has been filtering its context 
over the past ten years, at least hypothetically, as given. The value of one variable is thus 
assumedly fixed. Secondly, it makes an assumption about the nature of the discursive selectivity 
of the context within which KRG formulates its strategies, as has been repeated on a variety of 
occasions. Thirdly, it points us towards a closer examination of the fluctuating strategies and 
contextual selectivities that stand in relation to this particular cognitive template. A fixed 
cognitive template alone, indeed, cannot tell me anything about the overall development of 
KRG’s policies. In order to capture this organic process, I need to examine how this particular 
                                                        
387 For instance, Iran and the United States are the two very important actors to take into account when examining 
the dynamics in the region. However, since I cannot cover all aspects and players in the story, I will only focus on 
those I have considered to be of utmost importance to the understanding of the development of KRG’s foreign 
policies with regard to the hydrocarbon industry.  
388 It is indeed an established fact among almost all of the accounts on the Kurdistan Region. Arguing that the 
cognitive template is set, is, however not arguing that the KRG explicitly aims at an eventual declaration of 
independence from Iraq. 
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cognitive template interacts with unique spatio-temporal strategic selectivities and foreign 
policy strategies. Even more importantly, to demonstrate the significance of each factor in the 
overall outcome of the situation, I need to – at the same time – engage in counterfactual analyses 
via illustrative examples of how it “could have been if not for this and that”. Therefore, the 
forthcoming analysis will take the form of a detailed process-tracing (part factual, part 
counterfactual) of the path-dependent, yet contingent, development of temporally co-extensive 
selectivities, strategies and cognitive filters in Kurdistan Regional Government’s foreign policy.  
 
It is important to highlight one more issue that I think deserves a paragraph of its own here. 
This is an inquiry aiming to point at the relationality of strategies, selectivities and ideas in the 
explanation of social reality, hence the research question being indeed “How to explain KRG’s 
foreign policy post-2003?”. As such, it does not attempt to make any claims with regard to 
matters such as whether it was greed or grievance that primarily motivated the leadership in 
its unilateral policies with regard to the exploration, exploitation and export of oil vis-à-vis 
Baghdad. Likewise, it does not try to make any assessments on issues, such as, whether it was 
because of the fear of Turkey or the pressure of the USA that the Kurdistan Regional 
Government decided to stay within Iraq instead of declaring independence in 2003. What this 
research does attempt to address is firstly, how in each instance, the foreign policies deployed by 
the KRG can be attributed to three temporally co-extensive and mutually relational factors: 
strategically selective context, strategic action and cognition; and secondly, how the intended and 
unintended consequences of these foreign policies are responsible for a contingent, yet path-
dependent, development of the region’s foreign policies over the past eleven years. I am 
highlighting the importance of this question at this point for two reasons. The first one is related 
to viewing statehood as a non-changing variable, which can be indeed equated to making an 
unwarranted claim similar to the ones mentioned above. However, as I implied earlier, I am 
taking the paradigm as a given only hypothetically, based on the findings of the constructivist 
de facto theoreticians. As such, it is mainly through the instrumental role it plays in this research 
that the pre-given assumption of statehood as a non-variable factor should be viewed. The KRG 
may be, indeed, driven by statehood as the de facto theory suggests, but the primary reason for 
using this assumption at this point is, however, not in its accuracy or erroneousness. The 
principal reason is, instead, in the need to illustrate, via a concrete example, how paradigms 
and cognition dialectically interact with selectivities and strategies. The second reason for 
outlining the essential purpose of this research at this point, is related to the first one: namely, 
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the counterfactuals that I mentioned above. Once again, these examples also lend a helping 
hand in conceptualizing not only the fact that no situation is determined by structural 
imperatives or agential will alone, but also the fallacy of relating them in a temporal sequence 
as Archer had done. Counterfactuals serve to demonstrate, how all three analytical concepts 
are related in space and time; change the value of one and you will have an entirely different 
setting with completely different outcomes.389   
 
Let me get back to the plan of execution. Beginning from 2003, I will first briefly elaborate on 
the major events that took place during the particular period of examination. I will then filter 
the events through the analytical concepts provided by Jessop and Hay. The context will be 
examined as both a discursively and a strategically selective environment, including both the 
domestic and the international spheres. The leadership will be examined as the bridging factor 
between the material and the ideational – as reflexive actors, driven by strategic calculations of 
the selectivities of their context, which are based on the cognitive templates through which they 
filter the world. These actors are understood to be capable of monitoring and evaluating the 
intended as well as unintended consequences of their action. Based on these observations they 
are then also viewed as capable of strategic learning and, thus, the altering of their identities, 
interests and strategies depending on past experiences and current perceptions of selectivities. 
In order to avoid a pitfall of including a little bit of everything in the context from here and 
there, I will study only one or two central foreign policy decisions within each particular period. 
A significant weight will be put on the examination of the hegemonic paradigm of statehood in 
its dialectical relation with contextual selectivities and foreign policy strategies.  
 
Having examined the context and strategies, I will then move on to the elaboration of the 
outcomes of the foreign policy strategies – both intended and unintended consequences of 
action. The presentation of outcomes will lead the analysis chronologically into the second 
period of examination, starting from where the last one ended, 2011. The above-mentioned 
steps will be repeated to examine the developments in that period in a similar manner. The 
selectivities of the contexts will be examined to see whether any changes have occurred. Most 
importantly, I will try to assess whether or not any of the changes in the selectivities of the 
context can be attributed to the intended and unintended consequences of the previous foreign 
                                                        
389 Brighi 2013, 117. Brighi, has argued that if one of the elements of the dialectic is changed, the outcome of the 
situations would look entirely different. 
101 
 
policy strategies (or to the change in KRG’s current strategies for that matter). What will also 
be of particular importance here, is taking note not only of the influence of previous foreign 
policy actions on their context, but also of how the modified contexts have impinged back on 
these strategic actors resulting in strategic learning and the new positioning of the actor vis-à-
vis the selectivities of its context. Intended and unintended consequences of action, indeed, 
often influence the ideas, paradigms and narratives that the strategic actors possess before 
making particular foreign policy decisions. They may remain unaltered, but they could also 
change dramatically regardless of other continuities or fluctuations in the context. Within this 
second period, I will then indeed attempt to point contextual selectivities that are independent 
of the influence of previous strategies of the KRG. Finally, I will arrive at the current state of 
affairs and summarize my conclusions. 
 
7.1.2. Sovereign Statehood as a Hypothetical Cognitive Template  
 
Even though, as I elaborated on above, the assumption of the driving cognitive template of 
statehood plays more or less of an instrumental role in the inquiry, I still think a brief 
elaboration on why I have decided to locate it at the heart of the analysis is warranted. I will 
then elaborate on its dialectical intersections with foreign policy strategies and contextual 
selectivities in the conceptual analysis of each period separately.  
 
It perhaps comes as no surprise to claim that United Nation’s all-or-nothing conceptualization 
of sovereignty or self-determination has gained an almost universal triumph over other forms 
of political organization ever since the Concert of Europe period in the 1820s, during which the 
fundamental idea was adopted.390 Sovereignty, indeed, came to be seen as “[…] the solution of 
all problems and the adjustment to all new developments were made to conform to it”.391 
Stephen Krasner has likewise argued that, 
 
“[…] the sovereign state is the only universally recognized way of organizing 
political life in the contemporary international system. It is now difficult to even 
conceive of alternatives”.392 
 
                                                        
390 Pegg, 1998, 20.  
391 Hinsley 1986, 204–205. 
392 Krasner 1988, 90, cf. Pegg 1998, 20. 
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Looking at this issue from the strategic-relational approach, we can argue that the international 
context is discursively selective in favor the idea of sovereignty as the only way of political 
organization. Not only does this imply that there is a utility associated with the preservation of 
this particular belief, but also that the idea is constantly actualized in spatio-temporal instances 
as explained in 6.4. “Semiotic Imaginaries as the Consolidators of Structured Coherences.” 
Jackson has, indeed, argued that the “negative sovereignty game” will continue to hold in the 
future as well. He has given three reasons for this (discursive selectivity in favor of the idea of 
full sovereignty). The first one is instrumental and related to the fact that the costs of alternative 
arrangements are feared to be greater than its benefits. Therefore, continuing to recognize 
failing or collapsing states such as Syria or Iraq is considered to be far safer than recognizing 
the existence of KRG or the new Kurdish cantons in Syria. This, however, causes no problems 
for the de facto state, because recognizing Iraq does not necessarily entail the denial of the 
existence of Kurdistan. The second reason is normative; International Relations is not 
perceived of comprising only power and interests, but also law, courtesy and respect. Again, 
this is not a problem for the KRG either since, as we will come to see, it has been able to 
gradually increase its engagement with the international community in spite of lack of a formal 
sovereignty, which would assumedly undermine Iraq’s sovereignty. Jackson’s third reason is 
linked to the fact that institutional arrangements of the international society are built according 
to the principle of sovereignty. Nothing about the existence of de facto states necessitates an 
institutional change in the current international system; they can operate just fine without 
challenging the current ones, as we will come to see in the following chapters, indeed. Since the 
material existence of de facto states questions none of these three conditions necessary for the 
continuance of a belief system based on sovereignty, a discursive selectivity in its favor is 
indeed secured.393 The persistence of sovereignty, therefore, also entails the survival of a vision 
of the de facto state as a pragmatic (non-)solution to the question of how to accommodate 
existence beyond full sovereignty. De facto statehood will continue to remain as the 
international community’s “functional non-solution” to the inability to accommodate the idea 
of a self-determinant political organization short of full independence. 394  Pål Kolstø has 
similarly argued that,  
 
“[…] the problem with the involvement of the international community in de facto 
state conflicts is the indecision and inconsistency it has been pursued with. Rather 
                                                        
393 Jackson 1993, 189–202. 
394 Pegg 1998, 20. 
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than resolve conflicts, stalled negotiations freeze them and perpetuate status quo. 
In this way, they contribute to the prolonged existence of the de facto states.’’ [italics 
added]395 
 
As we came to see in the previous chapter, critical realists – or more precisely the SRA – argues 
that there are always material counterparts to ideas; semiosis is never independent from extra-
semiotic facts. The two are mutually interdependent for their survival. In terms of the question 
at hand, Jackson’s argument seems to imply that, as long as the idea of full sovereignty responds 
to the mediated or experienced realities of actors, and so long as de facto statehood as such does 
not fundamentally challenge this perception, there is no reason to assume that the selectivities 
favoring statehood will change. This is, however, not to imply that discursive elements are 
independent from actors. The survival of a belief system – be it sovereignty, capitalism or 
globalization – is dependent on the constant reproduction and actualization of its tendencies. 
On the one hand, the KRG, driven by the idea of statehood can be seen as continually actualizing 
the idea of sovereignty in its spatio-temporally located strategies. On the other hand, it can be 
seen as filtering its context through and formulating these strategies on the basis of this belief 
at the same time. The co-existence of agential and structural dimensions of social reality in time 
becomes quite apparent here.  
 
Albeit the idea of this inquiry is not to elaborate any closer on the continuance or potential 
change of this particular belief system as I have attempted to argue earlier (in 6.4.) – but instead 
to enlighten the path through which KRG’s current status has come to existence through 
agential and structural dynamics – I considered it important to highlight the implications of a 
discursive selectivity in favor of sovereignty with regard to the KRG’s foreign policy 
development. Within the context of this inquiry, it is, in other words assumed that the idea of 
statehood is discursively selected for. There is reason to believe, not only post-hoc but also, ad 
hoc and, in fact, in advance, that the selectivity of the context with regard to this idea has 
remained unchanged throughout the period chosen for examination of the KRG’s foreign policy 
development. However, as was implied above, cognitive templates are but one aspect of the 
dialectic. The other two – strategies and other strategic selectivities – are equally responsible 
for the contingent, yet, path-dependent development of the foreign policies of the autonomous 
                                                        
395 Kolstø 2006, 734. 
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region from 2003 onwards. I will now move on to the examination of these particular 
intersections. 
 
 
7.2. The First Period, 2003-2010: The Constitutional Recognition of the 
KRG 
7.2.1. The KRG in between 2003-2010 
 
Let me begin with March 20th, 2003 when the coalition forces entered Iraq. I have chosen this 
event as my starting point because of the simple fact that the occupation marked a complete 
change in the balance of forces within the country and set the Kurdistan Region’s – a safe haven 
of misery struggling under the double sanction of the Baathist regime and the UN – autonomous 
project on an entirely distinctive path. The leadership of the Kurdish de facto state allied itself 
with the United States following Turkey’s surprising refusal to grant transit rights to the 
coalition forces. The KDP and PUK wasted no time. Understanding the uniqueness of the 
situation and under the pressure of the U.S., they temporarily forgot about the disputes dating 
back to the civil war in the mid-1990s, merged their Peshmerga forces and proceeded to the 
disputed territories – including Kirkuk and Mosul – as the U.S forces ‘looked the other way’.396 
Hussein was toppled and an interim governing council was established. In a few years, elections 
were held: the allied Kurdish parties secured 77 seats in the Iraqi parliament and Talabani was 
elected as the interim president of the country. In no time, the Kurds had managed to establish 
themselves in Iraqi politics. Joost Hiltermann 397  has for instance, argued, that the Kurds 
succeeded in “Kurdifying Iraqi politics” to the extent that no decision could have been taken 
without the input or rather ”without the threat of a Kurdish veto” any longer.398 They became 
the “kingmakers” in Baghdad indeed 399 . This became most evident in Transitional 
Administrative Law (2004), which provided that a forthcoming constitution could be vetoed by 
the minimum of two-thirds majority of three governorates in Iraq. What this meant in practice, 
was, that the three Kurdish governorates of Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymanyia could reject any draft 
that they did not perceive of being in their interest.400  
                                                        
396 Galbraith 2005, 271-273.  
397 Joost Hiltermann is indeed a veteran analyst of Kurdish matters.  
398 Hiltermann 2008, 7.  
399 Entessar 2009, 100. 
400 Ibid., 99–102. 
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Furthermore, the KRG managed secure a legitimate status within the new Iraqi Constitution in 
2005, which came to formally recognize the region as an autonomous federal entity within 
Iraq. 401  In addition to the recognition of the authority of the regional government and its 
branches, it also gave the Kurdish Peshmerga forces the status of a legitimate army. To cut the 
long story short, the new constitution secured all the redlines that the KRG had put on the table 
for negotiation; namely the recognition of the region’s right to make its own laws on domestic 
matters and its lawful army, the right to reunify with Kirkuk402 via a referendum and, most 
importantly, the right over its unexploited oil and gas resources.403 As a consequence the nature 
of the political games played in between Baghdad and Erbil came to approximate a state-to-
state rather than a federal-government-to-a-de-facto-state-government relationship. It is no 
wonder that Brendan O’Leary has argued that following the constitutional recognition, 
Kurdistan could be considered ”freer within Iraq than any member state within the European 
Union”.404 The three most important articles with regard to the autonomous development of 
the region’s hydrocarbon resources, were the following: 
 
Article 112: 
 
The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from 
present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in 
proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country. [italics 
added]405 
 
 
Article 115: 
 
All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government 
belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organized in 
a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government and 
the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and 
                                                        
401 The Kurds indeed voted in favor of the constitution.  
402 The oil-rich city of Kirkuk is one of the disputed territories over which the central government and the KRG 
often clash. During the Baathist regime, the city was subjected to a systematic Arabization project. The other three 
are Ninewa, Salahaddin and Diyala provinces. The disputed internal boundaries in Northern Iraq have been and 
remain one of the most central fault lines between the Kurds and the Arabs within the country. For more see, for 
instance, Bartu (2010.) 
403 O’Leary 2009, x–xi; Entessar 2009, 100–104. Needless to say that not all Kurds agree on this.  
404 O’Leary 2009, x–xi.  
405 The Iraqi Constitution. 
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governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute.406  
 
Article 121;2: 
In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in respect to a 
matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal government407, the regional 
power shall have the right to amend the application of the national legislation 
within that region.408 
 
The three provisions granted significant autonomy to the leadership, whose parliament quickly 
began drafting new laws and regulations within its three governorates. Among these were the 
Kurdistan Investment Law (Law No. 4)409 and Petroleum Law (Law No. 22)410. I am mentioning 
the two because, as we shall see, they provided – together with article 112 and 115 of the Iraqi 
Constitution, the legal basis for further steps to be taken towards economic independence. The 
KRG managed to create an exceptionally favorable environment – both legally and politically as 
well as in terms of security – to foreign investors, who soon came to poor into the region – into 
the “other Iraq”.  
  
The new constitution succeeded in reorganizing the country from a highly centralized 
dictatorship into a state so decentralized, that its governance became almost impossible. 411  
This became evident in the forthcoming outbreak of sectarian violence so intense, that most 
journalists and scholars termed it a civil war. Among the boiling restlessness and violence in 
rest of Iraq, the Kurdistan Region managed to keep relative stability within its three provinces 
and further its economic development and democratic experience.412  
                                                        
406 The Iraqi Constitution. In other words, this gave any law that was established in Kurdistan supreme authority. 
The central government’s powers were limited to foreign policy (quite paradoxical here, because KRG is viewed 
as having a foreign policy of its own within the context of this inquiry), defence policy, monetary policy and 
customs (Galbraith 2005, 272.) 
407 The exclusive authorities of the federal government are defined in Article 110 of the Constitution. It lists foreign 
policy, national security policy and monetary policies as the areas to be exclusively placed under the constrol of 
the central government. 
408 Iraqi Constitution.  
409 Investment Law in the Iraqi Kurdistan (Law No. 4 of 2006) 
410 Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region – Iraq (Law No. 22 of 2007). 
411 The draft was a not only the result of an intense arm-wrestling game between the Kurds and the Shites: needless 
to say that trying to accommodate the interests of Iran, Turkey and the United States lead to a draft written to a 
great extent by politicians, rather than by experts in law whose presence in the process remained rather 
insignificant. The Constitution indeed ended up being vague on a variety of issues, which became apparent in the 
disputes soon about to rise between different interpretations. (Mills, 2013, 54–56.) 
412  Benard and Shnapper-Casteras 2010, 84–86. This is of course not to say that such development was 
unproblematic and progressive. The region has been inflicted with a variety of serious issues, among them for 
instance violation of human rights and corruption slowing down the democratic process. 
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Relations with Baghdad during the first years following the overthrow of the regime were 
marked by relative stability in the newly formed order in Iraq. It was indeed an order based on 
an ethno-sectarian sharing of power between Kurds and Shites – both committed to solidarity 
with the Unites States at the time.413 The relationship between the two was, nevertheless, not 
unproblematic. In spite of the existence of some level of mutual understanding in the beginning, 
tensions surfaced soon in 2008.414 This is when the first major disagreements on the so-called 
‘disputed territories’ claimed by both sides led to a major clash between the two opposing 
parties, leading almost to an armed battle between the Peshmerge and Maliki’s “Dijla Forces”, 
only to be mediated by the pressure of the U.S.. In addition to territorial disputes, quarrels over 
the federal budget and the Kurdish Peshmerga Forces, one of the crucial points of disagreement 
between the two parties soon to arise was related to the right of the Kurds to sign independent 
oil and gas exploration contacts not only within the three provinces of the Kurdistan Region but 
also in the disputed territories.415 The KRG indeed soon began to sign international companies 
with lucrative Production Sharing Contracts, which infuriated Baghdad.416    
 
Relations with Ankara appeared rather cold, although economic interaction had been 
increasing over the past few years. Chances for Turkey finding a collaborator from the least 
likely player in the region – an autonomous Kurdish entity, which it had perceived of as one of 
the biggest threats to the country’s territorial integrity over the past decades, looked quite dim. 
It was indeed in 2007, when the Turkish premier Recep Tayip Erdogan had announced that he 
would not meet with “tribal leaders” when consulted about a potential rendezvous with the 
President of Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq.417 However, the situation soon began to 
change. Turkey started to become more and more comfortable with the idea of deepening 
economic cooperation with the Kurdistan Region as it came to notice the intersection between 
its own interests and those of the KRG. The warmening political relations between the two will 
be put under closer scrutiny in the next phase (2010-2014). 
  
                                                        
413 Alkadiri 2010, 1316. 
414 Mills 2003, 54. 
415 The question was linked also to exportation of oil and gas, payments to the international oil companies working 
in Kurdistan and the region’s 17% share in the national budget. (Mills 2013, 54.) 
416 Baghdad was – and still is – granting only Technical Service Contracts – less profitable forms of agreement to 
the international gas and oil companies. 
417 Hürriyet Daily News, August 6th, 2007. 
108 
 
7.2.2. Kurdifying Iraqi Politics: Kurdish Strategies and the Selectivities of a New Iraq – 
Why be a Mayor when You Can Be a King? 
 
I will now elaborate on how the SRA’s conceptual tools make sense of this situation as the 
particular intersection of a strategically selective context, foreign policy strategy and 
hegemonic political paradigms. Throughout the analysis, we will come to see how most of the 
ideas invoked by the SRA overlap with those of Carlsnaes. However, there are also some 
significant points where Jessop’s and Hay’s paths clearly diverge from that of Archer and 
Carslnaes as I have tried to demonstrate earlier, particularly in the concluding remarks of 
Chapter 6. 
 
Strategies among selectivities 
 
Let me begin with the selectivities of the context. In the words of Brighi, ”[…] the international 
context here is intended mainly as other actors, no more and no less than the set of relations 
which they entertain and the patterns they have generated”.418 As has been mentioned earlier, 
the strategic spatio-temporal selectivity of a context consists of two elements. The first is a 
conjunctural moment viable for change by certain strategies. The second is a structural 
moment, which cannot be transformed by an agent pursuing a particular strategy during a 
specific time period, and which will vary according to the strategic location of that agent within 
“[…] the overall matrix of the formation”.419 Discursive selectivity, once again, entails the success 
of certain narratives and paradigms at the expense of others. 
 
It is no big mystery that the toppling of the Baathist regime opened a window of opportunity 
for the KRG to realize its autonomy-seeking agenda driven by the idea of statehood. The United 
States’ hostility vis-à-vis Baghdad came to be of particular benefit for the Kurdish agenda, 
changing its position with regard to the selectivities of its context. The fact that KRG indeed had 
to wait for an opportunity like this to prop up, is a clear indication of the strategic selectivity of 
its context. The events taking place in 2003 comprised a conjunctural moment for KRG’s vision 
of statehood and strategies associated with it.420 The new power vacuum provided a spatio-
                                                        
418 Brighi 2013, 37–38. 
419 Jessop 2007, 44. 
420  Hence, context forms a conjunctural opportunity only to the particular spatio-temporal paradigms and 
strategies of particular agents. Contextual selectivities do not constitute objective constraints to all agents, 
strategies and policy paradigms.   
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temporal context viable for modification by the leadership’s policies, which were formulated 
on the basis of interests in the pursuit of statehood. Undoubtedly, the very same environment 
also comprised a structural moment for some other strategies, since not all decisions were 
possible in that particular place at that specific time.  
 
As a result of its bitter past experiences with Baghdad 421  and the normatively oriented 
perceptions it had of the selectivities (both conjunctural and structural) of its environment, the 
KRG decided to feel the ground and deploy the strategies it saw convenient for the realization 
of its intentions indeed. The leadership worked – to the extend that it could and within the space 
it had in between structural constraints and conjuntural opportunities – to decentralize Iraq422. 
Transforming its context into an environment favorable for the furthering of the Kurdistan 
Region’s autonomous position was the primary aim of the leadership. Consequently, it had to 
think of different strategies to achieve this outcome. Aiming at the realization of an ethnically 
based federalism423 came to be considered as the most viable option at the time.  
 
As was noted above, with regard to securing economic independence from Iraq, Articles 112 
and 115 turned out to be significant gains for the leadership. These spatio-temporal strategies 
deployed by the KDP and PUK were possible because they were selected for by the context. The 
KRG did not enter a previously structured terrain, whose rules determined to point the game it 
could play424; in fact there were constantly counter-tendencies and other potential strategies 
fighting against those formulated by the KRG. Marina Ottaway, for instance has argued that the 
United States was quite unhappy with the newly drafted constitution, because in spite of the 
fact that it wanted a decentralized Iraq, it was highly suspicious about federalism with ethnic 
lines.425  
 
                                                        
421 Unfortunately, I do not have the space nor the time to include a thorough examination of these past experiences 
of the Kurdish Region with the Iraqi government. Suffice it to say that the entire history of Kurds within Iraq is 
characterized with conflict with the central government and these experiences without doubt constitute a 
significant part of the Kurdish leadership’s suspicious stance towards cooperation with the central government. 
(See for instance Benard and Schnapper-Casteras, July 23rd, 2010; Dawoody, 2006.) 
422 See for instance Alkadiri 2010, 1318–1320. 
423 Hiltermann 2008, 11–13; Alkadiri 2010, 1316–1318: Alkadiry criticizes ethno-sectarian approaches to the 
analysis of Iraqi oil politics, which he indeed calls a fallacy.  
424 Even in situations where the rules of the game are given, actors are never predetermined to play it in specific 
ways. 
425 Ottaway, December 16th 2014. There are multiple arguments against this opinion, of course. They recognize 
the entire re-ordering of Iraq along ethnic lines as a conscious process. (Alkadiri 2010, 1317.) In fact, Joe Biden 
suggested for the partitioning of Iraq into three regions in order to maintain its unity 2006. For more see for 
instance, Joseph and O’Hanlon’s The Case of Soft Partition in Iraq (2007). 
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Cognition as the intermediary between contextual selectivities and strategic action 
 
Particular strategies however, never follow causally from a change in the selectivities of the 
context. It is important to understand here that the occupation of Iraq per se was not an 
objective contextual change faced by everyone in a similar manner. The reason is simple. 
Spatio-temporal contexts are relational to cognitive factors as well as to strategies. Let me 
explain exactly how. When looking at the events of 2003, we can see that they become particular 
structural constraints or conjunctural opportunities only when observed from the perspective 
the KRG. Change the actor or its cognitive template, and you will have a context comprising an 
entirely different environment. The two are relative and should always be examined as such. 
Neither the Iraqi occupation (structural factors) nor KRG’s interests (agential will) alone can 
explain the foreign policy strategies formulated and deployed by the KRG. In other words, KRG’s 
strategies were not an emergent property entering a pre-existent structure and 
consequentially transforming (morphogenesis) or restructuring (morphostasis) it. This is how 
the morphogenetic cycles would make sense of the situation. Examining actors and contexts 
sequentially and separately would locate the KRG and the Iraqi occupation in different temporal 
and ontological domains as if they could be examined separately from each other. The SRA, 
however, would argue that the strategies of the KRG could not be understood separate from 
their position in relation to the contextual selectivities. Similarly, the context exists as a 
conjuncturnal opportunity for the leadership to realize its interests only when perceived from 
the perspective of KRG’s strategies. This epitomizes the relationalist approach of Jessop exactly 
as Bentley and Dewey pointed it out: “[…] no one would be able to successfully speak of the 
hunter and the hunted as isolated with respect to hunting […] or hunting as an event in isolation 
from the spatio-temporal connection of all the components”.426 Similarly no one could speak of 
KRG’s strategies without invoking the selectivities of its context or talk of the contextual 
selectivities in isolation of the spatio-temporal connection of all the strategies (including those 
of Turkey, KRG, Iran etc.). 
 
It is here that Colin Hay’s argument on strategies – being a perceptual matter relating to the 
extent and quality of actor’s information about its environment and the normative orientation 
of the actor towards the context within which it is situated – become extremely relevant. The 
argument refers to the importance of ideas from two perspectives. The formerly mentioned 
                                                        
426 Dewey and Bentley 1949, 133; cf. Emirbayer 1997, 289. 
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points to the relevance of actors’ reading of the selectivities of their environment. The latter can 
be seen as referring to the weight of the value-laden paradigm through which they filter their 
context. What this means in terms of the case at hand, is recognizing the importance of cognitive 
frames in the overall matrix of the situation. The strategies KRG deployed were relational to 
and dependent on the ideas they held in two ways. Firstly, they were relational to the scope and 
quality of the leadership’s information about the situation within which it was embedded, the 
“real” selectivities of the context, that is. Secondly, they were dependent on the normative 
orientation of the leadership, that is, on the policy paradigm through which it navigated the 
world. It was indeed the case that, just like the contextual change examined separately could 
not explain, why some strategies were deployed instead of others, neither could the hegemonic 
paradigms or actors information about the selectivities of their context. The three were 
mutually dependent. It is only when the paradigm of statehood and KRG’s interpretation of its 
context427 are relativized to the contextual selectivities that we can comprehend the overall 
turnout of the situation. Let me illustrate this further in a few examples. 
 
It is clear that the overthrow of the Baathist regime constituted a contextual change, which was 
more or less independent of whether or not KRG came to filter it via its cognition. However, the 
fact that this change formed a unique conjunctural opportunity for the leadership of the region 
was highly dependent on its perceptions (values and interpretations) of the situation and as such 
of its strategies.428 This is something that Carslnaes, likewise, would have pointed towards; as 
a result of incomplete information actors give interpretations to their contexts, which are based 
on consciously and unconsciously constructed images of their surroundings. 429  What 
Carlsnaes’ approach located in the morphogenetic model, would have failed to demonstrate is, 
however, the fact that these interpretations ought to be perceived of as co-existing in time and 
dependent on the contextual selectivities of the Iraqi war. For instance, looking at the KDP and 
the PUK we can state, first of all, that they were normatively oriented towards their context not 
only through their past experiences with the Baathist regime but also through the paradigm of 
statehood. Secondly, they both consciously and unconsciously constructed a particular reading 
of the selectivities of their context amidst the events. The unique meaning the KRG, accordingly, 
                                                        
427 Perceptions of the context matter, because sometimes, strategies are based on misperceptions a-la-Jervis of the 
real conditions of the situation. These misunderstandings have significant consequences 
428 Of course, they were not independent from its actions, since the Peshmerge forces cooperated with the coalition 
forces in toppling the regime. 
429 Carlsnaes 1987, 88–90. These interpretations may be indeed constructed images, which misrepresent the 
nature of reality at hand consciously or sincere misinterpretations of the real conditions of the situation indeed. 
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assigned to the events on ground resulted from a complex interaction between the values and 
the perceptions they had. 430  Consequently, the situation was viewed as a conjunctural 
opportunity by the KRG due to its suspicious orientation towards Baghdad and the normative 
vision of statehood seeking more autonomy from the capital, in the fear of centralization of 
power once again. Had the leadership, for instance, possessed an alternative policy paradigm 
or a distinctive experience of the Baathist regime, the context would not have necessarily 
comprised a conjunctural opportunity for the KRG to alter the elements within it. In turn, the 
strategic-relational model can also tell us that, the strategies aimed at the federalization of Iraq, 
do not make any sense without their relativization to the conjunctural opportunity. We can, 
thus, conclude that it was only when the facts of the situation were mediated by the leadership 
of the autonomous region, that the context became a conjunctural opportunity viable for change 
by KRG’s strategies. Similarly, it was only when the autonomy-seeking strategies were 
relativized to a context strategically selective in favor of decentralizing strategies that these 
strategies came to make any sense.  
 
One final point should be made here; strategies are not necessitated by the spatio-temporal 
selectivities of context either, for contexts might select equally for multiple strategies. In other 
words, even if the spatio-temporal agent- and strategy-spesific selectivtities made up the rules 
of the game, they did not tell KRG exactly how to play their hand. A good example related to this 
is fact that the autonomous region’s leadership did not declare independence from Baghdad in 
2003 when it – at least potentially – had the chance to do so. 431 Nothing in the relations around 
KRG per se dictated the particular choice that was taken. The situation has been indeed 
considered by many as a one-time window of opportunity not likely to be opened again. If one 
is to look at the entity’s pursuit of statehood and past experiences, this strategy may seem more 
or less surprising, taken the conjunctural opportunity that the toppling of the Baathist regime 
provided for the declaration of independence. It is here, where the cognitive factors step in and 
explain, at least to a certain extent, why the autonomous region decided to stay within Iraq 
instead of deciding to go on its own.  
 
Given the leadership’s will to secure as much autonomy from Baghdad as possible, there were 
a variety of deployable strategies that could have lead to led to an outcome perceived of as 
                                                        
430Ibid., 87–94. 
431 Ottaway and Ottaway, April 29th, 2014. 
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possible. Some were of course more and others less likely to do so. In other words, KRG had a 
particular space in between the conjunctural opportunities and the structural constraints 
within which it could transform its environment into one more favourable of the idea of – in the 
words of Caspersen “[…] why be mayor when you can be a king” 432. Out of these strategies the 
KDP and PUK opted for one – to stay within Iraq. It is important to note here that this decision 
was based on the interpretations the entity gave to the selectivities of its context. In formulating 
a strategy of its own, the KRG had to take into account the strategies of other actors and assess 
the consequences of the deployment of one strategy over another; hence the logic of 
consequences invoked by rational theoreticians. At the same time it had to contemplate on the 
values and perceptions it had of its own position in the situation; hence the logic of 
appropriateness invoked by institutionalists.433 For instance, KRG acknowledged that had it 
declared independence, it “[…] would have had Ankara up in Arms”.434 Such a decision would 
have conceivably exposed the entire de facto statehood that the region already enjoyed in grave 
danger. By staying within Iraq the leadership could realize both its short-term and long-term 
interests – namely strengthen its autonomy and lay the foundations for an independent 
Kurdistan.435 Some have, however, attributed KRG’s decision to the leadership’s will to make 
concessions – albeit unnecessary ones – in order to accommodate their American ally. 436 
Whatever the actual reasons were for choosing one viable strategy over another (whatever the 
relation between logic of consequences and appropriateness), does not concern me here. It is 
the importance of cognitive factors that I wanted to point to via this example; the significance 
of their dialectical and relative relationship to the contextual selectivities.  
 
Implications on power 
 
One final significant point needs to be made here. It is related to the conceptualization of power. 
Following the relationalist approach to reality Jessop argued, that the relativization of action 
and context led to balance of power being a matter to be analyzed post hoc. As such, power was 
                                                        
432 Caspersen 2010, 127. 
433 March and Olsen 1989; 22–23. Political actors, when faced with a decision, choose not only on the basis of their 
wants but also the costs and the consequences of acting in a particular way. The two logics are in fact linked and 
interrelated in the SRA. 
434 Gonul, January 29th, 2013. Not only Ankara, but Iran may have also opposed to such a move. 
435 Entessar 2009; and Caspersen 2010, 128: Caspersen has indeed claimed that demands for self-determination 
are flexible and change according to external circumstances and dynamics within the community. 
436 Galbraith 2005, 274–275. 
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never to be examined as an independent variable responsible for particular outcomes as, for 
instance, realists assumed it to be. It had to be treated as an explanandum instead. Let me 
explain how. The overthrow of the Baathist regime as an overall situation brought about, 
following Jessop, “[…] a complex hierarchy of potential powers determined by the range and 
determinacy of opportunities for influencing elements that constituted constraint for other 
agents”.437 In other words, the change in the context (overthrow of the regime) constituted a 
situation in which actors – including the KRG – came to be differentially positioned with regard 
to these changes. Their positions were of course relative to the ideas they held and strategies 
they had, as has been demonstrated above. What is more, Jessop continued, this potential for 
powers depended “[…] not only on the relations among different positions in the social 
formation but also on the organization, modes of calculation and resources of social forces”. The 
actual balance of power was, therefore, determined only after the strategies and actions 
pursued by the KRG (federalization of Iraq to achieve more autonomy) had interacted with 
other strategies or counter-tendencies (for instance, those aiming at a more centralized Iraq), 
“[…] within the limits imposed through the differential composition of structural 
constraints”.438 Viewed from this perspective then, power comes to be seen as a relational and 
a contingent matter, the distribution of which is determined only after the spatio-temporal 
intersection of strategies and contextual selectivities. It is not a property possessed by actors 
prior to entering an actual situation and, consequently, determining the success or failure of 
their deployed strategies;439 hence Jessop’s appeal to the importance of contextual examination 
of power.  
 
The SRA makes an extremely important observation here, in terms of this inquiry. First of all, 
KRG’s “hand in the game” cannot be examined separate from the spatio-temporal contextual 
selectivities the region’s leadership was confronted with, nor beyond the cognitive templates 
they had at the event of the overthrow of the regime. Secondly, the negotiating hand they had 
cannot be studied apart from its relation to the hands of other players in the game, either. The 
potentialities for power in March 2003 were located in the relations of these differentially 
positioned strategies, indeed. Looking at the case at hand, we can thus conclude that, the power 
                                                        
437 Jessop 2007, 44. 
438 Ibid., 44. 
439 Jessop has not, in particular, referred to the two alternative conceptualizations of power as either a property 
or a relation, but based on his reading on the nature of the relationship between agents and structures, his 
understanding reflects the relational view of power. Unfortunately, I do not have the space or the time to reflect 
on this subject any further. 
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relations between the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shites in the Post-Saddam Iraq, were 
determined by two things; firstly by the reciprocal interaction of the objectives and strategies 
of these players and secondly, by the unequal positioning of those strategies in relation to the 
contextual selectivities of that particular spatio-temporal moment. In our case, the strategies of 
the Kurds, for instance, were selected for since the contextual selectivities offered a window of 
opportunity for the decentralization of Iraq, while those of some of the pro-Baathist Sunnis 
were not. We can see therefore, why the examination of balance of power in Iraq makes sense 
only, when studied after the interaction of these forces had taken place.  There is simply no logic 
in claiming that the KRG had this and that amount of power, without taking into account the 
intersection of its particular spatio-temporal objectives with those of other players, as well as 
their differential positioning in relation to the contextual selectivities of the situation.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Within this analysis we could see how the specific intersection of conjunctural opportunity 
coupled with structural constraints in relation to strategic action based on hegemonic 
paradigms and perceptions, determined the scope within which KRG could actually influence 
its environment within the events taking place in 2003. We could also see how perceiving of 
the context as “abstract, atemporal or unlocated” objective constraints prevented one from 
understanding the fact that contextual selectivities were always relational, not only to the space 
and time in which they existed, but also to the policy paradigm of statehood as well as foreign 
policy strategies aimed at reproducing the context or alternatively transforming it; “Structures 
are irredeemably concrete, temporalized and spatialized; and they have no meaning outside 
the context of specific agents pursuing specific strategies”, as Jessop has, indeed, argued.440 
Following Brighi, I could therefore conclude that that it was not structural conditioning per se 
that happened to offer or deny opportunities to the KRG at the fall of the former regime. It was 
instead the relation between the KRG’s autonomy-seeking strategy and its context selective in 
favor of such strategy that did so.441  
 
I also tried to demonstrate the implications of the strategic-relational approach on the 
understanding of power. It was only after the interaction of particular strategies that the 
                                                        
440 Jessop 2007, 44. 
441 Brighi 2013, 63. 
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balance of power in the overall formation was determined. Furthermore, I argued, the decision 
to stay within Iraq was certainly not the only strategy feasible for actualization at the time. It 
was, however, the one eventually deployed. This decision, in turn, marked the actualization of 
particular and contingent tendencies of the strategic selectivities of the context. Accordingly, 
what is about to follow in the further development of the foreign policy of the KRG, should be 
seen as the path-dependent consequences of these more or less contingent actualizations of 
different strategies; hence the contingently unfolding nature of relational reality. Let me now 
move on to address these consequences of KRG’s decision to stay within a unified, yet a legally 
and politically federalized, and an ethnically divided, Iraq. 
  
7.2.3. Consequences of Action 
 
As we saw above, the success of KRG’ strategies were dependent on how strategically placed 
they were in the overall formation of the situation and on the meanings they gave to the events 
taking place at that time. The deployed strategies were contingent in a sense that, they were 
not necessitated by the structure of the situation as such. The politically negotiated decision to 
stay within Iraq – and contribute to the legal and political federalization of the country – had 
both intended and unintended consequences on the context. It is within this newly developed 
environment that the leadership had to formulate its forthcoming foreign policy strategies. The 
altered context, in turn, impinged right back upon the autonomous region, positioning it in a 
unique and novel way. Let me clarify this illustratively. 
 
The Kurdistan Regional Government was now officially recognized within a decentralized Iraq, 
in the governance of which it participated. The newly drafted constitution without doubt 
changed the position of the Kurdistan Region vis-à-vis Baghdad. An environment, which was 
partly brought about by the Kurdish leadership’s calls for autonomy, constituted new 
conjunctural opportunities and structural constraints for its forthcoming ambitions. We can see 
the contingency of path-dependent development at play here once again: had any of the 
elements – ideas, spatio-temporal selectivities or strategies been slightly distinctive – the 
spatio-temporal context would have perhaps turned out to be entirely different as well.  
 
Beginning from the newly drafted constitution, we can see how it, first of all, created a 
conjunctural opportunity for the KRG to develop its foreign policies in specific directions. 
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Secondly, the constitution also comprised an incentive for the deployment of certain strategies 
instead of others. Among the strategies selected for, was the adoption of an autonomous 
Petroleum Law in Kurdistan (Law No. 22)442. It had indeed become clear for the government 
that decreasing economic dependence from Baghdad required the creation of a foreign 
investment -friendly environment in the Kurdistan Region. In order to attract investors, 
particularly to the hydrocarbon sector, the KRG needed to provide them with carrots better 
than those offered by Baghdad. An independent Petroleum Law was a partial answer to this 
dilemma.443 It gave the leadership a legal basis to negotiate oil and gas contracts on its own 
terms444 and, as such, to give better deals to IOCs than Baghdad would; Production Sharing 
Contracts instead of the central governments Technical Service Contracts. 
 
Understanding its favored position with regard to the spatio-temporal selectivities of the 
context, the KRG decided to embark on a risky journey indeed; signing PSCs with a few of 
International Oil Companies. The game was quite risky for these corporations as well. The 
safety of their legal and political environments was not guaranteed, because the vague Iraqi 
Constitution was subject to conflicting interpretations. However, the potential gains that these 
lucrative deals entailed were too big to be undermined by the hazards associated with the game. 
The IOCs will be the subject of our closer examination in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to 
say that their entrance into the KRG was important, because it lay the ground for giants such as 
ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron and the Anglo-Turkish Genel Energy445 to step in the game later on, 
bringing intriguing twists and turns on board. 446 I have situated some of the ideas introduced 
above in the strategic-relational model formulated by Colin Hay in Figure 7. 
 
                                                        
442 Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region – Iraq (Law No. 22 of 2007). 
443 Coupled with the constitutional provisions (Articles 112, 115, and 121:2) it can be considered one of the most 
important decisions that the leadership of Kurdistan took during the first years following the fall of the Baathist 
regime 
444 This view is, of course, contested in Baghdad. (Morelli and Pischedda 2014, 108-109.) 
445 There are claims according to which these ”smaller companies” which the KRG initially contracted with, were 
in fact ”sent” by the bigger players to feel the ground without having to risk their own game just yet. The first 
foreign exploration company to come to Kurdistan in 2004, was DNO International (Washington Post, June 12 th, 
2014; For more see for instance: http://www.dno.no/dno-operations/kurdistan-region-of-iraq/).  
446 Morelli and Pischedda 2014, 108–109 
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Figure 7: Strategic and discursive selectivity as adopted from Hay (2002, 212) and applied to the analysis of KRG’s 
foreign policy development from 2003 until 2010. 
 
 
7.3. The Second Period 2010-2014: Turkey’s and KRG’s Interests Meet 
 
7.3.1. The KRG in between 2010-2014 
 
Disputes over the limits of federalism in the hydrocarbon sector did not arise following the 
drafting of the new Constitution. The quarrel between Kurds and the Iraqi government date 
back to the overthrow of the old regime. What is more, the issue is also tightly linked to another 
major source of conflict between the two parties: that of the disputed territories, indeed.  The 
point of intersection is in the fact that there is a significant amount of oil and gas resources 
within these regions as well. Ever since 2003, multiple efforts have been made to settle the two 
questions. They have, however ended up being more or less fruitless in spite of, or perhaps also 
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because of, the involvement of other parties such as the United States, as intermediaries.447 I 
will not delve any deeper into the importance of the natural resources Iraq and Kurdistan, since 
this issue was already addressed in Chapter 2 of the research.  
 
Continuing from where we left off in the previous chapter, the Iraqi constitution provided 
indeed that the central government had exclusive control over the existing oil fields. It remained 
silent on the jurisdiction over those found and developed after the enactment of the 
constitution.448 KRG, therefore, saw it apt to regulate an independent oil and gas law in 2007. 
Beginning first with contracting a number of small IOCs, it soon invited international giants 
such as ExxonMobil, Gazprom Neft, Total and Chevron into the territory with lucrative 
Production Sharing Contracts449, which infuriated Baghdad. Maliki declared the PSCs illegal and 
threatened to blacklist companies from bidding for contracts in Southern Iraq if they sign PSCs 
with the KRG.450 His fear was of course in the region obtaining an independent export capacity. 
Both parties had different readings of the constitution and each asserted the legitimacy of their 
own interpretation. Nevertheless, the dispute was – and still is – not a legal, but a highly political 
one. Maliki is worried about internal sovereignty, while the KRG – having a secured domestic 
authority in most of the Kurdish-populated areas – is more concerned with achieving economic 
independence from the capital.  
 
The withdrawal of U.S. Combat Forces from Iraq in 2011 further emphasized the existence of a 
power vacuum to be filled by Iran and Turkey. It was indeed around 2010-2011 that Ankara 
decided to properly step up its game in the Kurdistan Region.451 It had been only in 2007, when 
Erdogan had even refused to meet up with Kurdistan’s president. It was also around the same 
time, when Turkey had been busy with his bombing campaign in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, 
targeting PKK strongholds in the Qandil Mountains. However, fast forward into 2010-2011 and 
you will find the Turkish Foreign Minister opening a consulate in the capital of Kurdistan and 
                                                        
447 Alkadiri 2010, 1318–1320; Mills 2013, 53-55; Zedalis 2012, 44–45. 
448 Ottaway and Ottaway, April 29th, 2014.  
449 Platts McGraw Hill Financial, January 17th, 2014. The KRG has indeed signed 50-plus PSCs with international 
oil companies. 
450 Mills 2003, 55. In fact, he has already done so with a few IOCs and blamed them for ”smuggling Iraqi oil”. 
However these threats have not deterred IOCs from signing contracts with KRG., See for instance, Natali, February 
28th, 2014. Iraq’s reaction to Kurdistan Region’s independent development of its hydrocarbon resources 
proceeded from denial that such resources even existed in the territory to the subsequent blacklisting of the 
international companies contracting with the regional government and now, most recently at the time of the 
writing this thesis, to the cutting of the Kurdistan’s budget because of the exported oil to Turkey.  
451 Park 2014, 1–7. 
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Erdogan becoming the first Turkish premier in history to visit the capital of the KRG.452 Ankara, 
indeed, came to realize the nexus between its domestic and foreign policy interests with KRG’s 
attempts to further their economic independence from Baghdad around 2010-2011.453 First of 
all, it is worth mentioning that Turkey’s increasing economic growth coupled with the 
international sanctions posed on Iran necessitated a diversification of the country’s energy 
sources.454 Secondly, Erdogan’s domestic interests required finding a ‘solution’ for the Kurdish 
dilemma once and for all. The prime minister was indeed aiming at an amendment of the 
Turkish constitution to secure his hold on power. He needed an ally to get the votes necessary 
for the realization of this intention: Kurdish parties seemed like a viable option. Accordingly, 
the pressure to address the Kurdish question in Turkey became heavier around 2012. KRG’s 
role in all of this, was of course, to act as an arbitrator and messenger between Qandil and 
Ankara.  Thirdly, and on another front, Syria’s civil war had reinforced PKK’s position in the 
region, raising Erdogan’s fears of an independent Kurdistan in its southern neighbor. At the 
same time, and even more importantly, a PKK safe haven also meant a stronger bargaining hand 
for the Kurds in Turkey, in general, and the PKK, in particular; hence the advantage that the 
Turkish premier saw in negotiating at least a superficial deal with the Kurds in Turkey. What is 
interesting, here, is how KRG’s Barzani came to be the route through which Erdogan could 
address most of his problems; no wonder he has been called “Ankara’s favorite Kurd”. 455 
 
The United States initially worked in support of cooperation between Turkey and Erbil – 
perceiving of the collaboration as a counter-balancer for Iran’s increasing influence in Iraq. 
However, as we will come to see, this cooperation reached to extends beyond what the U.S. 
initially aimed at: voices of dissatisfaction have mounted to what has apparently become a joke 
in the Turkish diplomatic circles, claiming that “The United States wanted Turkey and Iraq’s 
Kurds to become friends, not get married.”456  
 
                                                        
452 Barkey 2011, 663–664; Iseri and Dilek 2013, 26–28. 
453 The intersection of interests has been accounted for in the academia by a number of scholars. Among these are 
for instance a recently published extensive study by Bill Park (March 2014). Also worth mentioning are other 
articles and briefer accounts by Morelli and Pischedda (2014); Mattew J. Bryza (2012), Marianna Charountaki 
(2010).   
454 Iseri and Dilek (2013, 29–30) assert that the warming of the relationship between the two came indeed at a 
time when Turkey’s domestic oil consumption was predicted to increase by 32% and its natural gas demand was 
expected to double by 2023.” 
455 Park 2012, 116. 
456 Morelli and Pischedda 2014, 112. 
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The KRG also had an interest in this cooperation. Having found a vast amount of energy 
resources on its territory, the landlocked region needed an export route.457 Turkey appeared 
like the only option. The two parties, therefore, collaborated and built up an oil pipeline partly 
bypassing Baghdad’s supervision.458 Where previously Kurdish oil had been trucked to Turkey, 
through this pipeline the KRG had the change to increase its exports significantly.  Exports, 
indeed, began in no time, and one billion barrels of Kurdish oil headed towards Europe in late 
May 2014, without the approval of the Iraqi government.459  
 
Maliki has put substantial effort into halting every step of this process from the blacklisting of 
the companies to cutting off the Kurdistan Region from its share in the national budget, and 
most recently, to filing a case against Turkey in the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris.460  The threats and quarrels have, since then, also occasionally led to other forms of 
political games. For instance in 2013, Baghdad’s and KRG’s disputes over Maliki’s refusal to pay 
IOC’s operating in in the Kurdistan Region led to the passing of the Iraqi budget without the 
approval of the Kurds.461 Also, on the Iraqi front, the parliamentary elections of 2010 and 2014 
further complicated matters; interests, compromises and threats became so intermingled and 
fused, that it was difficult for anyone to tell who needed whom and why. Just to add a bit of 
more complexity to the game, I need to also mention the intra-Kurdish rivalries epitomized in 
the relationship between the PKK and the KDP.462 Perhaps this is a good point to stop at, and 
reflect on these developments via the SRA.  
 
7.3.2. KRG’s Strategies and Altered Selectivities – IOCs and Turkey as the “New” Players in 
the Game 
 
Strategies among selectivities 
 
                                                        
457 The implication that the discovery of vast oil and gas resources had on the foreign policies of thei KRG point to 
the importance of the inclusion of domestic factors when accounting for foreign policy development.   
458 Park 2014, 27-29. 
459 Reuters, June 11th, 2014.  
460 Natali, November 11th, 2013. By this I am referring to KRG’s ability to export oil via an independent pipeline, 
not linked to the Iraq-Turkey pipeline. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, under the control of the central government 
meets with the KRG-Ceyhan pipeline merging into the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline monitored by the SOMO and thus the 
central government.  
461 For more, see for instance Natali, February, 20th 2013, Salaheddin March 7th, 2013. 
462 The Syrian dissolution had indeed strengthened the PKK significantly, which now held three independent 
cantons isolated from violence in the rest of the Syrian regions. 
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Interaction between different actors and their strategies makes social reality a constantly 
transforming process. Each actor contributes to this process via its own input. We can therefore 
say, that each player in the game constitutes a part of the makeup (strategic selectivities 
positioning actors unequally) of what is understood as the “context” – an abstract analytical 
tool, indeed. Via the consequences of its strategies examined above, the KRG, similarly, altered 
its context in multiple ways. As there were other players in the game as well, the consequences 
of their inputs became likewise important; at least to the extent that they affected the 
contextual selectivities facing the KRG. The reciprocal interaction of all those relevant actors 
during 2003-2010 gradually developed KRG’s relative “context” and transformed its strategic 
selectivities. Since I cannot examine the impact of each actor’s strategies on the context, my 
emphasis is mostly on the consequences of the KRG’s own conduct and the influence it had on 
the relative selectivities of the context. Nevertheless, as context consists of the interaction of 
other actors, making a few statements on their strategies here and there becomes relevant as 
well.463 Before assessing the consequences of strategies deployed 2003-2010 on the contextual 
selectivities of 2010-2014, let me stop for a brief moment to address the importance of the 
discovery of vast oil and gas reserves in Kurdistan.  
 
The discovery of these fields throughout the past ten years have had an integral role in the 
development of Kurdish foreign policies. KRG’s leadership could not have embarked on the 
road it did, had it not been for these reserves that provided the means to assert pressure on 
Baghdad. In other words, the discovery of oil and gas in Kurdistan significantly altered KRG’s 
strategic positioning vis-à-vis other players in the region. What is more, the influence they had 
also points to the necessity to include domestic sources in foreign policy analysis.464 However, 
examining the role of oil and gas reserves without relating it to the contextual selectivities of 
the international domain makes no sense either; hence Brighi’s emphasis on the importance of 
addressing the nexus between domestic and international factors. 
 
The profitable PSCs created a context strategically selective for the objectives of international 
giants, which started to steadily enter into agreements with the KRG. The selectivities had, in 
turn, bent against Baghdad here. The contracts represented a better strategic positioning for 
                                                        
463 For the Iranian connection to the nexus of Turkey’s Energy Foreign Policy with Kurdish Oil see, for instance: 
İseri and & Dilek (2013) 
464 Hence the need for a model capable of accounting for both internal and external sources of foreign policy.  
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the KRG vis-à-vis the capital; the more PSCs the KRG signed, the more it increased its chances 
of survival without Iraq. However, since the landlocked region was dependent on the export 
infrastructure controlled by Baghdad, the KRG needed to work its way out of this contextually 
constraining factor. In other words, the impact of the structural moment had to be altered to 
better meet KRG’s strategies. How to do that, therefore, became the most important question 
to be answered at the time. As we learned via the SRA, one possible way for actors to modify 
the selectivities of their context was by changing their alliance strategies. This is exactly what 
the KRG eventually did. Aiming to undermine the impact of its dependence on Baghdad, the 
leadership turned to Turkey, with whom Barzani began strengthening his ties. A multi-trillion 
contract was signed with Ankara to construct a KRG-Ceyhan pipeline. What used to appear as 
an unalterable structural moment for the KRG soon came to constitute a conjunctural 
opportunity, which it succeeded in modifying so that it now better met the leadership’s 
strategies. The deal struck between Ankara and Erbil, indeed, marked a significant change in 
the positioning of the KRG within its contextual selectivities; for even though the new pipeline 
did not equal to complete independence from Baghdad 465 , it did result in an increased 
bargaining power for the KRG. The reason is quite obvious: the KRG could now shelter itself 
from complete economic breakdown if Baghdad were to continue the shutdown on budget 
allocation. Furthermore – and even more importantly – the strategic positioning of the KRG 
altered due to Turkey’s involvement in the game; since Ankara had invested in these pipelines 
it also had an interest in protecting them. As Morelli and Pischedda have argued, so long as 
KRG’s interests stay aligned with those of Turkey, the autonomous region is not only 
economically but perhaps also militarily secured. In case of a violent confrontation between 
Baghdad and the KRG, the pipeline investments would presumably lead to Turkey safeguarding 
the Kurdistan region against Iraqi forces, were there an armed confrontation between the two. 
The chance for a violent clash between Baghdad and Erbil is by no means an impossible 
scenario. There are opinions in Baghdad in support of the idea of the use of force to halt the 
increase of KRG’s bargaining power. It is seen by some as better than having to concede to 
further demands, which the KRG’s growing (inter-)dependence with Turkey necessarily leads 
to: the more Ankara has at stake in Erbil, the more it will be willing to confront Baghdad. 466 
                                                        
465 For more, see for instance Natali, November 4th, 2013.  
466 Morelli and Pischedda 2014, 114–115: There are two arguments regarding the potential consequences of the 
construction of the pipelines. On the one hand, it is claimed that since these pipelines provide the means to cope 
economically in the case of continued halt on bugdget allocation from Baghdad, incentives to secede from Iraq are 
decreased. On the other hand it is argued that the very same economic autonomy creates more incentive to declare 
de jure independence from Baghdad. In their game-theoretic examination, Morelli and Pischedda assume that 
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And it seems like Turkey is indeed willing to put more at stake taking into account its increasing 
involvement in the Kurdish oil business. For instance, in June 2014 the state-owned Turkish 
Energy Company purchashed a 20% stake of ExxonMobil’s six blocks within the Kurdistan 
Region meaning of course that Turkey now has an even more concrete interest in ensuring that 
KRG’s oil can be sold via the newly built pipeline.467  However, Morelli and Pischedda add that 
that while Ankara might protect KRG’s economic de facto independence, it will not go so far to 
recognize complete de jure independence from Iraq.468 Either way, an increased bargaining 
power does not necessarily lead to an increased incentive for secession on the part of the KRG. 
Its leadership has indeed affirmed time after time willingness to share power and understands 
that the de jure independence is to be achieved via peaceful means requiring first and foremost 
support from Baghdad and Ankara.469  
 
Coming back to the conjunctural opportunities I want to emphasize that none of the above-
mentioned gains associated with a better strategic positioning came for free; cooperation with 
Erdogan included changes in the contextual selectivities not necessarily in favor of all of the 
Kurdish leadership’s strategies. This is to say that Turkey had its conditions as well. Mutual 
cooperation required the KRG to rule out a number of strategies, which it saw the new context 
would obviously select against. As Denise Natali has argued, while the alliance furthered 
Barzani’s aim to achieve his own interests, it also “[…] reinforced the KRG’s dependence on 
Turkey and the need to coordinate its nationalist agenda with Ankara”.470  It is here, that the 
critique coming from the nationalist Kurdish front becomes relevant, indeed. Some have 
accused Barzani of opting for dependence on Turkey just to unleash the KRG from dependency 
on Baghdad. In other words, what has been viewed as pragmatic politics on some fronts, has 
been, in turn, judged as the betrayal of Kurdish nationalism on other fronts.471  
 
                                                        
KRG’s demands might grow with their bargaining power. Increased bargaining power vis-à-vis Baghdad, however 
does not necessarily mean increased incentive to engage in a violent confrontation and a subsequent secession 
from Baghdad.  
467 Iraqi oil Report, June 10th, 2014. 
468 Morelli and Pischedda 2014, 116. 
469 Ibid., 115.  
470 Natali, January 8th, 2014. 
471 Ibid.,. This is what, for instance, Denise Natali has also discussed as Erdogan’s ”mishandling” of the Kurdish 
files; by collaborating with Barzani the Turkish premier has increased nationalist sentiments among Kurds and 
managed to heighten ”the polarization between two emergent Kurdish nationalist power centers: followers of 
Barzani and supporters of Ocalan.” 
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As I have emphasized, my aim is not to examine the strategic selectivities facing Turkey’s 
objectives, but rather those confronting the KRG’s changing strategies. However, since the 
transformations of contextual selectivities facing the Kurdish leadership in Iraq is constituted 
to a great extent by its position in relation to Turkey, the interests of the latter need to be 
addressed briefly as well. The seeds of the cooperation between these two actors lay at the 
particular intersection of their strategies. This is to say that around 2011, the relative contexts 
of both the KRG and Turkey had become strategically selective for their cooperation. Looking 
to the south, Turkey was facing a civil war in Syria. The PKK was gaining an upper hand in the 
northeastern regions of the country, and having learned from previous experiences, Turkey 
well acknowledged that Assad could easily use the PKK-card to pressure Ankara into keeping 
its nose out of Syria’s business. Looking into East, dependency on Iran’s – the Syrian ally’s – 
natural gas implied a need for an alternative source of energy imports, especially at a time when 
the country’s domestic demand had been projected to double by the next 10 years. Gazing into 
Baghdad Erdogan was confronted with the increasing influence of Iran on Maliki’s government. 
Moreover, the domestic front was not selecting against a potential cooperation with the Kurds 
either. The AKP472 was facing an upcoming election and Erdogan needed Kurdish votes in order 
to secure his success and possibly amend the Turkish constitution to maintain his hold on 
power for another four years. The success of the PKK in Syria also marked a strengthened PKK 
in Turkey; the Kurdish question started to get heavier on Ankara. Barzani seemed to sit in this 
equation perfectly. The Kurdish president, accordingly, became Turkey’s “interlocutor” in 
addressing Kurdish issues on three fronts; in Iraq, Syria and Turkey.473 To cut the long story 
short here, the changes in contextual selectivities clearly pointed towards an environment 
selective for Turkey’s and KRG’s collaborative efforts.   
 
Moving on to Baghdad, we can point out to how Maliki’s efforts at centralizing power, his refusal 
to pay the IOCs in the KRG and cutting off the region from its national budget as a retaliatory 
measure against the unilateral energy policies of the Kurdish leadership, continuously 
reconstituted a context selecting against the cooperation of the two in the energy sector. 
Compromises were, however, made only at the time of Iraqi elections in 2010 and 2014, when 
the selectivities of the context favored a temporary settlement of disputes. What is more, 
counter-tendencies working against the actualization of tendencies in favor of Turkish-Kurdish 
                                                        
472 The AKP refers to Erdogan’s Justice and Developement Party. 
473 Natali, January 8th 2014.  
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cooperation were constantly at play. For instance, Iran and the United States, both seemed to 
fear that the cooperation between the two would to develop into what could become a threat 
to the unity of Iraq. Their strategies, therefore, aimed more or less at keeping some sort of a 
balance in the country by pressuring the KRG and Maliki to reach an agreement on their 
disputes.    
 
Cognition as the intermediary between contextual selectivities and strategic action 
 
As we saw in the previous phase, fluctuations in contextual selectivities do not necessarily lead 
to certain strategies. In spite of the strategic selectivities favoring Turkish-Kurdish cooperation 
at the expense of good relations with Baghdad, the outcome was by no means a necessary 
consequence of these changes.474  Changes in Turkey’s and KRG’s relative positioning vis-à-vis 
each other per se did not inevitably lead to their cooperation. It was cognition that came to be 
the mediator in between their relative contexts and strategies. Just like the toppling of the 
Baathist regime was relational to the cognitive templates of the KRG, so were the new 
contextual selectivities brought about by the Syrian war, Turkey’s interests and Tehran’s 
influence on Baghdad. Since I addressed the values and perceptions driving KRG’s unilateral 
energy policies in the previous phase, I will not do it again here. Suffice it to argue that they 
were responsible for particular interpretation that the KRG came to give to its contextual 
selectivities. Had the entity not been oriented towards its context via the normative paradigm 
of statehood, contextual selectivities would under no circumstances have comprised the exact 
same conjunctural opportunities (for instance, contracting IOCs with PSCs, constructing a KRG-
Ceyhan pipeline) and structural constraints (for instance, coordination of the nationalist 
agenda with Ankara) that they actually did. 
 
Consequently, and even more importantly, we can assess that it is only when examined from 
the perspective of the KRG that the contextual changes become a conjunctural opportunity for 
the leadership of the region to further their economic project. As such, studying the Syrian civil 
war or Turkey’s altered interest separately as contextual selectivities (structural factors), does 
not make any sense. Similarly, examining KRG’s objectives (agential will) apart from the spatio-
temporal selectivities of its environment makes no sense either. We need to know the strategies 
                                                        
474 Hence the role of cognition and contingency here that I will address in the next section. 
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in order for selectivities to make sense and selectivities in order for strategies to make sense. 
Context and action are always dialectical and relational. Once again, this is where the weakness 
of the morphogenetic cycles lie: they fail to capture both the ontological and the analytical 
interdependency of these two components of reality because of the simple fact that they depict 
the agent-structure relationship as a sequential rather than as a reciprocal unfolding of 
relationality. 
 
As the proponents of the SRA claim, however, agents and structures should not be situated in 
temporally different domains simply because agential will and structural constraints are co-
existent in time. They cannot be examined separately. For instance, the construction of an oil 
pipeline between Turkey and KRG should be viewed as an outcome of contextual and agential 
dynamics in two ways. First, cooperation resulted from the change that occurred in the 
relational positioning of the KRG with regard to Turkey and Baghdad around 2011. It is only 
when we relativize KRG’s economic-indendency-seeking objectives to the changed contextual 
selectivities that we can understand “the product of their fusion”, not when examining the two 
separately. Secondly, cooperation resulted from the unique interpretation given to the situation 
by KRG and Turkey. For instance, both of them could have chosen completely alternate 
strategies, equally selected for by their context, but they chose cooperation instead; hence the 
contingent path-dependency which cognition brings to social reality. This is something that, for 
instance, conventional balance of power theories cannot accommodate. They would assume 
outcomes simply as a necessary consequence of the distribution of power; actors act on the 
basis of real threats and interests rather than perceived ones.475 It is only the relationalist view 
of the constructivist tradition that can locate contingency at the heart of its conceptualization 
of social reality.476 
                                                        
475 Balance of threat theory would come closer to the SRA than the bop, because it manages to take into account 
cognitive factors; states balance against perceived threats rather than real threats (Walt 1985). According to this 
understanding, Kurdish-Turkish cooperation would point to Turkey balancing against Teheran (and as such 
against Maliki) because it perceives of Iran’s current regime – not Iran per se – being a bigger threat than a potential 
Kurdish State in its neighbor. However, balance of threat is faulty in the sense that it still amounts to the nested 
game model, incorporating perception of leaderships only as an intervening variable. What is more, it fails to 
address the nexus of domestic and international factors of foreign policy. 
476 Parsons 2010, 83–89; Stroker and Marsh 2010, 88; The essence of constructivist social ontology lies in the role 
it gives to contingency; individualists and structuralists or, in the words of Craig Parsons, “standard non-
constructivist explanations” are “enemies of the contingency and human agency”. While recognizing that their 
assumptions are probabilistic rather than deterministic, they, however, fail to place contingency at the center of 
their theorization like constructivists do. For instance, rational choice theory or neorealism do not claim that 
people lack ideas in their heads, but rather that all the talk about identities and norms are rather rational responses 
to some real (not socially constructed) constraints and incentives such as geography, economics and security 
competition. Thus, for instance the foreign policy conduct of a particular state, is considered as the behavioral or 
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Once again, nothing about the context per se necessitated Turkey’s and KRG’s collaboration. 
Both of the players could have opted for different strategies that would have guided the 
dynamics of the relationship between the two on an entirely different path. With regard to the 
KRG, the eventually deployed strategies were indeed also dependent on ideas in two ways. 
Firstly, the strategies were relational to the information the leadership had about their context; 
perceptions and misperceptions about the real selectivities of their environment. Secondly, 
they were dependent on the autonomous region’s policy paradigm targeting at economic 
independence indeed. Had the strategies of the KRG not been driven by pursuit of economic 
independence from Baghdad, Barzani would not have necessarily turned to Ankara and 
“compromised” – as some have accused him of having done – on the nationalist agenda the way 
he did.  Once again, however, the outcomes also required taking into account contextual 
selectivities; had they been any different, KRG and Turkey may have not seen any point in 
changing their relationship from what it used to be. We can see here the importance of giving 
equal weight to each of the three elements in the explanation of the final outcome. None of them 
examined alone or separately can give an adequate explanation of relational unfolding of the 
events. 
 
Implications on power 
 
Turning to the question of power, we can point to the changes that occurred in the hierarchy of 
potential powers post-2010. For instance, the consequences of KRG’s own strategies with 
regard to its defying energy policies or events such as the discovery of oil and gas resources in 
the first place, all constituted a new situation in which actors came to be, once again, 
differentially positioned within their relative contexts. Potentialities for power were, indeed, 
redistributed in a new order, which provided new cards to Erbil, Baghdad and Ankara. The 
power relations between the three came to be determined once again by two things; their 
reciprocal interaction and the unequal positioning of their strategies vis-à-vis the contextual   
selectivities of the period in question. We could see, for instance, how the KRG’s hand in the 
game was altered by the discovery of vast oil and gas resources, but to understand the 
                                                        
causal effect of material relations of difference, giving no role to agents who have had a choice to choose in between 
meanings they have given to their context. It is here that the strategic-relational account can be credited for its 
merits.    
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implications this change had on the redistribution of power relations, we need to locate the 
leadership’s independence-seeking strategies in their context. I want to highlight, once again, 
that at any point, the particular distribution of power did not determine outcomes in KRG’s 
foreign policy development; it was rather the explanandum, which came to be determined by 
the unique intersections of strategies, selectivities and cognitive templates.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The previous analysis could not – nor did it even try to – address the strategies of all the possible 
players or the consequences of their actions. The changing relations between Turkey, Baghdad 
and Erbil were indeed complex and involved an infinite number of twists and turns. My point, 
was, however, mainly to demonstrate how foreign policy development was determined by the 
unique intersections of KRG’s strategies, contextual selectivities – out of which some favored 
whereas other worked against its objectives – and normatively oriented perceptions of the 
context. Furthermore, I once again, attempted to present the contingency of power and its 
dependency on relations; KRG’s power vis-à-vis Baghdad and Turkey was determined only after 
unique spatio-temporal intersections of contextual selectivities such as the discovery of energy 
resources and strategies such as the construction of a KRG-Ceyhan pipeline. We can thus 
conclude that power did not itself determine – and, thus, cannot explain – any of the outcomes 
related to KRG’s foreign policy development.  
 
7.3.3. Consequences of Action 
 
It is perhaps too early to assess the exact consequences of strategies deployed during 2010-
2014. It can be said, however, that KRG’s increased Baghdad-defying strategies post-2010 have 
been perceived of as a success with regard to achieving economic independence. For instance, 
ever since the KRG started selling PSCs to international oil companies, the Kurdistan Region’s 
GDP has grown exponentially and the influx of foreign investment keeps on growing.477 What 
is important to note here is that whatever the consequences, in line or not with KRG’s 
objectives, have been dependent on its strategic positioning in relation to its contextual 
selectivities and the quality and type of the readings they have given to their environment. As 
                                                        
477 Bloomberg, May 22nd, 2014. 
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we saw, the regional government recognized a conjunctural opportunity in the changed 
selectivities of its environment – particularly the nexus of KRG’s interests with those of Turkey 
– around 2010. Continuing from its unaltered pursuit of economic independency from Baghdad, 
KRG accordingly worked to change the context to better meet its strategies of economic 
independence. Of course, the leadership could aim at transformation of its context only to the 
extent its saw was possible within the space offered in between conjunctural opportunities and 
structural constraints. We could see how none of the three elements of the dialectic per se 
necessitated KRG’s decisions in this period either; hence the contingency of path-dependency. 
The cognitive template of statehood did not cause KRG to contract IOCs with Production 
Sharing Contracts rather than Technical Service Contracts or construct a new pipeline with 
Turkey rather than export Kurdish oil via the Iraqi-controlled Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. The 
particular path that KRG’s foreign policy development took was rather a consequence of a 
series of unique intersections of spatio-temporal contextual selectivities (mediated by the 
pursuit-of-statehood-driven policy paradigm) and deployed strategies.  
 
Up until now the consequences of KRG’s energy policies have further strengthened its position 
vis-à-vis-Baghdad. This in turn, can be seen as a success of strategies aiming at achieving 
economic independence from the Iraqi capital. However, at the same time throughout this 
journey, these defiant policies have subjected KRG to risks such as the shut-down on budget 
allocation and other forms of efforts hampering KRG’s cooperation with Turkey.  With regard 
to Ankara, it is clear that KRG-Turkey relations have deepened considerably with Turkey’s 
continuously growing will to increase its stakes in the game. What this has meant for the KRG, 
in turn, is that its increasing (inter-)dependence with Turkey has, at least for the time being, 
partly secured its balancing game in the north and moderated Ankara’s fear of an extensively 
autonomous Kurdistan at its southern borders.478 Furthermore, KRG now has Turkey – at least 
potentially – holding its side in case of any violent confrontations with Baghdad. When it comes 
to Turkey, this intermingling of interests may perhaps also lead to unexpected and unintended 
consequences. As Ofra Bengio has acknowledged;  
 
”Should Turkey decide to give Barzani the green light, he would not hesitate to go 
the extra mile and declare independence. One thing is certain: Turkey has willy-
                                                        
478 I discussed KRG’s balancing game vis-a-vis Baghdad and Ankara in Chapter 2; hence ”secure its game in the 
north”. 
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nilly helped the Kurdish genie escape from the bottle and it will be very difficult 
for Ankara to push it back inside.”479 
 
The consequences of KRG’s strategies are continuously unfolding, so we cannot conclude with 
a set of particular effects of strategies deployed during 2010-2014. KRG’s future remains an 
open case, viable for rapid and surprising developments. Contextual selectivities are 
undergoing speedy transformations and the autonomous region is closely following the 
transforming elements of its surroundings. For instance, recently the jihadist Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant seized the city of Mosul in Northern Iraq and they are rapidly advancing 
into other central cities, mostly in the ‘disputed territories’ of the country referred to earlier in 
this chapter. Under the orders of Maliki, the Iraqi government troops have fled these areas with 
no bullets fired, which, in turn, has left KRG’s Peshmerge forces to advance into these cities and 
secure them from the militants. One of the utmost remarkable events is indeed the fact that the 
strategic oil city of Kirkuk is currently – for the first time since 2003480 under Kurdish control. 
Whether or not this marks a positive movement with regard to KRG’s objectives, is a debatable 
issue indeed. Some would argue that the currently unfolding events could be considered as a 
conjunctural opportunity for the KRG to further its interests with regard to the disputed 
territories – currently all under the control of the Peshmerge forces. Others see it as a 
misperception or erroneous reading of strategic selectivities, since by leaving the disputed 
territories, Maliki is forcing the KRG to secure them and, as such, he is trying to fight his Sunni-
battle via the Kurds. This, in turn, marks a structural moment rather than a conjunctural 
opportunity for KRG’s objectives.481 Either way, we can say that during the past three decades 
and particularly the past ten years of autonomous experience, the autonomous leadership has 
gained a good amount of experience (strategic learning), which may or may not help it in 
reading off the strategic selectivities of its context and maybe even assist it into a more skillful 
navigation of its rapidly changing environment. One thing is for sure; if the past ten years have 
taught the KRG anything, it has been the fact that conjunctural opportunities need to be 
recognized quickly and strategies formulated even more swiftly, if they are truly aiming for full 
independence.  
 
                                                        
479 Bengio, December 6th, 2012. 
480 As I mentioned 7.2. The First Period 2003-2010: The Constitutional Recognition of KRG, after the fall of the 
Baathist regime in 2003, the Peshmerge forces advanced into the disputed territories, but, however, retreated 
shortly partly due to following pressures from the United States.  
481 For this conflicting account see Forbes, June 12th, 2014.  
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I have, once again attempted to demonstrate the link between strategic selectivities, strategic 
action and cognitive templates via Hay’s model as illustrated below in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Strategic and discursive selectivity as adopted from Hay (2002, 212) and applied to the analysis of KRG’s 
foreign policy development from 2010 until 2014. 
 
7.4. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I tried to explain KRG’s foreign policy development in terms of its efforts of 
gaining economic independence from Baghdad post-2003. To do so, I adopted a strategic-
relational approach to the analysis of foreign policy development. This development was 
presented as a product of “contingent necessity” – the unfolding of a non-necessary process of a 
de facto state’s strategies heading towards gaining economic independence. In a more or less 
simplified analysis of the contextual selectivities, strategic action and the dominant paradigm 
of statehood, I suggested that explaining the unfolding processes of foreign policy development 
required an understanding of the relational nature of reality. This in turn, meant highlighting 
the contingency in path-dependent development, which was responsible for bringing about a 
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unique political reality in which the KRG now found itself. I studied the development through 
two periods, situating the first in 2003–2010 and the second in 2010-2014.  
 
In the first phase I suggested that one should direct their attention to the fall of the Baathist 
Regime and the legal and political decentralization of Iraq, when looking for the contextual 
selectivities. In terms of strategies I, for instance, referred to the decision to stay within Iraq 
instead of declaring independence. Contextual selectivities and strategic action were, in turn, 
relativized the policy paradigm of statehood, particularly within the context of economic 
independence through the hydrocarbon sector. In the second phase, I highlighted the oil and 
gas discoveries as well as the importance of paying attention to the role of the two increasingly 
important players in the game – Turkey and the International Oil and Gas Companies.482 While 
Turkey’s involvement in Iraq and Kurdistan was by no means something new483, its role in the 
oil dispute, in particular, became explicit and increasingly crucial for both the KRG as well as 
Turkey itself. In terms of the “old players” in the game (Baghdad), the domestic politics of Iraq 
was highlighted via Maliki’s increasingly tightening grip on power and his strategies narrowing 
the space available – in between conjunctural opportunities and structural constraints – for the 
KRG to transform its context. Another important issue was the Iraqi elections of 2010 and 2014, 
which altered the selectivities relative to the strategies of the KRG; Maliki needed the support 
of the Kurds to preserve his seat in power. This, in turn, marked a stronger bargaining hand for 
the KRG to pursuit its objectives or – to term it via the theoretical lenses of Jessop – it marked 
a broadened space of conjunctural opportunity for the autonomous region’s leadership to alter 
its context to better accommodate its objectives. I will leave the wider empirical conclusions to 
the following chapter, where I will also connect the two phases of examination. 
 
                                                        
482 Unfortunately, I do not have the time nor the space to elaborate in more detail on the unique implications of 
the entrance of these non-state actors into the game. 
483 In 2011 Iraq was the second-largest market for Turkey, the Kurdistan region accounting for 70 percent of the 
exports. This comes in addition to major investments in construction and natural resources. What is more, trade 
and Turkish investment in Kurdistan has exploded ever since the fall of the previous regime.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
8.1. Empirical Conclusions: Contingent Development Towards Economic 
Independency 
 
This inquiry began with an interest in the recently warmed up relations between Turkey and 
the KRG. The collaboration between two actors that were only ten years ago the least likely 
partners in the region, raised the question of how and why their relationship had developed 
the way they had post-2003. This question, in turn, directed me towards KRG’s continuous 
efforts to secure economic independence from Baghdad through defiant energy policies – 
mainly because Turkey appeared to be involved in the game KRG was playing. The struggle over 
the limits of its autonomy turned out to be, indeed, at the heart of KRG’s disputes with Baghdad 
and its improving relations with Turkey. With this inquiry, my objective was to shed light on 
the autonomous region’s gradual process towards the economic independency it had – to a great 
extent – achieved today. Since KRG’s efforts to unleash itself from Baghdad’s shackles 
concerned more or less its external relations and the “foreign policy” strategies it deployed to 
achieve the given objective, I ended up analyzing the foreign policy development of the 
leadership, indeed. Among a good number of issues addressed, there was one key hypothesis 
guiding the research; the KRG’s foreign policy development was assumed to be the workings of 
what Jessop called “contingent necessity” – an organic project, throughout which both the KRG 
itself, as well as its context, were continuously transformed and redefined. It was this 
relationalist hypothesis that I wanted to test through the SRA’s three concepts of strategic 
action, strategically selective context and policy paradigm. In other words, I made an effort to 
study how particular causal processes or their junctures produced the apparent outcomes of 
KRG’s foreign policy development, which would not have otherwise occurred. 484 
 
2003 was chosen as the point of departure because the overthrow of the Iraqi government 
provided a remarkable conjunctural opportunity for the KRG, setting its leadership’s foreign 
policy development on an entirely new path, unfolding up to this day as a product of contingent 
necessity. The research began from a brief elaboration on the constructivist theorization of de 
facto statehood. I considered it necessary, because the theory made an important assumption 
                                                        
484 Jessop, December 2nd, 2013. I asked this in Chapter 6.3.  
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about the foreign policies of such entities. They were claimed to be driven by the idea of 
statehood, on which their entire survival depended: de facto states’ strategies changed, but the 
idea of statehood – in the sense of the achievement of full independence – always remained and 
guided the development of both the foreign policies and domestic dynamics of these entities. 
Even though the KRG had already passed the phase of transformation from an armed conflict 
to an administrative government of a de facto state, it was still assumed to be in a transitory 
state. The concept of statehood, therefore, provided a viable point of departure in the 
examination of its policies. It was in the light of this presumption on the dominant cognitive 
template, that the development of the autonomous region was analyzed later.  
 
Having gone through different substantialist approaches to the analysis of foreign policy, I 
ended up with the relationalist strategic-relational approach due to its ability to capture the 
dialectical intersection of the ideal and the material as well as context and action as a process, 
in which “agents” and “structures” were continuously redefined and transformed. A closer 
discussion of this relationalist view of reality, led to its application to the study of the foreign 
policy developments of the KRG post-2003. Through the analytical concepts provided by the 
SRA, I demonstrated the contingent, yet path-dependent development of the ten-year-period of 
KRG’s pursuit of statehood or economic independence, manifested in its energy policies. I 
carefully explained the assumedly ambiguous, transitory and oscillating foreign policies of the 
region via reference to the temporal co-existence of the mutually interdependent context, 
strategic conduct and policy paradigm.  
 
Looking back at the initial question of the research of how can we explain KRG’s foreign policy 
development post-2003” – we can say that Chapter 7 provided one possible way to answer it – 
with a relationalist understanding of reality, indeed. I suggested this approach as an alternative 
to substantialist and dualist relationalist explanations of change. 485  Through the SRA’s 
conceptual tools I could demonstrate the contingent necessity in the process, through which 
the region had ended up where it was today; two billion barrels of Kurdish oil waiting to be sold 
to the international markets – something, which the tight space in between structural 
                                                        
485  With substantialist approaches I am referring to monocausal explanations based on ”self-action” and 
multicausal explanations based on ”inter-action” as explained in Chapter 5. With dualist relationalist approaches I 
am referring to Archer’s morphogenetic approach.  
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constraints and conjunctural opportunities would not have had the KRG even hypothetically 
anticipating, let alone realizing, only ten years ago. Gareth Stansfield has argued, indeed, that, 
 
“If the Kurds are able to pump the amounts of oil they’re promising, then this is a 
fundamental geopolitical game changer. It gives the Kurds economic 
independence from Baghdad.”486 
 
 
The continuous inflow of foreign investment alongside the increasing income that will be 
coming with oil (and presumably also gas in the future) exports – promises a bright future for 
the economy of the autonomous region. However, as I argued, the future still remains an open 
case, subject to swift changes that may result in completely distinct hands in the game. 
“Potentialities for power” as Jessop would designate – are continuously being redistributed as 
the future keeps on unfolding contingently. As we argued earlier (6.3.), the social world is an 
open structure with an infinite number of future possibilities.487 The ISIL surge in Iraq and the 
Peshmerge advancing into disputed territories may result in new contextual selectivities 
expanding KRG’s conjunctural moment and, as such, perhaps lead to further independence for 
the autonomous region; with a chance of Iraq ending up on Syria’s path, a scenario of Kurdish 
independence and Iraqi dissolution cannot be opted out. This, of course, will depend on how 
the leadership manages to read the selectivities of its context and formulate strategies that do 
not backfire against its objectives. It is, therefore, also equally possible that the KRG makes 
strategic mistakes or, as Jessop would designate – fail to correctly read the selectivities of its 
context. As such, its leadership may end up, not only missing an opportunity that would have 
furthered its objectives, but also curtailing the space within which it could have been able to 
transform its context in the future as well.488 Not dwelling too much on what the future holds, 
I want to make two important remarks regarding my empirical conclusions.  
 
Firstly, I find it essential to highlight that what I wanted to demonstrate via the conceptual 
analysis in Chapter 7 was not so much whether or not KRG now had better or worse relations 
with Turkey or Baghdad, for these were only secondary matters with regard to this inquiry. As 
I argued in the introductory chapter, the primary objective of this research was, instead, to 
                                                        
486 Bloomberg, May 22nd, 2014.  
487 Luhmann 1979, 6, 13; cf. Jessop 2007, 43. 
488 Consequences of action are, indeed, never exclusively intended because actors do not have immediate access 
to reality (a critical realist position). There is always cognition mediating in between actors and their surroundings, 
leading to the unpredictable nature of the unfolding of social reality. KRG may choose a strategy that the 
selectivities of its context reject albeit it seemed to its leadership as if they would have been favoring it.  
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explain how KRG had ended up in a position, where it could revel in an economic success marking 
independence from Baghdad beyond the extent it could have imagined only ten years ago. As we 
saw in the empirical analysis, the Iraqi and the Turkish capitals, of course, to a large extent 
formed the contextual selectivities facing KRG’s strategies aiming at this objective throughout 
this process. However, whether or not the autonomous region now had a better relationship 
with Ankara or an aggravated one with Baghdad was not the main point I wanted to make 
through the strategic-relational analysis. The conduct of an inquiry into KRG’s foreign policy 
development was only a medium through which I wanted to demonstrate the contingent path-
dependency (contingent necessity) of the process, through which the autonomous region had 
achieved its current status: none of the three elements of the dialectic were responsible for the 
outcomes alone. 
 
While explaining the KRG’s strategies and their consequences, the inquiry, nevertheless, was 
also able to simultaneously point to these fluctuating relations of the autonomous region with 
Baghdad and Ankara, throughout the period of examination, as the contextual selectivities and 
deployed strategies unfolded contingently. This is also what Caspersen and Stansfield 
projected, indeed. I want to emphasize here that, it would be misleading to equate KRG’s 
temporary approximation to Turkey as “better relations” in between the two in general, let 
alone make any assertions regarding the future of their relationship. It will be the temporally 
co-extensive intersections of contextual selectivities (mediated by readings of that context and 
the pursuit-of-statehood-colored paradigm) and deployed strategies that will dictate what is to 
become of the KRG-Ankara nexus in the future. Similarly misinforming would it be to argue that 
the KRG has alienated Baghdad permanently, for throughout the disputes, where their interests 
have not met, there have also been points of agreement with the Iraqi capital. This, in turn, 
makes it difficult to argue that KRG in general has worse relations with Baghdad than it did ten 
years ago, let alone project that their relations will deteriorate even further. 489  I can thus 
conclude that the KRG’s pursuit of economic independence through Baghdad-defying energy 
policies post-2003, aided to a significant extent by Ankara as the export route for KRG’s oil, has, 
in a contingently path-dependent road led to KRG’s economic independence at least for the time 
being. At the same time, this has meant an increasing, albeit not permanent, estrangement from 
Baghdad and reciprocal approximation to Ankara. Whether or not these developments mark 
                                                        
489 One also needs to take into account the intra-Kurdish ”division of labour” that I addressed in Chapter 2. KDP 
may have ”worse” relations with Baghdad, while the PUK is still holding the balance. 
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new contextual selectivities favoring a strategy of declaration of full independence provides a 
good amount of food for thought for further inquiry. 
 
The second issue is related to an effort by Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla (2009) to capture de facto 
states’ status within the international community via the measurement of three categories; 
political, economic and public spheres. The political domain refers to the international 
community’s willingness to interact with such entities. The economic sphere, in turn, marks 
readiness to engage in trade and other forms of economic activities with these entities, 
indicating trust in the legal environment and governance of the region. Finally, the public 
sphere refers to the de facto state’s efforts to engage with the international community and the 
international community’s reaction to that call. To measure these three variables, Berg and 
Toomla have then developed a four-level scale - a “normalization index” – beginning from 
negation, going into boycott and toleration and ending up with quasi-recognition. However, I am 
highly dubious about the ability of this model to provide any useful accounts with regard to the 
change that has happened in KRG’s status over the past ten years. Berg and Toomla, for 
instance, have designated official recognition, the number of foreign trade partners, and air 
communication as some of the independent variables making up for the level of de facto states’ 
integration in the international community.490 However, most of the variables they have listed 
– if not all of them – give too simplistic of an account of de facto states’ status. KRG has, for 
instance, not even declared independence or asked for recognition for it to be examined 
through Berg’s and Toomla’s index. Furthermore, having more foreign trade partners or a 
country telephone code tells us nothing about the constantly changing nature and powers of 
these entities, which only a transactional analysis of their relations can point towards. It is for this 
reason, that I have decided not to filter the change observed in the region’s status or the  “degree 
of KRG’s normalization” in its relations with the rest of the world via Berg’s and Toomla’s index.      
 
I will now, move onto the theoretical conclusions of the research. The key objective is to 
address, why it was the SRA instead of substantialist or dualist relational conceptualizations of 
reality that could better demonstrate and reflect the process, through which KRG had managed 
to achieve the status it had today.  
 
                                                        
490 Berg and Toomla (2009). 
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8.2. Theoretical Conclusions 
8.2.1. The Fallacy of Substantialism 
 
 
I want to begin with what I see as a fallacy of the substantialist perception of change – be it 
change in foreign policy, the economic independence de facto state or sovereignty. For it was 
this understanding that led me into approaching KRG’s foreign policy development through a 
relationalist approach instead. Charles Tilly argued, that the building blocks of any social and 
political analysis were “[…] configuration of ties – recurrent sociocultural interaction – between 
social aggregates of various sorts and their component parts.” 491  We were accustomed to 
referring to these ties as entities. Ties were, however, not “static ‘things’, but ongoing 
processes”, which transformed and changed their meaning through relations. As I argued 
throughout Chapter 4, substantialist understandings were based on this mistaken assumption 
of pre-given entities. As such, they necessarily attributed change to them as well, rather than 
the relations they epitomized. Individualists ascribed change single-handedly to assumedly 
independently existing individuals with pre-given preferences, whereas holists reduced all 
change to supposedly autonomous structural constraints (discoursive or material) with 
internal logics of their own. Synthetic efforts based on “inter-action” did not do much better. 
Instead of entities, they had attributes of entities doing the acting. Nevertheless, these 
approaches still designated the secondary properties of – once again, pre-given entities – as 
responsible for change, rather than their relations. None of the three substantialist 
understandings could, therefore, acknowledge the fact that change was instantiated – not by 
entities themselves (“self-action” –approaches) or in their varying attributes, such as power 
(“inter-action”-approaches) – but, instead, in relations that continuously transformed the 
nature and meanings of these configurations of ties. 
 
I could have applied substantialist approaches to explain the changes observed above, for 
instance, in KRG’s economic independence or its relations with Turkey and Baghdad between 
2003 and 2014. In such case, there would have been two potential paths to take; either the one 
based on self-action or the one constructed upon inter-action. When it comes to the former, 
very few analysts today would attribute outcomes exclusively either to individuals or to 
                                                        
491 Tilly 1996, 2; cf. Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292; According to Tilly, these ties included economic, political and 
cultural transactions. As we saw in the analysis, KRG’s relations demonstrated in this inquiry epitomized all three 
domains.   
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structures. Monocausal explanations may not, indeed, be viewed as legitimized today as they 
once were.492 It is generally understood that some form of synthesization is necessary for an 
adequate account of foreign policy. Carlsnaes’ tripartite model is one such example, which gives 
weight to a variety of different factors from cognitive variables to normative institutions.  In the 
case of the latter – the inter-action –based models, it seems that they are viewed as more 
pertinent in the field. Nevertheless, regardless of which approach I had decided to choose, there 
was a still problem I could not have escaped. It was related to the tendency of substantialism to 
address change via “static dynamics”, as introduced in Chapter 5. As such, trying to 
conceptualize change, for instance, in the level of KRG’s economic independence, would have 
meant selecting two snapshots; one from 2003 and the other from 2014. The subsequent 
comparison of the two snapshots would have lead to particular explanations of change – 
depending on whether I had chosen self-action or inter-action, as depicted below.  
 
Had I chosen the “structural perspective”, the change described above would have been 
attributed to KRG’s continuous rational responses to material constraints of its environment 
such as the distribution of power. The leadership’s preferences guiding its decision-making 
every step of the way would have been treated as given by the fact that it possessed less power 
than Turkey or more power than Baghdad. In the “social-institutional” approaches, the 
differences between the two snapshots would have been attributed to KRG’s decisions, which 
were based on the meanings it gave to its context (“Bagdad wants curtail our autonomy, we 
should work with Turkey to strengthen it”). In this case, however, the interpretations made by 
the KRG would have been reduced to structural imperatives of discourse – possible ways of 
understanding the world in the first place. Had I chosen the “agency-based perspective”, I would 
have, for instance, been able only to point to the “pulling and hauling” of different views, and 
the triumph of one over the others, when explaining Turkey’s and KRG’ changed relations 
between 2003 and 2014. Finally, had I adopted the “interpretative actor’s perspective”, I could 
have only stressed the different interpretations KRG, and the actors interacting with it, gave to 
their context, resulting in observed changes. The solution provided by the inter-action -
theoreticians would not have helped me much in this dilemma, for they would have only – in 
an ad-hoc manner – chosen variables from here and there and claimed that it was some type of 
combination of them, that had resulted in the fact that KRG now had more economic 
                                                        
492 Self-action -approaches would, indeed, not deny that the independent variables they gave for foreign policy 
explanation were not single-handedly or even primarily responsible for KRG’s foreign policy change. 
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independence that it did ten years ago, or – alternatively – better relations with Turkey than it 
did in 2003.  
 
The problem here is that in any of the previously outlined efforts to explain the changes in 
between 2003 and 2014 – whether the level of KRG’s economic independence or its relations 
with Baghdad and Turkey – is that they would have ended up asserting the observed change 
rather than examining it as the product of an unfolding process of contingent necessity (particular 
intersections of contextual selectivities and strategic action). Substantialist self-action 
approaches could not have captured such development, because they were fixated on 
explaining the achieved economic independence by referring to changes in KRG’s preferences 
and interests based on structural imperatives or individual will.  Substantialist inter-actionist 
models, in turn, would have been equally ill-equipped, because of pointing out to changes in 
these entities’ attributes. The question was however, what did the process, through which the 
KRG had ended up in the situation it currently was in, look like. Neither of these models could 
have answered this question because they were unable to connect their static snapshots.493 Had 
they been able to do so, they would have seen that it was in fact relations that produced the change, 
not KRG’s agential will (individualism), structural imperatives (holism) or the varying secondary 
attributes of these entities (inter-action). 
 
8.2.2. Development as a Product of Contingent Necessity 
 
In their problematization of an assumed essence of structures and actors – and, therefore, the 
examination relations instead of entities – the relationalist models succeeded in what 
substantialists failed to do: to explain the link between the snapshots. The dialectical models 
could finally overcome the inability of substantialism to shed light on the ambiguous sphere in 
between their static snapshots of reality. However, there seemed to be a problem with some of 
the assumedly relational methodologies offered by system theoreticians – such as those 
provided by Giddens and Archer. Their methods proved to be incapable of overcoming the 
substantialist impasse. For instance, Archer well acknowledged the fundamental weaknesses 
inflicting the substantialist approaches. Nevertheless, she still failed to develop a relationalist 
model capable of capturing the processual nature of reality she was advocating.  What her 
efforts led to, instead, was the redefinition ontological duality as ontological dualism. Dualism, 
                                                        
493 In other words, substantialists were unable to explain the process through which 2003 had become 2014.   
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in turn, all too easily reinforced the ultimate weakness of the substantialists, and as such, failed 
to address duality genuinely: “Two elements, which are mutually constitutive are still two 
distinct elements”, argued Jackson and Nexon.494 The morphogenetic model tried to explain 
foreign policy by referring to agential and structural elements independently or via their 
interaction, instead of centering its focus on the process manifested in relations. Jackson and 
Nexon continued, indeed, that, 
 
“[t]emporal-sequential resolutions [such as that of Archer’s or Giddens’] to the 
agent-structure problematic accentuate this tendency [substantialist]. In the 
temporal sequential analytic, agents and structures are held constant at 
progressive time increments (t, t+1, t+2, etc) in order to explore how their 
interaction gives rise to new terms of structure and agency.”495 
 
This sequential examination of agents and structures, resulting from their temporal separation 
was doomed to fail. By adding time as an external variable to Giddens’ duality, Archer’s model 
came to symbolize what she had essentially criticized: substantialist reductionism. Social 
reality was reduced to “self-action” and “inter-action” instead of “transaction” that logically 
preceded supposedly existent pre-given agents and structures. Archer’s assumption, that the two 
components had separate emergent properties, left their mutual constitutiveness to be 
revealed and unfolded only over time.496 To cut the long story short, the problem with the 
morhphogenetic approach – and also the reason for not applying it – was that it failed to 
translate the relationality of social reality into a viable methodology. Archer would have, in 
other words, been unable to deliver the relationalist message into my empirical inquiry. Had I 
located my observations in the morphogenetic cycles, I would have necessarily delivered a 
substantialist understanding of changes. For instance, the warmed up relations between KRG 
and Turkey or the level of economic independence that the region had managed to secure, 
would have been demonstrated as random agential bursts (KRG’s decisions) interrupting 
otherwise stable structural patterns (distribution of power, international norms etc.). Once 
again, the model would have depicted reality as if it was the KRG or its context (Baghdad, 
Turkey, international norms etc.), which did the acting – instead of demonstrating that it was 
relations and transactions that acted, causing the development and change we saw in Chapter 
7.  
 
                                                        
494 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 298. 
495 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295. 
496 Bartelson 1995, 48.  
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The strategic-relational approach, instead, succeeded in keeping Giddens’ duality intact, but 
suggested an alternative methodology to his inadequate “bracketing” that would have, likewise, 
resulted in substantialist empirical analysis. Nevertheless, unlike the morphogenetic approach, 
Jessop’s model did not add time as an external variable, but saw it, instead as unfolding within 
the intersections of the three elements of the dialectic: it was practice – strategic action oriented 
towards strategically selective context – that produced time, which is why – following the 
argumentation of Jackson and Nexon, there were just as many forms of times as there are 
practices.497  The SRA’s ability to deliver this message in a methodological model, symbolized its 
success in delivering in methodology, what the relationalist message promised in ontology: the 
fact that agents and structures anteceded relations. It was transaction that defined, constructed, 
reconstructed and transformed the interests, identities and constitutive properties of “agents” 
and “structures”. The empirical analysis conducted in this research can be seen as epitomizing 
the SRA’s capability to examine KRG’s foreign policy development as the contingently necessary 
unfolding of relations, through the temporally co-extensive dynamics of action and context. 
Neither agents nor structures existed independent from each other in order for one to have 
been to be able to examine them separately in the first place, as Archer had done. The 
distinction between the two components of reality was only analytical and the conclusions we 
witnessed above were the ‘product of their fusion’ indeed.  
 
8.3.3. Kurdistan Regional Government as the Product of Unfolding Relations 
 
The benefits of the relationalist approach were not only in their ability to point out the temporal 
co-extensivity of action, context and ideas in explanation of foreign policy. Their anti-
substantialist approach to reality had an even more important implication with regard to this 
inquiry: examining KRG’s foreign policy development via the SRA simultaneously led to a 
fundamental reconceptualization of the nature of autonomous region. Where the substantialist 
approaches and the temporal-sequential solutions of Archer and Giddens would have led to 
viewing the de facto state as a static entity, the relationalist view allowed for an understanding 
of the KRG as a set of relations, instead – a configuration of ties, indeed. KRG’s constitutive as 
well as secondary properties were in a constant state of flux, continuously redefined through 
                                                        
497 Jackson and Nexon 1999, 320. Failing to deliver this spatio-temporal nature of strategic action and strategically 
selective context, Archer thus claimed to be offering a solution to the agent-structure problem, when she indeed 
was not. 
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its relations. It was only through the relationalist model that I could have revealed this view 
explicitly. The region’s foreign policy decisions did not indicate merely the contingently, yet 
path-dependently, unfolding external relations of the KRG, but also the contingently and 
path-dependently unfolding and transforming nature of their agency. This was a 
fundamental point that I wanted to highlight specifically in the concluding remarks. The 
empirical analysis demonstrated how KRG’s fluctuating position in relation to its context did 
not only determine its powers498 but also the oscillating nature of its identity and interests.  
 
The contingently unfolding nature of KRG’s agency through its relations, in turn, implied that 
its foreign policy decisions could not be reduced to an assumed set of ‘inherent properties’ the 
entity supposedly possessed at given times. De facto states did not have intrinsic attributes that 
somehow differentiated them from sovereign states and, as such, lead to their foreign policies 
being different on the basis of these ‘inherent’ properties. What set them and their foreign 
policies apart from sovereign states was the pursuit of statehood. Pursuit of statehood, in turn, 
was an element (and a consequence) of relations, not a fixed inherent property of an entity. 499  
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that quest of statehood set de facto states apart from their 
sovereign counterparts, it could not explain KRG’s foreign policy outcomes alone;500 pursuit of 
statehood was only one element (the policy paradigm) of the dialectic, tightly interlinked with 
the other two: strategies and context. Foreign policy – or any social phenomena produced by 
contingent necessity for that matter – could be explained only with the presence of all three, 
never to be reduced to any single one of them. As we saw in Chapter 7, it was the continuous 
alteration of specific intersections of the paradigm of sovereignty with strategies and 
selectivities that explained the process and, as such, the changes that had occurred in between 
2003 and 2014. We could, thus, argue that, KRG’s lack of independency may have set their 
foreign policies apart from sovereign states to the extent that they filtered reality (perhaps 
                                                        
498 With regard to power – as a secondary attribute of ”entities”, I followed the relationalist approach and argued 
that power relations were determined by the specific positioning of actors in relation to other players and their 
context. As such power did not determine outcomes. It was instead, itself determined by outcomes; a fundamental 
point of difference between relationalist and substantialist approaches – such as realism, which treats power as 
an independent variable.   
499 Ashley 1984, 273–274. In fact, sovereignty is in a constant state of flux, itself also redefined through relations. 
As Richard Ashley has aptly argued: sovereignty is “[…] a practical category whose empirical contents are not fixed 
but evolve”. 
500 See for instance 7.1.2. ”Sovereign Statehood as a Hypothetical Cognitive Template”, where I have argued that 
pursuit of sovereignty is only one element in the dialectic incapable of explaining foreign policy development 
alone. 
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primarily) through the lack of sovereignty, but it would have been highly misleading to claim 
that the region foreign policy development single-handedly depended on their quest for 
sovereignty.  
 
To conclude, I want to once again assert, that it was only via the strategic-relational approach 
that I could point out that none of the three elements of the dialectic per se were responsible 
for KRG’s foreign policy development. As we saw throughout the empirical analysis, the pursuit 
of statehood per se could not alone explain any of the outcomes at any point of the continuing 
process. Similar was the case with contextual elements; the overthrow of the Baathist regime, 
discovery of oil or Turkey’s growing interest in KRG could not be claimed to have single-
handedly caused any of the decisions that KRG ended up making. Most importantly, this inquiry 
demonstrated the ability of the SRA to capture how “entities’” like de facto states’ identities, 
preferences and interests (or in other words their ‘essence’) were in a constant state of 
transformation. Their foreign policy actions, in turn, were formulated on the basis of these 
continuously changing preferences and interests. This is exactly what Caspersen, Stansfield and 
Bartmann posited with their constructivist assumptions.501 The SRA’s strategic action oriented 
towards a strategically selective context, in turn, succeeded in demonstrating this relationalist 
assumption inherent in de facto state theorization: it was through the unfolding of relations 
that the essence of anomalous entities became constantly redefined and transformed.  
 
I want to end this inquiry with Bob Jessop: social facts – be they sovereign states or de facto 
states – are projects in the making, always organic, never finished, constantly redefined through 
their relations. The Kurdish de facto state is a project in the making, always organic, never 
finished, constantly redefined through its relations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
501 As such, the constructivist theorization of the de facto state is, indeed, based on a relationalist view of reality.
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